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Conventional memory technology scaling has introduced reliability challenges due to
dysfunctional, improperly formed cells and crosstalk from increased cell proximity. Further-
more, as the manufacturing effort becomes increasingly complex due to these deeply scaled
technologies, holistic sustainability is negatively impacted. The development of new mem-
ory technologies can help overcome the capacitor scaling limitations of DRAM. However,
these technologies have their own reliability concerns, such as limited write endurance in the
case of Phase Change Memories (PCM). Moreover, emerging system requirements, such as
in-memory encryption to protect sensitive or private data and operation in harsh environ-
ments create additional challenges that must be addressed in the context of reliability and
sustainability. This dissertation provides new multifactor and ultimately unified solutions
to address many of these concerns in the same system.
In particular, my contributions toward mitigating these issues are as follows. I present
GreenChip and GreenAsic, which together provide the first tools to holistically evaluate
new computer architecture, chip, and memory design concepts for sustainability. These
tools provide detailed estimates of manufacturing and operational-phase metrics for different
computing workloads and deployment scenarios. Using GreenChip, I examined existing
DRAM reliability techniques in the context of their holistic sustainability impact, including
my own technique to mitigate bitline crosstalk. For PCM, I provided a new reliability
technique with no additional storage overhead that substantially increases the lifetime of an
encrypted memory system. To provide bit-level error correction, I developed compact linked-
list and Bloom-filter-based bit-level fault map structures, that provide unprecedented levels
of error tabulation, combined with my own novel error correction and lifetime extension
approaches based on these maps for less area than traditional ECC. In particular, FaME,
can correct N faults using N bits when utilizing a bit-level fault map. For operation in
iii
harsh environments, I created a triple modular redundancy (TMR) pointer-based fault map,
HOTH, which specifically protects cells shown to be weak to radiation. Finally, to combine
the analyses of holistic sustainability and memory lifetime, I created the LARS technique,
which adjusts the GreenChip indifference analysis to account for the additional sustainability
benefit provided by increased reliability and lifetime.
iv
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1.0 Introduction
Technology scaling has introduced many challenges in reliability and sustainability. To
solve these problems, I have developed holistic sustainability tools for deeply scaled tech-
nologies, compact bit-level fault maps, and efficient encoding solutions which either require
no overhead or utilize the bit-level fault maps for unprecedented levels of error prevention.
1.1 Contributions
1.1.1 PART I: Holistic Sustainability Solutions
As process technologies continue to shrink, manufacturing energy has become a signifi-
cant contributor to system energy consumption [1, 2]. However, most existing energy frame-
works ignore this contribution of manufacturing, instead focusing on the use-phase costs.
My solutions GreenChip and GreenASIC provide architectural and circuit-level design tools,
respectively, to include this manufacturing impact in holistic energy analysis. LARS extends
these analyses to also include replacement costs from memories and devices which wear-out
over time, such as Phase Change Memories (PCM).
1.1.1.1 GreenChip GreenChip [4, 5] is the first predictive manufacturing and use phase
environmental impact estimation flow based on targeted technology node and computer
architecture design choices such as number of processor cores, cache and main memory sizes
and architectures, and solid state disks. GreenChip can provide detailed analysis of these
choices with an end goal of supplying consumers with more holistic environmental data
akin to fuel efficiency reports for cars. We demonstrate this idea by using GreenChip to
compare the impact of different computer architecture choices. We classify the workloads
based on memory access requirements as one example of how the data can be aggregated.
Our comparisons are made with indifference point [6] and break even analyses.
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Indifference point analysis is a common economic metric to determine the point at which
there is no difference in cost between two alternatives. For environmental analysis, we
define the indifference point as the time when the energy to manufacture and operate two
competing system architectures is equivalent. The indifference point can be compared to
typical or projected product lifetimes to determine whether a change in manufacturing cost,
either across technology generations or due to changes in system architecture, is justified.
The break even time indicates the point when a new system will reach the same energy
consumption of the system it will replace. This comparison assumes the manufacturing cost
has already been invested for the original system. Thus, it identifies the upgrade time, when
the energy for the new system will be less than leaving the original system in service.
1.1.1.2 GreenASIC GreenASIC [7, 8] is a circuit and CAD-level tool flow for holistic
sustainability analysis. For GreenASIC, we developed a parameterized model for determining
environmental impacts of process-level changes for technologies between 130nm and 32nm.
As an example of using the parameterized model we demonstrate the environmental cost
savings for changing the number of metal layers in the stack at these technology nodes.
Then, using a variety of benchmark circuits, we demonstrated the change in area and use-
phase energy for different metal stacks and provide a holistic environmental evaluation of
their change in sustainability.
Our results indicate changing metal layers from eight to six can, with area tightly con-
strained, result in manufacturing energy savings of 9.5%, 13.8%, and 13.0%, on average, for
130nm, 90nm, and 65nm nodes. Moreover, while eight layer metal can have a lower opera-
tional energy than six layer metal, we show that this savings can often take years, or in some
cases may never overcome the additional manufacturing impacts from the more complicated
process.
1.1.1.3 LARS LARS is a new cradle-to-grave energy evaluation framework that con-
siders system lifetime. As carbon emissions increase, it is increasingly important to have a
holistic understanding of how computing systems consume energy. However, tools such as
GreenChip do not consider lifetime due to reliability in their analysis. We propose the Life-
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time Amortized Replacement for Servers (LARS) indifference analysis approach to conduct
sustainability evaluation of systems. LARS considers the impact of reliability techniques via
replacement cycles for servers, along with embodied and operational energy. Using LARS
in concert with GreenChip, we conduct a holistic life-cycle-based energy analysis of the
manufacture and operation of PCM with AES-XTS across its lifetime. Using LARS, we can
provide a holistic analysis of reliability solutions such as MACE and WINDU, demonstrating
how the 15% mean reduction in dynamic energy and lifetime improvements inform system
design and memory selection.
1.1.2 PART II: Bit-level Fault Maps
The scaling of process technologies has also significantly impacted the frequency of faulty
cells due to process variation. For many types of faults, process variation results in the
existence of weak cells, cells which have an abnormally large probability to exhibit the failure
mode in question. This ranges from vulnerability to crosstalk, to abnormally fast wear-out,
to weakness to neutron radiation. In order to enable highly-effective bit-level correction
schemes, I have developed compact bit-level fault maps which provide a dense representation
of these weak cells in the memory system.
1.1.2.1 SFaultMap SFaultMap [9] is a sustainable bit-level fault map (SFaultMap) for
use in memories with potential faults caused by process variation. A goal of SFaultMap is
to reduce holistic energy, including embodied energy. As embodied energy is rising along
with technology scaling, SFaultMap’s design makes apparently unconventional tradeoffs to
address holistic energy. We explore tradeoffs in adjusting SFaultMap’s search strategy and
size in order to make the most sustainable choice.
In DRAM, SFaultMap can be used to identify cells susceptible to crosstalk (i.e., “weak”
cells), and cells with low retention time. It may also be used to identify permanently faulty
cells in DRAM, such as manufacturing defects from improper cell orientations or cells with
unconnected bit or wordlines. Moreover, it can be used to identify cells that have failed
during active use such as endurance stuck-at faults from PCM. We compare SFaultMap to
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error correction pointers (ECP) that essentially store a version of the fault map distributed
across the rows of the memory [10], as well as ArchShield [11]. Further, we demonstrate
through indifference analysis the points at which different error mitigation strategies are the
most sustainable for holistic energy consumption. Finally, SFaultMap is a low-area bit-level
fault map for a low embodied energy solution to reliability in emerging technology nodes,
which demonstrates significant benefits in holistic sustainability when compared to existing
solutions such as ECP and Archshield.
1.1.2.2 FLOWER FLOWER (Fine-grained, Low Overhead Weak- and Error-prone-cell
Registry) is a space and energy efficient bit-level fault map to enable fault tolerance in the
presence of high fault incidence rates (i.e., ≥10−4). FLOWER leverages Bloom filters for its
implementation to ensure that it is both space efficient and has a low access latency. While
FLOWER can report a small number of “phantom faults” or false positives due to overlapping
of the hashing functions, FLOWER is guaranteed to report all “true faults.” We demonstrate
that the number of false positives are easily minimized through effective multiple dimension
hashing while maintaining the same storage overhead. Further, leveraging processing-in-
memory techniques, we demonstrate how FLOWER can efficiently construct fault vectors in
DRAM and emerging non-volatile memories such as PCM from the multi-dimensional fault
map.
Additionally, FLOWER supports dynamic updates and scales efficiently at higher fault
rates expected in current and future deeply scaled technology. FLOWER uses minimum-
cumulative intersection, a tuned hashing technique we developed, which has lower collisions
for moderately dense data than traditional (e.g., disk-level hashing) techniques along with
better performance. FLOWER can use processing-in-memory to construct fault vectors
from multiple dimensions to minimize memory traffic, and uses novel PETAL bits for error
correction of in-memory operations.
1.1.2.3 HOTH Before beginning HOTH, I examined the hypothesis that single event
effects from neutron radiation are heavily biased to a small number of cells which, while not
permanently failed, experience a higher incidence of soft faults. In particular, evidence from
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experiments conducted at Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) demonstrates
that a small number of these weak cells are responsible for a high proportion of SEEs in
DRAM. Moreover, these SEEs experienced can be classified into three groupings, multi-bit
latchup, single cell upset to a weak cell (predictable), and single cell upset to a random cell
(unpredictable).
Based on this classification, we propose a fault correction approach based on HOTH,
or Hashed Omniposition-correction-pointers with TMR for Harsh-environments. HOTH
combines a fault map that stores pointers to fault locations with spare bits to mitigate
predictable faults. When combined with Chipkill ECC, we demonstrate that fault tolerance
can be dramatically improved to be competitive with dedicated radiation tolerant solutions
while leveraging the density, performance, and energy of commercial, off the shelf (COTS)
DRAM.
Our experiments show that COTS DRAM is highly prone to SEEs and these SEEs are
highly predictable. In contrast, FPGA BlockRAMs (SRAMs) experience few unpredictable
SEE faults, and Intel Optane experience no faults. Furthermore, we demonstrate that HOTH
provides seven or more orders of magnitude additional fault tolerance in terms of
uncorrectable bit error rate (UBER) to SEEs compared to traditional fault tolerance alone.
1.1.3 PART III: Encoding Solutions for Mitigating Memory Faults
With low-area bit-level fault maps made available by work in my previous section, ex-
tremely compact and thorough correction can be created. In these chapters of my disser-
tation, I discuss my low-overhead encoding methodologies for avoiding faults for different
memory vulnerabilities. This includes PFE, primarily for bitline crosstalk, counter advance
for worn-out cells in encrypted PCM, and FaME, for a variety of permanent failures or weak
cells.
1.1.3.1 PFE: Periodic Flip Encoding Periodic Flip Encoding (PFE) [12] avoids bad
patterns that lead to crosstalk. This technique reduces bitline crosstalk while not harming
the protection against wordline crosstalk. PFE first partitions the data into groups and then
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flips the same bit position of each group. For groups of three bits, this approach provides
four different code words for a block, and only two auxiliary bits are needed to specify the
code word used. In the absence of information about weak cells, PFE is fault-oblivious and
selects a code word that decreases the number of bad patterns. However, when the locations
of the weak cells are known, PFE may also be employed in a fault-aware fashion by selecting
a code word that may have a bad pattern, as long as the center of the bad pattern does not
overlap with a weak cell.
PFE is the first work that uses coding-based techniques to mitigate bitline crosstalk
in DRAM cells by reducing the number of bit patterns vulnerable to crosstalk. PFE is
available with fault-oblivious and fault-aware (which requires a bit-level fault map) periodic
flip encodings that increase the encoding space in return for crosstalk fault mitigation. We
provide a characterization of the fault mitigation of PFE and conduct an extensive study to
illustrate the tradeoffs between reliability, cost, performance, and power.
1.1.3.2 Counter Advance Counter advance [13] is a technique which leverages the
existing encryption hardware to improve reliability in PCM with dedicated counter-based
encryption. Counter advance utilizes several observations: First, for stuck-at PCM cells,
depending on the value to be written and the state of each faulty cell, the data can either be
stuck-at the right value (stuck-at right, SA-R) or the wrong value (stuck-at wrong, SA-W).
Second, a new encryption of the same data item can be generated by running the encryption
with the next counter value. Third, for each new encrypted candidate for storage, there is
a 50% chance for each faulty cell that the data will be SA-R. Thus, by exploring multiple
counter values, a value that eliminates (or minimizes) SA-W values may be obtained. In
this case, even for a row with some faulty cells due to endurance, the system may continue
to operate, extending the useful lifetime of the memory. Assuming a 27- to 32-bit counter,
108 to 109 writes per row, which meets or exceeds the projected PCM cell endurance, can be
achieved for a single key. If multiple encryptions are used only to tolerate faults, then the
average counter advances per write will be << 2.
Counter advance improves the reliability and lifetime of PCM storage subject to en-
durance faults. As part of this contribution, we demonstrate an architecture to apply counter
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advance in the context of the leading method to reduce energy for counter encrypted PCM,
and show the combined capability of counter-advance with ECC and ECP protection to
improve reliability and minimize storage overheads.
1.1.3.3 FaME FaME (Fault Map Enabled error correction) is a new fault tolerance
technique enabled by our bit-level fault maps. FaME distributes spare storage cells as small
numbers of auxiliary bits for each memory row. For each memory access, FLOWER reports
the location of the faulty cells in that row and the FaME spare storage cells are used in
place of those bit locations. This avoids the need to maintain pointers to the fault locations
within the row, as is the case for ECP. FaME also naturally protects auxiliary bit failures by
including the auxiliary bits in the fault map and sparing faulty auxiliary bits. In contrast,
ECP requires two pointers to correct one failure in the auxiliary bits. For the space of an
single ECP pointer and replacement cell, FaME can correct as many as 10 faults. FaME can
dramatically reduce storage overheads while maintaining high fault tolerance for high fault
rates.
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2.0 Background
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first covers the first major topic of my
dissertation, memory reliability. Similarly, the second section covers holistic sustainability,
the second major topic of the dissertation. The third section covers background necessary
for one or several of my contributions, but not all or most of my contributions.
2.1 Memory Reliability
2.1.1 DRAM
Certain DRAM cells, referred to as victim cells, experience wordline crosstalk faults
when their stored charge is drained prematurely due to the repeated charging of adjacent
wordlines without the victim cells being refreshed [14]. Studies have demonstrated that as
few as 30,000 accesses to adjacent rows without refreshing can manifest in an incorrectly
stored data bit [14]. “Row hammering” exploits this form of crosstalk through intentionally
repeated opening and closing of a row with the goal to create changes in neighboring rows
to gain access to protected memory locations or to cause the system to crash [15]. Proposed
solutions include ECC, per-row and groups of counters [16], probabilistic refreshing [14],
reducing the refresh interval, and runtime testing which identifies and avoids weak (prone
to crosstalk) DRAM cells with use of a word-level fault map [11].
Similar to wordline crosstalk, bitline crosstalk occurs when certain susceptible cells are
especially vulnerable to this form of crosstalk [17]. Bitline crosstalk is manifested by fluctu-
ations in the read bit values originating from the voltage levels of bitlines connected to the
same sense amplifiers [18]. Within an individual row, bitline crosstalk can be observed in
cases where bits surrounding a weak cell, and the weak cell itself, share the same charge [17].
This can result in the weak cell flipping, resulting in an incorrect data bit [19]. Until recently,
circuit-level techniques [20, 21] have all but eliminated bitline crosstalk. However, these ap-
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proaches exacerbate wordline crosstalk. The combination of increased wordline crosstalk and
restrictions in the design kit, such as 1-D routing, have resulted in DRAM manufacturers
returning to the open bitline structures where bitline crosstalk is present [22, 23]. Bitline
crosstalk is sufficiently present in scaled DRAM that it has been used to determine the
locations of physically neighboring cells in DRAM products [17].
Weak cells can also manifest with reduced retention time that can lead to faults without
crosstalk, if not suitably refreshed. This hampers power savings efforts by reducing refresh
intervals [24, 25] or by requiring additional error correction [26, 27, 28]. While significant
work has been completed with the intention of solving all three of these problems, many
of the correction schemes developed for one type of fault either directly exacerbate another
problem (bitline twisting, increased refresh time) or come at the cost of significant area
overhead for error correction (e.g., multi-bit ECC). Further, it has been shown that cells with
reduced retention capability are not related to the wordline crosstalk victim cells despite the
functional similarities[14], increasing the difficulty of managing all three types of faults.
2.1.2 PCM
PCM has been proposed as a potential replacement of DRAM for main memory to gain
storage density and save static power. It has recently gained commercial traction in 3D
Xpoint (Optane) memory [29]. Other than the challenge of higher write energy, the primary
concern with PCM utilization is the limited write endurance (circa 108 writes) before cells
become permanently “stuck-at” a particular value. While these cells can be read, they can
no longer transition from their current amorphous or crystalline phase [30].
Additionally, early failures of weak cells due to process variation will severely limit the
useful lifetime of PCM. By extending the fault-tolerance capability from 10−4 to 10−2 using
techniques I have developed throughout this dissertation, the lifetime can be increased by
more than 100% for a coefficient of variation of 0.2. This improvement grows to 3.8× and
16.4× as CoV grows to 0.25 and 0.3, respectively [13].
PCM is also vulnerable to write disturbance due to crosstalk. Due to the high disparity of
energy during writing from the fundamental asymmetry of the phase-change process, writing
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certain patterns such as “00” in combination with a weak cell can be incorrectly stored as
“10” or “01” [31]. In all of these cases, knowledge of the location of weak cells is critical to
appropriate fault tolerance.
2.1.3 Existing Fault Maps
ECP [10] is essentially a fault-map combined with spare bits distributed through row-
level auxiliary bits. For stuck-at faults at low error rates, ECP is more efficient than ECC but
sacrifices protection of transient faults. ECP has also been adapted for DRAM [32, 28]. Each
N -bit memory row contains pointers of log(N) bits along with a bit to store the correct value
at that pointer location. While ECP is effectively a bit-level fault map, it is expensive in
terms of area, and scales linearly with the number of expected faults per row. ArchShield [11]
is a word-level fault map combined with sparing proposed for DRAM. In its design, each row
contains two bits to set whether the row has zero, one, or multiple faulty words in a row.
A combination of error correction (when possible) and replication is used to maintain fault
tolerance. Rows with multiple faults must access the redundant copy of the faulty words
on every access, while rows with single faults only need to access the redundant copy if the
ECC protection in the original stored location fails. ArchShield operates on incident fault
rates between 10−6 and 10−4, and within this range is space efficient and typically results in
a performance degradation of less than 2%. As error rates scale beyond 10−4, the required
overhead scales super-linearly, and as a result ArchShield is not viable in that operating
range.
2.2 Holistic Sustainability
The considerable attention and focus to use phase energy consumption in modern com-
puting systems is a natural extension of research that aims to address thermal concerns
caused by increases in power density associated with semiconductor technology scaling.
These use phase energy reduction measures can help maximize battery life for mobile elec-
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tronics and minimize operational energy costs of data centers. To achieve holistic sustain-
ability requires considering the entire computing life-cycle, for which a science called Life
Cycle Assessment (LCA) is commonly used. In this section we briefly introduce LCA and
discuss previous work in LCAs on computing equipment and in particular their ICs.
LCA allows an engineer to quantitatively evaluate how processes and products use mate-
rials, water, and energy resources and the resulting environmental impacts throughout their
lifetimes. Established guidelines for performing detailed LCAs are documented by the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, Society for Environmental Toxicologists and Chemists, the
International Organization of Standardization (ISO), and the American National Standards
Institute [33, 34]. As defined by the ISO 14040 series, LCA is an iterative four-stage pro-
cess including: 1) Scoping —- defines the extent of analysis and the system boundaries; 2)
Inventory Analysis —- documents material and energy flows that occur within the system
boundaries (life cycle inventory or LCI); 3) Impact Assessment —- characterizes and assesses
the environmental impacts using data obtained from the LCI (life cycle impact assessment
or LCIA); and 4) Interpretation and Improvement —- identifies opportunities to reduce the
environmental burden throughout the product’s life cycle.
There are three main LCA strategies: Process LCA, Economic Input/Output (EIO)
LCA, and Hybrid LCA. Process LCA evaluates all steps involved in each stage of the LCA
and directly evaluates their impacts as well as impacts from upstream elements such as the
fundamental components used in the process. EIO LCA works from the principle that en-
vironmental impacts typically correlate with the financial cost of the process, and therefore
uses the cost of a product to estimate its environmental impacts. Hybrid LCA uses a mixture
of both Process and EIO LCA. Several life-cycle tools and databases have been developed
such as the NREL LCI database [35] and the LCIA Tool for the Reduction and Analysis
of Chemical and other environmental impacts (TRACI) for distinguishing carcinogenic im-
pacts [36]. In the next section we present some relevant research on LCA as it applies to
computing systems.
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2.2.1 LCA of Computing Systems
In Figure 1, we present the carbon emissions from the life-cycles of various Apple prod-
ucts [1], demonstrating that the dominant phases are production (manufacturing) and use.
Contrary to expectation, use phase impacts do not dominate; for tablets [Figure 1(a)], man-
ufacturing can reach as much as 90% of the overall carbon footprint. Additionally, while the
use phase impact decreases across product generations, the manufacturing impact has con-
tinued to rise. For instance, comparing the iPhone 5s and 6s, the use phase impacts remain
constant, but the manufacturing impact increases by more than 25%. A similar situation
can be observed with the iPad Mini and Mini 4, which have nearly identical carbon impacts,
but the use phase savings are entirely offset by the manufacturing increase. Looking at
computing systems from laptops to workstations [Figure 1(b)], we see a similar trend where
manufacturing impacts are at least half, and in many cases far more than half, of the total
carbon footprint.
Recent life-cycle studies [37, 38, 39, 40] have pinpointed ICs 1 and displays as hav-
ing the dominant manufacturing environmental impacts of computing systems. As the use
phase energy and resulting environmental impacts continue to decrease, there is mounting
evidence that the environmental trends for IC manufacturing are becoming increasingly en-
vironmentally unfriendly. Considering the two desktop machines from Figure 1(b) without
an integrated display, the Mac Pro and Mac Mini gain 67% and 90% of their impacts from
manufacturing of non-display components, respectively. In these cases, the IC components
become the dominating contributors due to solid state drives (SSDs) and large amounts of
memory in addition to the processor and supporting circuitry. We explore IC manufacturing
trends further in the next section.
2.2.2 Impacts from IC Fabrication
A hybrid LCA of IC manufacturing over a 15 year period ranging from 350nm to 45nm [2]
reveals problematic environmental trends. Environmental impacts from fabrication per area
1 ICs are grouped with printed circuit board manufacturing [39] but shown to be negligible compared to
ICs [38].
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(Figure 2) reached a minimum point at 130nm. Unfortunately, as technology descended
below 90nm, the “environmental impacts per die area” increased with feature size. While
these trends could be mitigated if IC die area per system decreased with the descent in feature
size and resulting increase in device/transistor density, the opposite trend has been observed.
Newer systems tend to have more IC area (for example, area increased from 750 to 1200 mm2
between 2001 and 2010) due to trends to include more processor cores, embedded memory,
accelerators such as graphics processing units, and solid state storage [39]. Moreover, trends
such as “dark silicon,” where many infrequently used hardware blocks and accelerators are
included for use in improving energy efficiency and performance of relatively infrequent niche
functions, also work against manufacturing sustainability.
Using the parameterized fabrication estimation method for ICs from Murphy et al. [3]
combined with the Apple LCA data, it was possible to extend the chart in Figure 2 from 45nm
to 28nm. We examined the manufacturing cost of several apple tablet products over different
generations implemented with processors fabricated at 45nm and 28nm. Using the reported
breakdown of IC contributions [40] and the overall manufacturing effort at each node, the
trend indicates a dramatic increase in manufacturing effort, supported by a transition in
CMOS manufacturing from planar bulk CMOS to silicon-on-insulator at 36nm [41] (between
45nm and 28nm). This resulted in a significant savings in use phase energy [42] but seems to
dramatically increase manufacturing effort. There is additional indication that lithography
effort, currently the dominant component of manufacturing costs [43], may have seen a sharp
increase.
Standard immersion lithography (193nm ArF source with immersion) provides a pitch
size limited to approximately 60nm. 2X CMOS nodes (28nm and lower2) require some
form of double patterning [43], which, depending on technique, can increase the number
of lithography steps and resulting environmental impacts dramatically. The resulting data
indicates a 5X increase in energy and GWP [1], which is consistent with this trend. Moreover,
this trend appears to be poised to accelerate aggressively as nodes at 10nm and lower appear
to require multiple patterning lithography. This is due to extreme ultraviolet lithography’s
222nm is confirmed to require double patterning while 32nm only requires single patterning [43]. 28nm
is assumed to require double patterning based on the increase in IC manufacturing impacts reported by
Apple [1] which is a feasible changeover point for a 193+i lithography pitch limit of 60nm.
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earliest availability being predicted for the 7nm node [43] and is consistent with economic
cost improvements of Dennard scaling breaking down at these nodes [44]. With current
technology utilizing power-optimized hardware, production often exceeds 75% and reaches
90% of the total life-cycle cost for a 4-year service time (see Figure 1) [1]. This fact, along
with the aforementioned trends, points to a need to examine the holistic environmental cost.
2.2.3 Holistic Sustainability Related Work
There have been several LCA studies of ICs [40, 45, 38, 37, 2, 46] and full computing
systems [39, 47, 48]. The studies examining IC manufacturing typically evaluate the fabri-
cation process generally for different technology nodes [2, 3]. Other studies examine study
particular computing products for their environmental impacts [1]. Other studies consider
case studies of particular products to draw general conclusions about different classes of com-
puting products [45, 49]. Finally, many existing LCA tools provide the ability to provide
estimates for semiconductor environmental impacts such as GaBi and SemaPro. Unfortu-
nately, these LCA tools are designed to examine the materials used in the final product
to estimate impacts, which can often be misleading for semiconductors in which materials
may be applied and entirely removed to create smaller feature sizes, a common practice in
multiple patterning lithography.
The LCA results from many studies have identified use phase and manufacturing phase
impacts as the dominant contributors to energy and carbon emissions for computing sys-
tems [2, 38]. This is demonstrated in Figure 1, where phases like transportation and recycling
are very low compared to the manufacturing and use phases of the system life cycles [1]. Our
tool, GreenChip, focuses on these two dominant phases to provide a representative view of
the system.
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2.3 Miscellaneous
2.3.1 Memory Encryption
Counter-mode encryption [50] to secure main memory, depicted in Figure 3, was originally
proposed for DRAM [51] by adding a cipher into the memory controller and adding counter
storage for each memory row. Using a private key, a unique counter value, and the row
address, the cipher generates a one-time pad (OTP). The OTP is XORed with the data
to create an encrypted ciphertext. Decryption functions in the reverse, reading the data
ciphertext and the counter in plaintext from the memory row to recreate the OTP and
reverse the encryption process.
Unfortunately, encryption has the side effect of disrupting data locality, as for each
plaintext value written, a unique OTP is generated containing a random set of 0’s and 1’s.
Because the OTP changes for each write and the OTP is XOR’d with the plaintext, small
or large changes in the plaintext results in similarly random ciphertext. This unpredictable
output for each OTP is what gives the encryption its strength. When applied to a memory
technology like PCM, standard energy saving techniques such as encoding and differential
write are defeated and the increase in bit changes can lead to early cell wear-out.
SECRET or Smartly EnCRypted Energy EfficienT non-volatile memories [52] addresses
these challenges by allocating a dedicated “epoch sub-counter” for blocks within the row.
Thus, row writes must only encrypt dirty blocks. The sub-counter maintains independent
count values for each block within an epoch. When a sub-counter saturates, the epoch ends,
the main counter is advanced, all sub-counters are reset, and the entire row is encrypted
and written with the new count value. SECRET addresses reliability by allocating ECP
pointers [10] per row to tolerate faults.
2.3.2 Bloom Filters
Bloom filters [53] improve space and time efficiency of checking set membership. Their
application includes commercial search engines [54], DNA sequencing [55], and fast packet
classification [56]. Bloom filters typically appear in the form of a bit array with a hash
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function, where an item hashed to the corresponding bit in the array was set to ‘1.’ Multi-
dimensional Bloom filters use multiple hashes where each hash location in the array is set
to ‘1.’ On checking set membership, the bit corresponding to each hash function is accessed,
and the item is only considered a member if each of those hashed values return ‘1.’ Because
Bloom filters reduce the amount of stored information, there is a chance to categorize a
non-set member as a member of the desired set. While this situation, referred to as a false
positive, may occur, the opposite case, where a member of the set is incorrectly classified
as not being in the set (or a false negative), cannot occur. Another side effect is that while
Bloom filter construction (adding set members) is simple, items cannot be removed from the
set without outside knowledge.
Many Bloom filter modifications have been developed to suit particular applications. A
selection of these many variants include the blocked Bloom filter [57] (optimized to fit into
cache lines) , the counting Bloom filter [58] (allows deletion by decrementing count value),
the stable bloom filter [59] (optimized for streaming applications), the quotient bloom filter
[60] (stores additional meta data for deletion), and the cuckoo bloom filter [61] (improved
version of quotient filter). In addition to adjustments to the structure of the Bloom filter,
many studies and enhancements have been performed on the hashing algorithms used in
Bloom filters. The goal of a Bloom filter hash algorithm is to produce independent random
variables when hashing the value in a multidimensional Bloom filter. This minimizes the risk
to hash into the same bin and ultimately minimizes the occurrence of false positives. While
traditional cryptographic hash functions such as SHA-2 work well for this purpose, faster non-
cryptographic hash functions which approximate k-independence are often sufficient, such
as Pearson’s hash [62] and MurmurHash [63] , the latter of which is used in Hadoop [64].
Similar to our utilization of Bloom filters for memory error correction, CiDRA [32] uti-
lized Bloom filters to create a cache to detect if an address contains any faulty cells. In this
way, the additional error correction procedures or redundant information retrieval only has
to occur for the select few addresses which have faults or are false positives. While both
CiDRA and this work utilize Bloom filters, CiDRA uses them for caching memory elements
(e.g., cache lines or memory rows) which have errors. CiDRA runs into similar problems
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to solutions like ArchShield for high fault rates as CiDRA will report nearly all memory
elements are faulty. This is exacerbated by the false positives reported by the Bloom filter.
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Figure 1: Impact of manufacturing/production from ICs in “use phase energy” optimized
systems.
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3.0 GreenChip
3.1 The GreenChip Sustainable Computing Prediction and Evaluation Tool
To evaluate and compare the manufacturing and use phases of new computer architec-
tures and systems we have created the GreenChip flow shown in Figure 4. GreenChip can
be used for the processor in isolation [Figure 4(a)], combined with the main memory system
[Figure 4(b)], and even extended to consider secondary storage in the form of SSDs [Fig-
ure 4(c)]. GreenChip first simulates the behavior of a mixture of workloads on a proposed
architecture to generate performance statistics. The simulator output, architecture specifica-
tion, and technology node are then fed into a use phase power estimation flow. To accomplish
this, existing tools are available and may be leveraged. GreenChip is currently built from
the Sniper full system simulator [65] and the McPAT use phase power estimation flow [42].
A more detailed, cycle-level simulator such as gem5 [66] can easily be used with GreenChip.
However, this level of detail may not be required for this type of analysis. Furthermore, the
simulation time required for cycle level processor simulation makes it difficult to use large
workloads that stress the main memory and disk in a reasonable amount of simulation time.
GreenChip extends this flow with a manufacturing environmental cost estimator1 that
uses a combination of the technology node impacts per area and the predicted area of the
IC or ICs. For example, in the processor evaluation [Figure 4(a)], area estimates for the
processor for a particular technology node can be obtained from McPAT [42] and CACTI [67]
and combined with the manufacturing cost per area of CMOS logic (Figure 2) to determine
overall manufacturing cost.
DRAM manufacturing cost is computed in a similar way to the processor cost using the
DRAM technology trend [2]. DRAM tends to mirror the CMOS trends with an increasing
cost per area starting after 70nm. Total cost is determined based on the die area, itself a
function of the capacity per DRAM IC, combined with the cost per area. DRAM tends to
1When discussing manufacturing cost, effort or impact, we are referring to environmental impact/cost,
not economic cost, unless specified.
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trail CMOS by one technology node, so generally systems comparisons would consider the
year a system was built rather than identical feature sizes (e.g., a 45nm processor would have
a 57nm main memory system). Manufacturing cost can also be determined for Flash ICs
used in SSDs, although the data is typically reported per capacity rather than die area [2],
and is incorporated into GreenChip [Fig 4(c)] in the same fashion.
To determine the overall energy cost of a system during its lifetime, a usage scenario
must be considered consisting of the time the system is awake versus asleep (sleep ratio),
when awake, how much it is active versus idle (activity ratio), and the time period it will be
in service. We determine this number from the average power of the usage scenario shown
in Eq. 3.1
P = (1− rS)(rA(PD + PS) + (1− rA)PS) + PL (3.1)
where PD, PS, and PL are dynamic, static, and sleep power, respectively, during workload
execution, rS is sleep ratio, and rA is the activity ratio of time spent executing the specified
workload. Thus, the time tW for the processor to be doing useful work is tW = t(1− rS)rA
where t is the service time. The overall energy cost is computed by E = P · t+M where M
is the manufacturing cost described previously.
In addition to reporting raw environmental impact outputs for a particular system
design, GreenChip also provides direct comparisons of two design choices. Using indif-
ference analysis, the choice of system can be evaluated based on the expected service
time. The indifference formula tI of comparing two architectures, System0 vs. System1,
is shown in Eq. 6.1. tI is the time at which the increase in manufacturing cost will be
outweighed by the savings in use phase cost. If the proposed service time t < tI the ar-
chitecture with the lower manufacturing cost minimizes environmental impact and for a
proposed service time t > tI the architecture with the lower use phase cost minimizes
impact. If one system is lower in both costs, tI is either < 0 or = ∞, making it in-
valid and pointing toward the selection of the lower cost system regardless of service time.
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tI =
M1 −M0
P0 − P1 tB =
M1
P0 − P1 (3.2)
The break even time tB is also defined in Eq. 6.1. tB represents, given an existing system
(system0), what service time for a new system (system1) would be required to offset the
upfront manufacturing cost to save overall energy. This is relevant to answer the “upgrade”
question. For both of these comparisons, GreenChip automatically adjusts the selected
usage scenario to account for the change in performance due to a different architecture
configuration. Using the workload, the IPC of both proposed systems is determined. With
system0 as a baseline, the activity ratio of system1 is adjusted by replacing rA with r′A =
rA( IPC0IPC1 ) in Eq. 3.1
2.
Additionally, GreenChip is able to report various gas and byproduct emissions including
carbon emissions and carcinogens from manufacturing and use phase energies for the U.S.,
China, and for a worldwide average using data from the literature [2] and electricity gener-
ation mix data [68]. For the remainder of this paper we focus on case study comparisons
of energy from manufacturing and use phases of common architecture configurations at dif-
ferent technology nodes and for different workloads to highlight interesting trends and the
importance of considering manufacturing impacts in developing next generation sustainable
computers.
3.2 Case Study I: Environmental Impacts of Recent Processor Trends
As processors have descended below the 90nm node, clock frequencies have become rel-
atively fixed to manage thermal concerns. Performance improvements have instead been
achieved by using the additional density per die to increase the number of processor cores
2In our comparisons, the baseline system was typically set to the slower of the two systems. If IPC0 >
IPC1, the activity ratio of system0 would instead be adjusted by r′A = rA( IPC1IPC0 ), with the activity ratio of
system1 unaltered.
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and on-chip cache sizes. In this section we use GreenChip to demonstrate how these trends
impact sustainability.
3.2.1 Experimental Setup
We consider pseudo ISO-area configurations across several different technology genera-
tions that mirror the processor products available in the corresponding years. In particular,
a 90nm processor was configured with one core and 1MB of LLC, a 65nm processor with two
cores and 2MB LLC, a 45nm processor with 4 cores and 4MB LLC, and a 28nm processor
with eight cores and 8MB LLC. Each system employs a 4-way issue, out of order core model
operating at 2.6GHz3 with a bus-based interconnect to access the LLC and main memory.
Cache and main memory latency and power consumption were taken from CACTI [67] and
DRAMSim2 [69], respectively. Power consumption of the processor configurations (i.e., PD,
PS, and PL from Eq. 3.1) was determined using McPAT [42].
We used GreenChip to analyze the indifference points, IPC, energy, and MPKI of a mix of
the Parsec [70] and SPEC-CPU2006 [71] multi-program workloads. The memory impact and
specific benchmarks to construct the workloads is shown in Table 1. The Parsec workloads are
both multi-threaded and multi-program, while the SPEC workloads are single threaded and
multi-program. Unfortunately, due to limitations in the simulation environment, the Parsec
multi-threaded workloads could only be run on the four and eight core configurations, limiting
their experiments to the 45nm and 28nm processors. The estimations of the individual
benchmark memory impacts were taken from the literature [70, 72] and are listed in the
order of the benchmarks. Multi-program workloads were selected to represent systems with
several concurrent processes.
In our sensitivity analysis, we evaluate different usage scenarios with four activity and
sleep ratios (see Section 5.2) shown in Table 2 representing the load experienced by a cloud
server (Server) that is typically online but often underloaded, a high-performance machine
(HPC) that is typically constantly online and heavily loaded, a desktop machine (Desktop)
3Clock speed is assumed invariant across technology nodes as is commonly the case due to power/thermal
concerns.
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that is used often, but lightly during the working day, and a mobile device (Mobile) that is
mostly asleep, but when it wakes up is heavily loaded [2, 73, 74].
3.2.2 Results
The manufacturing costs of the different architecture choices are shown in Table 3. Man-
ufacturing cost is reported for 90-45nm by Boyd [2] and 28nm is determined from Apple
Environmental Reports [1] and normalized to 45nm from Boyd. The manufacturing cost
per technology node tends to increase for each generation due to the increase in manufac-
turing cost per area (see Figure 2) and even though the area decreases significantly for the
28nm node, the increase in manufacturing cost per area still results in a dramatic jump in
manufacturing energy.
In contrast, the use phase energy, shown in Figure 5, shows how increasing the core count
and cache size can dramatically reduce use phase energy by a combination of increasing
performance and savings in use phase power. However, the the appropriate environmental
design choice requires a combination of both manufacturing and use phase energy trends.
The indifference analysis of a selected benchmark (GLMN) is shown in Figure 6 to
illustrate the design space, with the four scenarios, Server, HPC, Desktop, and Mobile,
represented by circles in the top left, bottom left, top right, and bottom right regions of the
figures, respectively. For both the Desktop and Server scenarios, the higher manufacturing
cost of the smaller process node in the 90nm vs 65nm and 65nm vs 45nm comparisons is not
recovered through use phase gains. In contrast, the higher performance of the smaller node
in the HPC and Mobile scenarios results in the larger manufacturing energy being offset by
use phase gains in less than 2 years, suggesting the more environmentally sound approach is
to choose the smaller technology node. In the 45nm vs 28nm comparison, HPC and Server
scenarios reach the indifference point in less than 2 years, while the Mobile and Desktop
scenarios approach 10 years.
The break even comparison from Figure 7 shows similar trends but with sharper gradients
through the design space. Across the three node comparisons, the break even time for the
Desktop scenario is larger than 7 years, and always larger than 5 years for the Mobile scenario.
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While the Server scenario never breaks even for the 90→65 and 65→45 node comparisons,
45→28 breaks even after 3 years. Consistent with indifference analysis, the HPC scenario
demonstrates that upgrading is the most sustainable decision, as long as the new device will
be in use for at least a year.
To achieve a more global view, the average indifference points and break even times
are shown in Figure 8 for the four scenarios. The results follow similar trends as shown
in GLMN example, with HPC systems typically pushing toward the new technology node
quickly, Desktop, Server, and Mobile typically not pushing toward the new technology node
with the exception of purchasing 45nm mobile and 28nm servers over 65nm and 45nm,
respectively if within a 3-year usage time.
3.3 Case Study II: Sensitivity Analysis of the Impact of Cache Sizes on
Sustainability
One common architecture configuration option is to change the size of the last level
cache. In this case study we fix the processor into a four-core system and vary the LLC
capacity from 0.5MB to 4MB and examine the impact on sustainability. The manufacturing
cost of varying the LLC capacity is shown in Figure 9. For all technology nodes, the increase
of capacity is met with a significant increase in manufacturing cost, which attenuates as the
feature size is reduced.
Considering the same scenarios and workloads described in Tables 1 and 2, the indif-
ference point analysis always selected the smaller of the two technology nodes regardless of
scenario due to the reduction in manufacturing and use phase cost, with the exception of
the 45nm to 28nm transition. This is due to the iso-architecture comparison, where the
larger technology node areas are much higher, rather than the more realistic pseudo iso-area
comparison from Section 3.2. Interestingly, the 45nm to 28nm indifference points (Figure 10)
vary widely by cache size, trending to become smaller as the LLC capacity increases within
each usage scenario.
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Moreover, this trend differs from the break even study in Figure 11. The Desktop scenario
never breaks even from 90nm→65nm at any cache size. For the Desktop 65nm→45nm com-
parisons, mobile 90nm→65nm and 45nm→28nm, and server 90nm→65nm comparisons, the
break even times all exceed four years. The Desktop 45nm→28nm and mobile 65nm→45nm
comparisons are both around three years. Finally, the entire HPC scenario and Server
65nm→45nm and 45nm→28nm transitions all break even in less than one year.
To better understand these results we examined the performance in instructions per cycle
(IPC). In these experiments, the IPC (Figure 12) stays relatively constant across technology
nodes but has varying effects for the different multi-program workloads; for example for
RFFB the additional LLC capacity does not noticeably improve performance, while for the
other workloads the IPC steadily improves as the capacity increases. Also, as expected, the
misses per kilo-instructions (MPKI) decreases as the LLC capacity increases. The change
from 0.5MB to 1MB has the largest MPKI decrease with larger LLC capacities having limited
additional improvements.
The energy fluctuation (Figure 13) for the different cache sizes within a workload and
technology node depends on the trade off of additional performance from the larger LLCs
against the increase in static power as the cache size increases. For example, CXFD at 28nm
experienced sufficient performance benefits from increasing the LLC size to offset the static
power increase resulting in a reduction in energy. In contrast, RFFB at 45nm experiences
the opposite trend, as the static power increase offsets the nominal performance gains as
the cache size increases. On average, there is a reduction in energy from a 0.5MB to 1MB
LLC but for larger LLC sizes, the energy remains relatively consistent with the performance
trends.
These trends point to 1MB caches providing the best trade off between performance,
energy, and manufacturing cost. This is also supported by the breakeven results, with the
1MB LLC typically among the lowest break even times.
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3.4 Case Study III: Impact of Main Memory Density on Sustainability
As the number of cores and cache densities in modern processors increase, larger work-
loads, often with increasing parallelism, may be supported, which can place pressure on
main memory and secondary storage resources. A common example is the coexistence of
many virtual machines on a single cloud server, for which the system resources, including
core count, memory and secondary storage, must be appropriately partitioned. Thus, this
increased pressure engenders the urgency of considering holistic tradeoffs in the whole system
including main memory and secondary storage.
In this section, we examine these tradeoffs in the context of large, memory and disk-
stressing benchmarks (shown in Table 4) to study such a tradeoff. These benchmarks are from
the SPEC OpenMP benchmark suite (OMP2012) [75], as well as the NAS Parallel Benchmark
Suite (version 3, dataset D) [76]. For each benchmark, we combined secondary storage
(SSD) simulations using NVDimmSim [77] with memory and processor results simulated
using Sniper and DramSim2. For manufacturing impacts of DRAM and Flash we used
a model based on process LCA data [2]. DRAM was studied at both 65nm and 55nm
technology nodes, the CPU used 45nm technology, and the Flash SSD used 90nm technology.
The secondary storage simulation results from NVDimmSim used in the indifference point
calculations were comprised of ten representative samples from the entire execution of each
benchmark4.
3.4.1 Single Benchmark Detailed Analysis
To illustrate the impact of changing memory allocations, we highlight a sample bench-
mark from the NAS Parallel Benchmark Suite, “sp,” which has an order of magnitude larger
memory footprint than that of the largest SPEC CPU benchmark. Using a 65nm technol-
ogy process for the memory, 4GB and 8GB were selected as possible memory allotments.
These memory sizes could be considered the provisioning for a virtual machine (VM) run-
4The samples were taken during similar phases of the benchmark execution, based on percentage comple-
tion, even if the overall runtime changed due to parameter changes such as larger or smaller main memory
allocation.
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ning such an application on a server which handles multiple VMs, and where the server is
likely provisioned with much larger amounts of total memory. When the application memory
footprint exceeded the memory available, swapping to the SSD occurred and was modeled
for additional operational energy consumption and performance loss. The SSD allocation
was a constant 64GB for each experiment.
Figure 14(a) shows the 4GB and 8GB indifference points. The server, desktop, and
mobile usage scenarios all require more than 10 years of operation for the 8GB memory
to be more sustainable than the 4GB memory. Even for the HPC scenario, more than
5 years is required before the additional memory overcomes its manufacturing and static
power deficits. At the 55nm node [Fig 14(b)], the 4GB vs. 8GB comparison becomes more
favorable to using the 8GB memory. While the mobile and desktop scenarios still require
over 100 years in order for the operational savings to offset the additional manufacturing
cost of the 8GB memory, the server scenario now has an indifference point of approximately
5 years, and the HPC scenario is only about 18 months. Therefore, from a sustainability
perspective, for workloads resembling sp, HPC systems would seem to value adding memory
capacity, while desktop and mobile systems should remain at 4GB (or possibly investigate
even smaller memory sizes). The decision for the server scenario depends heavily on the
estimated service lifetime of the system, as well as the desired technology node.
The indifference comparison between 65nm and 55nm for 4GB [Figure 14(c)] indicates
indifference times of 1.9, 1.8, 0.8, and 0.3 years before 55nm is the sustainable choice for the
desktop, mobile, server, and HPC scenarios, respectively. For any 4GB memory system with
planned operation time of approximately 2 years (or more), it is more sustainable to use
55nm instead of 65nm technology. For the 8GB comparison, all indifference times increase
slightly, with desktop and mobile approaching 3.3 years. This indicates that for benchmarks
similar to sp with an 8GB main memory, the decision whether or not to fabricate using
55nm technology instead of 65nm depends whether or not the planned lifetime of the device
exceeds approximately 3.3 years.
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3.4.2 Multiple Benchmark Analysis
Moving beyond the design space diagrams for a single memory-intensive benchmark, we
considered the main memory size tradeoff for the various benchmarks enumerated in Table 4.
Figure 15 shows the 4GB vs. 8GB tradeoff at the 55nm technology node. In all cases, it
never makes sense for the mobile or the desktop scenario to use an 8GB memory. For ilbdc
and bt, the original server scenario indifference point also does not benefit from the increased
capacity in terms of holistic sustainability, while for sp workloads the transition does make
sense for systems in place longer than 5 years. For the HPC scenario, applications with finite
indifference times range from one to seven years to recover from the additional manufacturing
investment. The results for the equivalent analysis at the 65nm node (Figure 16) show similar
results for most cases with the 65nm memory capacity indifference time tending to be higher
than for the 55nm memory capacity indifference time. One exception is the server scenario
for bt, which benefits more quickly from 8GB at the 65nm technology node than at 55nm.
This indicates that for these relatively legacy nodes, memory expansions at the smaller
technology node are more efficient, and typically can make more sense in terms of holistic
sustainability than their predecessors.
We also directly compared transitioning from 65nm and 55nm main memory with the
same capacity, shown in Figure 17. In the case of the ilbdc benchmark, in every scenario it
does not make sense to transition from 65nm to 55nm, since the more costly 55nm manufac-
turing investment is never recovered. In the case of workloads similar to the cg benchmark,
the higher cost of 55nm manufacturing can be recovered, but only if the system is in use
for several decades, which is implausible. As one might gather from the similar indifference
magnitudes for the remaining benchmarks and scenarios, the indifference design space charts
for these benchmarks when comparing 55nm and 65nm are very similar, with slight offsets in
magnitude. In other words, unlike the main memory size comparison, the effect of adjusting
the main memory technology node (at least between 65nm and 55nm) is largely consistent
between benchmarks, and is not as dependent on the individual benchmark characteristics.
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3.4.3 Improving Cloud Server Utilization
With continued advances in virtualization, servers have been able to adaptively and more
efficiently utilize their available resources. This has effectively allowed servers to improve the
effective activity ratio to better approach the HPC scenario, which typically results in the
lowest indifference times. In the context of benchmarks and workloads which require signif-
icant communication with secondary storage, it therefore makes sense to not only examine
the server scenarios at the original cited activity ratio, but also to pursue a more detailed
consideration of the holistic sustainability of the server for different workloads across differ-
ent activity ratios. This can be observed individually for each benchmark in our indifference
design space charts (see Figure 18). By keeping the downtime (i.e., sleep) ratio constant
(5%) it is possible to determine the activity ratio required to achieve a positive sustain-
ability tradeoff for a desired product lifetime. In Figure 18, we show this for ten, five, and
three year indifference times starting from the original server activity ratio, and increasing
the activity ratios to achieve those indifference times. In the following discussion, we isolate
the activity ratio and indifference point relationship (assuming a 5% sleep percentage) from
these design space charts to view them collectively, as well as articulate the activity ratios
required to reach various indifference times.
Figure 19 demonstrates the impact of activity ratio on the indifference time of the 4GB
vs. 8GB comparison at 55nm for the different possible server scenarios. Applu and bwaves
always have infinite indifference time along the entire spectrum of server activity ratios,
indicating that for those workloads, no matter the server’s configuration it does not make
sense in terms of holistic sustainability to use 8GB main memory instead of 4GB main
memory. The ilbdc benchmark’s indifference time is infinite until the activity ratio reaches
at least 36%. The reason an indifference point cannot be reached is that the static power
for being active (even if the system is idle) overcomes the dynamic power reduction of the
lower technology node, resulting in an operational power increase compared to the older
technology node. With both a manufacturing and operational energy increase, the result is
an infinite indifference point. The indifference point drops to 20 years at 57% activity, and
10 years at 79% activity. At 100% activity it is 6.8 years.
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For the lu benchmark, the original cloud server (about 30% activity) scenario results in
approximately 20 year indifference point. At less than a 10% activity ratio, the indifference
time becomes infinite. The ten year indifference point can be achieved if the activity ratio
can be raised just over 50%. The smallest indifference point is 4.6 years when the activity
ratio reaches 100%. Lu has significantly different behavior than the bt benchmark. For
the original cloud scenario the indifference point is infinite, but increasing the activity ratio
to just over 40% results in an indifference point of 20 years. Reaching an activity ratio
of just over 45% drops this to 10 years, 60% drops it to 4 years, 85% drops it to 2 years,
and 100% decreases it to 1.5 years. This distinct behavior for the different benchmarks
demonstrates the careful consideration which must be taken when choosing particular server
configurations and activity ratios for estimated workloads and lifetimes. When trying to
remain as sustainable as possible, knowledge of these potential knees can be essential in
avoiding relatively inefficient regions.
Figure 20 also examines the relationship between the activity ratios and indifference
times for the original server scenario between 4GB and 8GB main memory sizes at 65nm.
As with the 55nm analysis, both applu and bwaves always have an infinite indifference time.
Both ilbdc and lu have a minimum indifference time of over 20 years, indicating for these
workloads for almost all conceivable lifetimes 4GB is the more sustainable choice. Bt and
sp have similar results to each other, bt and sp reach a 4 year indifference point at 57% and
90% activity ratio, and approximately 3 year indifference point at 100% activity ratio.
The server sensitivity analysis for 65nm vs. 55nm can be observed in Figure 21. Unlike
in the case of the memory capacity analysis, in the process node comparison ilbdc always has
an infinite indifference time. Thus, while in some cases for ilbdc use of a larger memory size
makes sense, for no possible activity ratios does the more advanced process node make sense
in terms of sustainability. The other outlier was cg, which has its lowest possible indifference
time of 33 years. For the rest of the benchmarks, no matter what activity ratio is achieved,
the 55nm node will be more sustainable after at most 8 years. This is very dissimilar
from the memory comparison, which for all benchmarks in all cases had an activity ratio
below which 4GB would always be more efficient than 8GB. For the bt, lu, sp, and bwaves
workloads they all have a maximum indifference time (calculated using a 1% activity ratio)
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between 2 and 3 years, clearly indicating that these workloads benefit significantly from the
technology node upgrade. Even the benchmarks with slightly higher maximum indifference
points, applu (4.8%) and ua (8%), remain below a 4 year indifference time for activity ratios
above 25%. In general, servers running similar workloads should benefit substantially from
the technology node upgrade. However, there are the important exceptions of ilbdc and cg.
A staple of cg (conjugate gradient) is irregular memory access and communication, and ilbdc
is also a solver (3D lattice Boltzman flow) which may share similar irregular characteristics.
Thus, these applications may have less locality and require heavier SSD usage, limiting their
performance and energy improvements from more advanced memory. Thus, servers which
may experience similar communication patterns may be more sustainable at 65nm vs. the
smaller 55nm.
3.5 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a holistic sustainability evaluation and prediction tool called GreenChip.
GreenChip allows detailed manufacturing and use phase energy calculation and compari-
son of integrated circuits used for constructing computing systems from processors, main
memory, and solid state storage. We presented several case studies that evaluate processor,
cache, and main memory choices. In many cases, indifference and break even times can be
compared with typical expected lifetimes. For example in Case Study I (Section 10.2), the
break even points for upgrading desktop computers and mobile devices often exceeded five
years and replacement cycles for such systems is often less than two years. Also, it often did
not make sense to upgrade servers even when the use phase gain was particularly helpful,
recalling that the 45nm→28nm upgrade time still exceeded three years.
One interesting trend is that chasing higher core counts, caches, and memory/storage
sizes may not always be the most sustainable solution, and there is potential with reaching
fabrication technology limits for manufacturing cost to become an increasingly important
factor in design choices. For example in Case Study II (Section 3.3) the results pointed
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to a moderate LLC capacity (1MB) providing the best compromise of sustainability and
performance.
Additionally, considering main memory sizes, a moderate main memory can outperform
a larger main memory from an environmental perspective as shown in Case Study III (Sec-
tion 3.4). Furthermore, our examination revealed that advances in main memory technology
nodes, while beneficial for most applications, had several applications which were significantly
less sustainable at the smaller, more operational energy efficient node. The characteristics
of these applications were irregular main memory accesses from different solvers, indicating
servers performing these applications should potentially consider other factors, such as larger
memory allotments or more efficient secondary storage for achieving holistic sustainability.
GreenChip provides a flow to evaluate many future design choices for holistic sustainabil-
ity such as server consolidation with larger core counts and memory capacity. Incorporating
more holistic evaluations into standards such as Energy Star and presenting sustainability
metrics for consumer electronics can empower consumers to make more informed choices
and lead to new marketing strategies resulting in a more sustainable computing electronics
industry.
In our future work we plan to develop more precise models that can extend the manu-
facturing estimates down to smaller technologies and incorporate the impacts of emerging
technologies such as 3D CMOS, CMOS compatible extensions such as non-volatile memories,
and others. Coupled with further scaled operational energy estimation flows, this will allow
comparisons of more modern designs that leverage some of the expensive process techniques
such as multiple patterning lithography.
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Table 1: Multi-program Workloads and Memory Footprints for the Parsec and SPEC Bench-
marks. Low (L), Medium (M), and High (H) represents those respective memory footprints.
Multi-Program Workload Abbr. Memory Footprints
Parsec Four Program Workloads
blackscholes-vips-streamcluster-swaptions BVSS L-L-L-L
canneal-x264-blackscholes-vips CXBV H-H-L-L
canneal-x264-freqmine-dedup CXFD H-H-H-H
raytrace-fluidanimate-freqmine-bodytrack RFFB L-L-H-H
SPEC-CPU2006 Four Program Workloads
bzip2-zeusmp-cactusADM-bwaves BZCB H-H-H-H
bzip2-gobmk-hmmer-libquantum BGHL H-L-L-L
GemsFDTD-lbm-milc-namd GLMN H-M-M-L
lbm-perlbench-leslie3d-astar LPLA M-M-M-M
mcf-sjeng-cactusADM-calculix MSCC H-L-H-M
povray-h264ref-calculix-soplex PHCS L-L-M-M
SPEC-CPU2006 Eight Program Workloads
bzip2-gcc-zeusmp-cactusADM-
HIGH8 H-H-H-H-H-H-M-M
mcf-GemsFDTD-milc-soplex
gobmk-hmmer-h264ref-gromacs-
LOW8 L-L-L-L-L-L-L-L
namd-povray-tonto-libquantum
gobmk-namd-lbm-perlbench-
MIX8 L-L-M-M-M-M-H-H
calculix-soplex-bzip2-gcc
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Table 2: Activity and Sleep Scenarios
Name Activity Ratio rA Sleep Ratio rS
Server 30% 5%
HPC 95% 5%
Desktop 17% 77%
Mobile 90% 92%
Table 3: Manufacturing costs for chips at different process nodes following product trends
(pseudo ISO-area) [1, 2].
Process Node (nm) 90 65 45 28
Core Count 1 2 4 8
LLC size 1MB 2MB 4MB 8MB
Area (mm2) 207 227 207 158
Manufacturing Energy (MJ) 124 148 164 598
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Figure 5: Joules Per 10billion instructions for the Parsec and SPEC multiprogram workloads
with different process node. All are run with the same chip area, as part of the iso-area
comparison.
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(a) 90nm vs 65nm (b) 65nm vs 45nm
(c) 45nm vs 28nm
Figure 6: Indifference points (tI) for the pseudo ISO-area comparisons across adjacent tech-
nology nodes for GLMN highlighting four usage scenarios.
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(a) 90nm vs 65nm (b) 65nm vs 45nm
(c) 45nm vs 28nm
Figure 7: Break even time (tB) to move to the next technology node in a pseudo ISO-area
comparison for GLMN highlighting four usage scenarios.
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Figure 11: Average break even times across all the benchmarks, iso-architecture comparison
with 4 cores. Note: All 90nm vs. 65nm data points for desktop except one benchmark never
broke even. Also, one benchmark for the server at 0.5MB never broke even, so the average
is the remainder of the benchmarks
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Figure 12: Global IPC and MPKI averaged for Parsec and SPEC four process multi-program
workloads across different technology nodes while varying LLC capacity. (min and max
shown by error bars)
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Figure 13: Joules Per 10 billion instructions averaged for Parsec and SPEC four process
multi-program workloads across different technology nodes while varying LLC capacity.
Table 4: Disk-Stressing Benchmarks
Name Mem(GB) Name Mem(GB) Name Mem(GB)
SPEC-OMP2012 NAS Parallel Benchmarks
applu 4, 8 bt 4,8 cg 4
bwaves 4, 8 lu 4,8 ua 4
ilbdc 4, 8 sp 4,8
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(a) 65nm Dram, 4GB vs 8GB (b) 55nm Dram, 4GB vs 8GB
(c) 65nm vs 55nm Dram, 4GB (d) 65nm vs 55nm Dram, 8GB
Figure 14: Memory indifference points for the NAS Parallel Benchmark “sp.”
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Figure 15: Indifference times (years) for 4GB vs. 8GB comparisons at 55nm. Note that the
scale is different from Figure 16.
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Figure 16: Indifference times (years) for 4GB vs. 8GB comparisons at 65nm. Note that the
scale is different from Figure 15.
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Figure 17: Indifference times (years) for 65nm vs. 55nm comparisons at 4GB.
3	years
5 years
10	years
Figure 18: An example of the impact of the different activity ratio options and their corre-
sponding impacts on indifference point for servers. The circle represents the original activity
ratio and the arrow shows increased activity ratios to achieve ten, five, and three year indif-
ference points.
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Figure 19: Indifference times (years) for the full range of server activity ratios at the 55nm
technology node for the comparison between 4GB and 8GB main memory sizes. Applu and
bwaves always have an infinite indifference time.
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Figure 20: Indifference times (years) for the full range of server activity ratios at the 65nm
technology node for the comparison between 4GB and 8GB main memory sizes. Applu and
bwaves always have an infinite indifference time.
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Figure 21: Indifference times (years) for the full range of server activity ratios at the 4GB
memory size for the comparison between 65nm and 55nm technology nodes. Cg’s curve
begins at 33 years, and ilbdc always has an infinite indifference time.
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4.0 GreenASIC
4.1 Environmental Impact Model
Computer-aided design tools create useful abstractions of the fabrication process that
bridge the gap between details of the process and the hardware description from the IC
designer. A careful analysis and characterization of the sustainability impact of these choices
will inform both the designer and the tools used in the design process. However, designers
currently do not have a way to visualize at design time the effect their decisions have on the
sustainability and environmental cost of IC fabrication. Thus, we propose a parameterized
environmental impact model based on the approach presented for 130nm [3]. From this model
we use a combination of economic information about the relative costs between steps [78] and
reported process LCA environmental data [2] to determine environmental costs per process
step at different technology nodes. This allows the process steps to be adjusted in order to
examine the impacts of changes in the process such as changing the metal stack. We discuss
a methodology to quantify these impacts for a fixed process in the next section.
4.1.1 Parameterizing the Fabrication Process
Determining the impact of changing the number of process steps when making adjust-
ments such as altering the metal stack for a fixed CMOS technology requires a method to
breakdown the environmental impact at each stage of the process. Then by changing the
number of steps in the particular process, the aggregrate impact can be estimated. Table 5
shows a detailed breakdown of the parameterized process model for 130nm technology. In
Table 5(a) the number of process steps are enumerated for different numbers of metal lay-
ers. Ion implantation and rapid thermal processing furnace steps remain unchanged as they
apply only to the underlying CMOS layer. Other steps decrease as the number of metal
layers decreases including chemical vapor deposition (CVD), cleaning, photo-lithography,
etching, metallization, and polishing (CMP). For each metal layer reduced we decrease CVD
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and metallization by one step due to eliminating the dielectrics and metal of those layers.
Photo-lithography, etching, polishing, and furnace are each reduced by two steps per layer
due to the separate via and interconnect sublayers of the stack.
Table 5: Parameterized model [3] with 130nm process LCA data [2] differentiating 10, 8,
and 6-layer metal stacks for a 200mm wafer.
Steps(a) Process Parameters(b) 5500 Wafer/Week(c) Energy[kWh/Wfr](d)
unit op metal layers wafer wafer T active idle machines active idle metal layers10 8 6 per run per h (h) pwr(kW) pwr(kW) per Step time time 10 8 6
implant 16 16 16 25 20 0.050 266 148 3 275 127 221 221 221
CVD 15 13 11 10 15 0.067 103 90 3 336 36 109 94 80
clean 39 35 31 50 150 0.007 800 750 1 36 98 213 191 169
furnace 25 21 17 150 35 0.029 251 192 2 157 111 185 155 126
furnace-RTP 7 7 7 1 10 0.1 21 20 5 550 120 17 17 17
lithography 31 27 23 1 60 0.017 997 413 1 91 43 522 454 387
dry etch 28 24 20 1 35 0.029 365 95 2 157 111 295 258 221
ash etch 31 27 23 1 20 0.05 8 7 3 275 127 13 11 9
metallization 13 11 9 1 25 0.04 663 360 2 220 48 359 313 266
CMP 22 18 14 1 25 0.04 172 47 2 220 48 153 130 106
Total: 2087 1845 1603
Table 5(b) provides details on the equipment used to complete each step including its
active and idle power consumption. In some cases the equipment works on a single wafer
and in other cases it works on a batch. From this, the throughput of a piece of equipment
is determined. Depending on the throughput requirement of the facility, the number of
machines required to meet the demand can be determined (Equation 4.1). This is shown
for a unit process step in Table 5(c) including the total active versus idle time from the
aggregate of the machines. The total energy from all the process steps of that type is shown
in Table 5(d) using the active and idle times for the number of process steps.
Machines = dwafers ∗ stepsop/throughpute (4.1)
To examine more closely the specific example of metalization, the sum of the energies in
Table 5(d) reveal that it is 13% and 30% more expensive to increase from six to eight and ten
metal layers, respectively, per wafer at 130nm technology. This indicates that the number
of metal layers can significantly impact the overall cost of fabricating CMOS at 130nm. To
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Figure 22: Total energy consumption across the different process steps for technologies
between 130nm and 32nm as calculated by our process model. The total across all steps [2]
(patterned bars of the same colors) use the secondary axis.
determine the impact of these decisions as we continue to shrink requires that the process
model be developed at each technology node. Thus, we provide a scaling method for this
model in the next section.
Table 6: Process steps and scaled 300mm wafer energy for 90nm, 65nm, 45nm, and 32nm
processes based on the IC model from Figure 22.
unit op
90nm 65nm 45nm 32nm
Steps Energy[kWh/Wfr] Steps Energy[kWh/Wfr] Steps Energy[kWh/Wfr] Steps Energy[kWh/Wfr]
Metal Layers Metal Layers Metal Layers Metal Layers
10 8 6 10 8 6 10 8 6 10 8 6 10 8 6 10 8 6 10 8 6 10 8 6
Implant 16 16 16 543 543 543 16 16 16 651 651 651 20 20 20 812 812 812 20 20 20 1742 1742 1742
CVD 15 13 11 266 231 195 15 13 11 319 277 234 17 15 13 361 319 276 17 15 13 775 684 592
clean 39 35 31 522 469 415 39 35 31 627 562 498 39 35 31 625 561 497 39 35 31 1341 1203 1066
furnace 25 21 17 416 350 283 25 21 17 416 350 283 17 13 9 283 217 150 17 13 9 283 217 150
furnace (RTP) 7 7 7 39 39 39 7 7 7 39 39 39 9 9 9 50 50 50 9 9 9 50 50 50
lithography 31 27 23 1280 1115 949 31 27 23 1536 1337 1139 31 27 23 1531 1333 1136 47 43 39 5098 4664 4230
dry etch 28 24 20 633 543 452 28 24 20 760 651 543 28 24 20 758 649 541 46 42 38 2555 2333 2111
ash etch 31 27 23 32 28 24 31 27 23 32 28 24 31 27 23 32 28 24 31 27 23 32 28 24
metallization 13 11 9 369 312 256 13 11 9 443 375 307 13 11 9 442 374 306 13 11 9 948 802 656
CMP 22 18 14 636 520 405 22 18 14 763 624 486 22 18 14 761 622 484 22 18 14 1633 1336 1039
Total: 4737 4149 3561 5586 4895 4204 5654 4965 4275 14457 13059 11661
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4.1.2 Scaling the Parameterized Model
Detailed, process specific information is not widely available per fabrication step at each
process node preventing the direct construction of a parameterized model where this in-
formation is not available. However, aggregate environmental data has been published for
CMOS technologies reaching 32nm [2]. Thus, if we assume this aggregated data is for a single
CMOS layer and uses the maximum size metal stack available at that technology we can
scale the parameterized model. Recalling from the background that environmental impact
trends tend to follow economic cost trends, we used economic data [78] and environmental
data [3] reported for 130nm to determine the relative weights of the individual process steps.
We also adapted the number of steps in the core process based on changes to the process at
different feature sizes as reported in ITRS [79]. For example, at 45nm and below, dopant
diffusion and thermal oxidation for the gate oxide are no longer employed, and additional
implantation and CVD process steps are performed in their place. We adjust the relevant
step parameters accordingly, adding implantation steps, RTP steps, and CVD steps while
removing furnace steps. From 130nm to 65nm we assumed the metal stack contained up to
eight layers, for 45nm and 32nm we assume the stack contained up to ten layers.
The results of our model for energies consumed for different process steps is shown in
Figure 22 at technologies between 130nm and 32nm. The resulting output of the model
demonstrates that there are typically linear increases in expected process steps between
technologies such as lithography, metrology, deposition, and etching, which was one of our
sanity checks. Additionally, the rate of increase (slope) in lithography and metrology is faster
than other steps such as deposition and etching, which also matches industry trends.
Moreover, certain process steps such as the furnace step remain relatively invariant to
process node unless the process steps change. This provides confidence that the model is
representative of the actual process impacts. Moreover, although our model data is reported
in energy, making it relatively easy to compare between fabrication and operational phases,
the model is capable of reporting other environmental impacts such as GWP, carcinogenic
chemicals, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and wastewater generated. We show this in
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more detail in the output of our experiments for different circuit benchmarks in the following
section.
Based on the model we conducted a similar analysis, modifying the number of metal
layers shown in Table 5 for the technology nodes represented, with the results for a 300mm
wafer shown in Table 61. The model demonstrates that increasing the metal layers costs
14%, 32-33% more embodied energy per wafer for moving from six layers to eight and ten
layers, respectively, for 90nm, 65nm, and 45nm nodes.
Our model assumes use of LELE (2× litho-etch) at the 32nm node as the physical limits
of 193nm+immersion lithography is about 30nm [79]. As a result, the lithography and etch
portions of the lower chip levels that define the transistors become more expensive. Thus,
increasing the metal layers that use traditional lithography have a reduced relative impact,
dropping to 11%, and 24% for moving from six layers to eight and ten layers, respectively.
While this may seem to imply that < 32nm technologies may minimize the impact of pruning
the metal stack, some metal-specific challenges are expected to keep it relevant, such as
additional steps for porous and air-gapped dielectrics, etc [79].
Unfortunately, determining the environmental impact per wafer is not enough to truly
understand the impact of these design choices on fabricated ICs. Changing the metal stack for
a particular process can have a significant impact on the area or energy of the resulting IC. As
a result, the fabrication impacts per die is impacted positively by reducing the process steps,
but impacted negatively by potentially increasing the die area, latency, and/or power. As a
result, the overall savings (or potential increase) is unknown without actually determining
a particular placement and routing in the target technology. Thus, in the next section, we
examine the environmental impacts of changing the metal stack for a series of benchmark
designs prepared for fabrication using representative technology design kits at 130, 90, and
65nm.
1Note, the results from Table 5 are for a 200mm wafer. To compare the results between these two tables
requires an approximately 2.25× scaling factor due to the area change.
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4.2 Results
Our parameterized model, in combination with running the design through a commercial
design flow can provide insights into the environmental impact of a design. In this section
we explore in more detail the process change of different metal stacks and the impact on
holistic sustainability through indifference analysis.
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
To study the impacts of using eight and six layer metal stacks, we ran eight benchmark
designs from the IWLS benchmark suite [80] ranging from 6,521 to 47,223 cells through
synthesis using Cadence RTL Compiler and commercial standard cell libraries for 130nm,
90nm, and 65nm processes. These designs include controllers (DMA, vga lcd), encryption
block ciphers (aes), and subsets of circuitry from micro processors (DSP, b17,b18,b22). The
benchmark designs were run through place and route with six and eight layer metal stacks
using Cadence Encounter Digital Implementation (EDI) System, which produced estimated
area, power, and timing results. We used our scalable parameterized model (Section 4.1) to
estimate manufacturing impacts. To make comparisons, we utilize the energy metric so as
to allow for holistic comparisons between the manufacturing and operational phases.
4.2.2 Minimizing Purely Manufacturing Impacts
First we compared a minimal area design for eight and six layer metal stacks at each
technology node. This resulted in the fabrication savings shown in Table 7. In some designs
below 130nm, there was no area increase, indicating the highest cell utilization for both
designs was identical and six metal layers were sufficient for a working IC with the original
area. In other cases, such as with wb con at 65nm, the negative impact of the reduced
die/wafer compared to the pure fabrication gains (14.11%) can be observed as the difference
between the pure fabrication gains and the final fabrication savings. Unfortunately, such
tight area constraints resulted in significant increases in operational power and delay, offset-
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ting the manufacturing savings. Thus, in the next section we examine a “relaxed” design
that considers impacts from both manufacturing and operational phases.
4.2.3 Optimizing for Holistic Sustainability
To balance the operational and manufacturing impacts, we determined the minimal area
design for both eight and six metal layer processes, such that the area was as low as pos-
sible while producing reasonable power and timing results. As the design approaches the
maximum cell utilization, power and latency spike for fractional gains. Backing off the area
requirement to just slightly under the maximum results in much more reasonable power and
delay, which can be manually tuned to find the knee that allows the selection of a minimal
area prior to the power and performance spike. In all cases, this chosen cell utilization was
within 6% of the maximum possible cell density.
The results for these experiments are shown in Table 8. For all benchmarks run at
65nm and 90nm, this constrained minimum area was the same between eight and six layers.
Consequently, the fabrication savings for the results in Table 8 at 65nm and 90nm were
independent of benchmark and were 14.11% and 14.55%, respectively. These gains come
directly from reducing the metal layers in our model as discussed in Section 4.1. For 130nm,
the maximum cell utilization for eight and six layers was often separated by 5% or more,
because the six layer design did not have enough routing flexibility to replicate the original
cell density. As a result, the largest utilization with reasonable power and delay was different
for eight and six layers, resulting in different area and resulting fabrication savings per
benchmark.
While the latency generally rises when changing from eight to six layers, particularly
for minimal area designs, the trend here is more complicated. Because the area is slightly
Table 7: Fabrication savings when using the minimum possible area.
DSP DMA aes wb con vga lcd b17 b18 b22 Avg.
Fabrication Savings, 65nm 14.11% 10.47% 14.11% 13.22% 10.54% 14.11% 14.11% 13.21% 12.99%
Fabrication Savings, 90nm 13.59% 14.55% 14.55% 10.56% 14.55% 14.55% 14.55% 14.55% 13.84%
Fabrication Savings, 130nm 6.96% 10.88% 10.72% 13.43% 7.38% 7.00% 6.49% 13.24% 9.51%
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relaxed, the six layer designs can have reductions in delay over the eight layer designs, but
often with increases in power, and vice-versa. In two cases, b17 at 65nm and vgalcd at
90nm, both the power and the delay decrease when moving from eight layers to six layers.
Intuitively, for these cases it makes no sense to fabricate the eight layer stack over the six
layer stack. Otherwise, a more holistic sustainability analysis is required to combine both
the manufacturing and the use phase results.
Thus, we adopt indifference analysis to calculate the time when the total energy of eight
and six metal layers are equivalent for both use and manufacturing phase (indifference point)
using Equation 6.1 [6], where P0 and P1 represent the total use-phase power of two systems
and M0 and M1 represent the manufacturing energy of those respective systems. The use-
phase powers in the denominator of the expression can be calculated based on different
usage scenarios (Equation 6.2) [5], where rS is the sleep ratio, rA represents the active to
idle ratio, PD is the dynamic power, PS is the static power, and PL is the sleep power. For
each benchmark, we calculate the indifference points for four active and sleep scenarios: a
Table 8: Results from an exploration of the effects of using eight metal layers versus six
metal layers in the same process. Results are within 6% of max cell utilization.
DSP DMA aes wb con vga lcd b17 b18 b22 Avg.
65
n
m
# of Cells 18512 7250 20695 23613 32847 18445 37410 18457 22187
Eight Layer Power (mW) 19.977 24.306 48.677 20.471 385.626 107.456 56.696 57.968 —
Six Layer Power (mW) 20.641 24.337 49.901 22.863 397.008 106.207 57.608 63.146 —
Power Increase 3.32% 0.13% 2.51% 11.68% 2.95% -1.16% 1.61% 8.93% 3.75%
Eight Layer Delay (ns) 1.578 2.19 1.807 3.32 1.439 3.211 3.274 3.846 —
Six Layer Delay (ns) 1.564 2.2 1.762 3.431 1.392 3.193 3.723 3.796 —
Delay Increase -0.89% 0.46% -2.49% 3.34% -3.27% -0.56% 13.71% -1.3% 1.13%
Fabrication Energy eight layers (MJ) 0.069 0.029 0.063 0.059 0.257 0.73 0.118 0.052 —
Fabrication Energy six layers (MJ) 0.059 0.025 0.054 0.05 0.22 0.063 0.102 0.044 —
90
n
m
# of Cells 17897 6303 14325 22014 31624 12096 36062 16904 19654
Eight Layer Power (mW) 19.961 27.606 24.386 21.189 250.792 24.081 73.903 59.76 —
Six Layer Power (mW) 20.215 27.784 25.595 26.218 250.24 24.341 73.016 64.521 —
Power Increase 1.27% 0.64% 4.96% 23.73% -0.22% 1.08% -1.20% 7.97% 4.78%
Eight Layer Delay (ns) 2.144 2.02 1.918 3.769 2.636 3.073 3.241 2.598 —
Six Layer Delay (ns) 2.265 1.978 2.062 3.765 2.537 3.171 3.26 2.688 —
Delay Increase 5.64% -2.08% 7.51% -0.11% -3.76% 3.19% 0.59% 3.46% 1.81%
Fabrication Energy Eight layers (MJ) 0.089 0.037 0.043 0.072 0.256 0.052 0.277 0.061 —
Fabrication Energy Six layers (MJ) 0.076 0.031 0.036 0.062 0.219 0.044 0.237 0.052 —
13
0n
m
# of Cells 19253 10835 28996 25372 47223 20394 38825 25520 27052
Eight Layer Power (mW) 29.520 36.313 32.491 41.413 234.724 49.212 109.897 33.319 —
Six Layer Power (mW) 33.828 37.086 33.986 48.524 236.017 47.876 112.7113 32.959 —
Power Increase 14.6% 2.13% 4.6% 17.17% 0.55% -2.71% 2.56% -1.08% 2.45%
Eight Layer Delay (ns) 2.978 2.677 2.809 4.108 4.59 3.234 4.451 6.889 —
Six Layer Delay (ns) 2.829 2.688 2.872 3.933 4.6 3.24 4.432 7.088 —
Delay Increase -5.0% 0.41% 2.24% -4.26% 0.13% 0.19% -0.43% 2.89% 0.71%
Fabrication Energy Eight layers (MJ) 0.168 0.09 0.107 0.151 0.639 0.114 0.342 0.129 —
Fabrication Energy Six layers (MJ) 0.166 0.082 0.096 0.14 0.606 0.104 0.31 0.112 —
Fabrication Savings 1.63% 9.2% 10.48% 6.88% 5.16% 8.16% 9.19% 13.13% 7.98%
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mobile computing system, a cloud server, a high-performance computing (HPC) system, and
a desktop system [73, 74, 2].
tI =
M1 −M0
P0 − P1 (4.2)
P = (1− rS)(rA(PD + PS) + (1− rA)PS) + PL (4.3)
Figure 23 shows the indifference time in years between the eight and six layer energy costs
for the mobile device scenario (rA=0.9, rS=0.92) [74]. This scenario approximates the usage
of a mobile device, which is often sleeping but very active when awake. The indifference time
indicates the interval after which the total energy (manufacturing and use phase) consumed
by both the eight and six layer design will be equivalent. Prior to the indifference point,
the six layer design is more efficient (since it always starts with a lower manufacturing cost),
and after the indifference point the eight layer design has a lower total energy cost. DMA
at 90nm, AES at 65nm, VGA at 90nm and 65nm, b17 at 65nm and 130nm, and b18 at
90nm and 130nm have an infinite indifference time, indicating the six layer design is lower in
both manufacturing and use phase for those benchmarks at those nodes. For the remaining
points, the optimal design depends on the expected lifetime of the circuit. For example, if
the chosen lifetime is four years, the most sustainable solution is for DMA and VGA to be
manufactured at six layers, and WB to be manufactured at eight layers, with the other four
benchmarks’ lowest energy cost solution depending on the chosen technology node.
Figure 24 displays the cloud server (rA=0.3, rs=0.05) [2] indifference points for the IWLS
benchmarks studied. The benchmarks and technology nodes with infinite indifference times
mentioned for the mobile scenario also have infinite indifference times for the cloud server
scenario (and all possible active and sleep scenarios), since both the manufacturing and the
use phase are always lower for six layers. For the finite cases, if a service lifetime of four
years is chosen for the circuit, then VGA and b18 at 130nm have lower total energy costs
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Figure 23: Mobile scenario eight vs. six layer indifference time (years).
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Figure 24: Cloud scenario eight vs. six layer indifference time (years).
for the six layer metal stacks. For the remainder of the cases for the cloud server scenario,
if the lifetime is four or more years, eight layers is the better choice for sustainability.
Indifference points for the desktop (rA=0.17, rS=0.77) [2] and HPC (rA=0.95, rS=0.05) [73]
scenarios are shown in Figures 25 and 26, respectively. The desktop system follows a similar
trend as the cloud server, but the indifference times are on a much higher scale, making it
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Figure 25: Desktop scenario eight vs. six layer indifference time (years).
0
1
2
3
4
DSP DMA AES WB VGA b17 b18 b22
In
di
ffe
re
nc
e	
Ti
m
e(
Ye
ar
s)
HPC	Indifference	Points
130nm 90nm 65nm
Infinity
Figure 26: HPC scenario eight vs. six layer indifference time (years).
less attractive to consider using eight layer designs in a desktop setting. While the total
energy consumed in the mobile scenario is often dominated by the manufacturing energy
due to the high sleep ratio that minimizes the use phase’s contribution, the HPC scenario
is dominated by its use phase contribution. In all finite cases, the indifference times are
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Table 9: Report on sustainability metrics, eight metal layers.
DSP DMA aes wb con vga lcd b17 b18 b22 Avg.
65
n
m
Smog (g NOx) 0.2386 0.1002 0.2170 0.2026 0.8846 0.2511 0.4085 0.1786 0.3101
Acidification H+ (millimoles) 14.0991 5.9217 12.8205 11.9726 52.2705 14.8363 24.1367 10.5537 18.3264
Ecotoxicity (g 2,4-D) 1.1496 0.4828 1.0454 0.9762 4.2621 1.2097 1.9681 0.8605 1.4943
Carcinogens (g C6H6) 9.34·10−5 3.92·10−5 8.49·10−5 7.93·10−5 3.46·10−4 9.83·10−5 1.60·10−4 6.99·10−5 1.21·10−4
Total DALYs 2.16·10−6 9.06·10−7 1.96·10−6 1.83·10−6 8.00·10−6 2.27·10−6 3.69·10−6 1.62·10−6 2.81·10−6
Noncancerous C7H7 (g) 97.6090 40.9962 88.7571 82.8874 361.8730 102.7130 167.1001 73.0643 126.8750
Eutrophication-air (g N) 0.0086 0.0036 0.0078 0.0073 0.0319 0.0091 0.0147 0.0064 0.0112
Eutrophication-water (g N) 0.0134 0.0056 0.0122 0.0114 0.0499 0.0142 0.0230 0.0101 0.0175
90
n
m
Smog (g NOx) 0.2758 0.1131 0.1323 0.2243 0.7936 0.1601 0.8582 0.1881 0.3432
Acidification H+ (millimoles) 16.0900 6.5970 7.7166 13.0830 46.2910 9.3374 50.0644 10.9750 20.0193
Ecotoxicity (g 2,4-D) 1.3178 0.5403 0.6320 1.0716 3.7915 0.7648 4.1005 0.8989 1.6397
Carcinogens (g C6H6) 1.15·10−4 4.70·10−5 5.50·10−5 9.32·10−5 3.30·10−4 6.65·10−5 3.57·10−4 7.82·10−5 1.43·10−4
Total DALYs 2.45·10−6 1.01·10−6 1.18·10−6 1.99·10−6 7.05·10−6 1.42·10−6 7.63·10−6 1.67·10−6 3.05·10−6
Noncancerous C7H7 (g) 113.3959 46.4930 54.3835 92.2043 326.2411 65.8061 352.8349 77.3476 141.0883
Eutrophication-air (g N) 0.0098 0.0040 0.0047 0.0080 0.0283 0.0057 0.0306 0.0067 0.0122
Eutrophication-water (g N) 0.0216 0.0089 0.0104 0.0176 0.0622 0.0125 0.0672 0.0147 0.0269
13
0n
m
Smog (g NOx) 0.4142 0.3083 0.5044 0.4586 1.8975 0.2685 1.1581 0.2912 0.6626
Acidification H+ (millimoles) 24.2158 18.0266 29.4879 26.8116 110.9288 15.6986 67.7051 17.0267 38.7376
Ecotoxicity (g 2,4-D) 2.0074 1.4943 2.4444 2.2225 9.1954 1.3013 5.6124 1.4114 3.2111
Carcinogens (g C6H6) 1.33·10−4 9.87·10−5 1.61·10−4 1.47·10−4 6.07·10−4 8.59·10−5 3.71·10−4 9.32·10−5 2.12·10−4
Total DALYs 3.70·10−6 2.75·10−6 4.50·10−6 4.09·10−6 1.69·10−5 2.40·10−6 1.03·10−5 2.60·10−6 5.91·10−6
Noncancerous C7H7 (g) 172.0596 128.0837 209.5192 190.5033 788.1782 111.5423 481.0624 120.9794 275.2410
Eutrophication-air (g N) 0.0148 0.0111 0.0181 0.0164 0.0680 0.0096 0.0415 0.0104 0.0238
Eutrophication-water (g N) 0.0440 0.0327 0.0535 0.0487 0.2014 0.0285 0.1229 0.0309 0.0703
Table 10: Report on sustainability metrics, six metal layers.
DSP DMA aes wb con vga lcd b17 b18 b22 Avg.
65
n
m
Smog (g NOx) 0.2049 0.0861 0.1863 0.1740 0.7598 0.2156 0.3508 0.1534 0.2664
Acidification H+ (millimoles) 12.1096 5.0861 11.0114 10.2832 44.8948 12.7428 20.7308 9.0645 15.7404
Ecotoxicity (g 2,4-D) 0.9874 0.4147 0.8979 0.8385 3.6607 1.0390 1.6904 0.7391 1.2834
Carcinogens (g C6H6) 8.02·10−5 3.37·10−5 7.29·10−5 6.81·10−5 2.97·10−4 8.44·10−5 1.37·10−4 6.00·10−5 1.04·10−4
Total DALYs 1.85·10−6 7.79·10−7 1.69·10−6 1.57·10−6 6.87·10−6 1.95·10−6 3.17·10−6 1.39·10−6 2.41·10−6
Noncancerous C7H7 (g) 83.8357 35.2113 76.2329 71.1914 310.8101 88.2195 143.5211 62.7544 108.9721
Eutrophication-air (g N) 0.0074 0.0031 0.0067 0.0063 0.0274 0.0078 0.0127 0.0055 0.0096
Eutrophication-water (g N) 0.0116 0.0049 0.0105 0.0098 0.0428 0.0122 0.0198 0.0086 0.0150
90
n
m
Smog (g NOx) 0.2357 0.0966 0.1130 0.1917 0.6781 0.1368 0.7334 0.1608 0.2933
Acidification H+ (millimoles) 13.7496 5.6374 6.5942 11.1801 39.5577 7.9792 42.7823 9.3786 17.1074
Ecotoxicity (g 2,4-D) 1.1262 0.4617 0.5401 0.9157 3.2400 0.6535 3.5041 0.7682 1.4012
Carcinogens (g C6H6) 9.79·10−5 4.02·10−5 4.70·10−5 7.96·10−5 2.82·10−4 5.68·10−5 3.05·10−4 6.68·10−5 1.22·10−4
Total DALYs 2.10·10−6 8.59·10−7 1.00·10−6 1.70·10−6 6.03·10−6 1.22·10−6 6.52·10−6 1.43·10−6 2.61·10−6
Noncancerous C7H7 (g) 96.9019 39.7304 46.4731 78.7927 278.7877 56.2343 301.5132 66.0970 120.5663
Eutrophication-air (g N) 0.0084 0.0034 0.0040 0.0068 0.0242 0.0049 0.0262 0.0057 0.0105
Eutrophication-water (g N) 0.0185 0.0076 0.0089 0.0150 0.0531 0.0107 0.0575 0.0126 0.0230
13
0n
m
Smog (g NOx) 0.3854 0.2748 0.4503 0.3970 1.7575 0.2497 1.0829 0.2527 0.6063
Acidification H+ (millimoles) 22.5313 16.0644 26.3278 23.2106 102.7459 14.6003 63.3082 14.7720 35.4451
Ecotoxicity (g 2,4-D) 1.8677 1.3317 2.1824 1.9240 8.5171 1.2103 5.2479 1.2245 2.9382
Carcinogens (g C6H6) 1.23·10−4 8.79·10−5 1.44·10−4 1.27·10−4 5.62·10−4 7.99·10−5 3.47·10−4 8.09·10−5 1.94·10−4
Total DALYs 3.44·10−6 2.45·10−6 4.02·10−6 3.54·10−6 1.57·10−5 2.23·10−6 9.66·10−6 2.25·10−6 5.41·10−6
Noncancerous C7H7 (g) 160.0906 114.1418 187.0663 164.9173 730.0366 103.7389 449.8212 104.9592 251.8465
Eutrophication-air (g N) 0.0138 0.0099 0.0161 0.0142 0.0630 0.0090 0.0388 0.0091 0.0217
Eutrophication-water (g N) 0.0409 0.0292 0.0478 0.0421 0.1866 0.0265 0.1150 0.0268 0.0644
much smaller than for mobile, and only three circuits exceed one year. For these cases and
three or more years of expected lifetime, the use phase advantage of eight layers exceeds the
manufacturing advantage of six layers, and the eight layer stack should be used.
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4.2.4 Additional Sustainability Reports
Based on the designs optimized to best tradeoff embodied and operational energy, our
tool can report more detailed data on other sustainability metrics aside from energy and
GWP. Tables 9 and 10 report smog in terms of Nitrogen Oxide (NOx), acidification in
terms of Hydron concentration (H+), ecotoxicity in terms of grams of dimethylamine (2,4-
D), carcinogenic hydrocarbons in terms of grams of C6H6, disability adjusted life years
(DALYs), non cancerous grams of C7H7, and eutrophication of air and water measured in
grams of Nitrogen, for eight and six metal layer wafers, respectively. Contributions to smog
damage the air quality. Acidification changes the pH of water making it damaging to wildlife.
Dimethylamine (2,4-D) can also harm plants similar to a pesticide. Carcinogenic compounds
have direct links to cancer. Eutrophication can encourage overgrowth of plants (including
algae) causing Oxygen depletion in water and starving animals that depend on the Oxygen
supply. DALYs quantifies the number of years lost due to ill-health, disability or early death
due to environmental impacts.
Interestingly, scaling to newer technology nodes does provide a benefit to many of these
factors, such as smog, DALYs and carcinogens, due to the area reduction of the die. This
is not true for energy and GWP and other factors such as eutrophication. Thus, while
holistic energy is a clearly important metric, the most sustainable design decision should
also consider factors outside of energy. However, the trends consistently show that reducing
the metal stack from eight to six layers provides a 10-12% reduction in these environmental
impact categories, making it desirable to simplify the process if energy and performance
allow.
4.3 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we proposed a scaled parameterized model for evaluating the environmental
impacts of IC fabrication. We demonstrated a practical use of this model to estimate the
manufacturing energy of six and eight layer metal stacks for 130nm, 90nm, and 65nm designs.
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Using the output of the model and use phase energy estimations, we provided a holistic
sustainability evaluation of the eight versus six metal layer decision. For any of the studied
benchmarks, technology nodes, and usage scenarios, our analysis can be used to determine
whether making a process change (e.g., six or eight metal layers) is the more sustainable
design for a desired service lifetime of the circuit.
This model can be applied to other design choices such as 3D CMOS and hybrid post-
CMOS designs. We also hope to explore design kits for newer technology nodes as they
become available to academic researchers. Moreover, conceptually, the model itself can be
extended further; however, changes in the process for nodes ≤22nm become increasingly
complex as lithography moves to multiple patterning and additional steps are required for
more exotic transistors, increasingly low-κ dielectrics, etc. We will explore these directions
in future work.
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5.0 LARS Indifference Analysis
5.1 LARS Concept and Implementation
The indifference analysis from Eq. 6.1 where Mi is the embodied (i.e., manufactur-
ing) energy and Pi is the operational power of system i, was proposed and implemented
in GreenChip [4]. It is sufficiently flexible for different holistic sustainability evaluations,
when system reliability is constant between design choices. However, when evaluating an
approach like MACE, different configurations will have an impact on lifetime due to memory
wearout. If a system has lower use-phase energy and lower embodied energy, but it must be
replaced every month, this replacement embodied energy should be taken into account when
comparing it with another system. Thus, we propose an extension to indifference theory
called Lifetime Amortized Replacement for Servers indifference analysis.
tI =
M1−M0
P0−P1 (5.1)
tILARS =
M1 −M0
(P0+A0)−(P1+A1) (5.2)
The fundamental difference between LARS indifference analysis and prior sustainability
indifference analysis [4, 5] is the inclusion of amortized embodied energy of replacements
reflected in Eq. 5.2. In Eq. 6.1, the indifference point reports the time it takes for a system
with lower operational power to save the equivalent energy of the larger embodied energy
from more complicated manufacturing. However, when the mean-time-to-failure (MTTF)
occurs for one system prior to the indifference time, traditional analysis is less meaningful.
With LARS indifference analysis, we consider replacement embodied energy as a cost per
time shown in Eq. 5.3, in a similar fashion to operational power. Ai is the embodied energy,
Mi, divided by the lifetime, Li, for a system i. Li can be determined as the ratio of writes
before failure WBFi to the write velocity (writes per second) Wi of system i. The LARS
comparison assumes two systems under comparison operate until failure, are replaced with
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the same system, and the cycle continues indefinitely. Essentially, the LARS indifference
time now considers replacement cycle along with embodied energy, operational energy, and
usage scenario.
Ai =
Mi
Li
= Mi ·Wi
WBFi
(5.3)
5.2 LARS Case Study
Based on the results of the lifetime studies, a sustainability analysis was conducted
using a modified version of the GreenChip [4] tool to include LARS indifference analysis.
The observed lifetimes for each of the configurations were used alongside estimates of both
embodied and operational energy consumption to evaluate the lifetime energy footprint.
Figures 27(a), 27(b), 27(c) show indifference point plots, calculated using Eq. 6.1 for (a)
ECP6 versus MACE 32,6 (32 cosets, 6 pointers), (b) MACE WINDU (MW), which reverts
to MACE 32,2 when compression is not possible, versus MACE 32,6 for a 1TB memory, and
(c) the same MW versus MACE comparison for a 4TB memory. Note, the MACE configura-
tion consistently has a larger area overhead, i.e., embodied energy, with a lower operational
energy. The figures highlight a range of usage scenarios for blade servers, from from 95%
uptime and low utilization (underloaded cloud) to similar uptime and high utilization (heav-
ily loaded cloud or supercomputer). Figure 27(a) indicates that MACE requires ≥29 years
to recoup the additional embodied costs from the area overheads. Similarly, Figures 27(b)
and 27(c) show MACE requires 2.1-7.3 years and 4.3-17.5 years, reflecting highest to lowest
activity, for 1TB and 4TB memories, respectively.
Recalling from Section 5.2, that Eq. 6.1 does not accurately reflect indifference when
reliability and replacement cycle are a function of the system comparison. Figure 28 shows
the same comparison as Figure 27, except using Eq. 5.2 which takes into account amor-
tized embodied energy from replacements (Eq. 5.3). The biggest change is in Figure 28(a),
where indifference time of 29 years drops to <5 months, and low utilization approaching
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(a) ECP v MACE (b) MW v MACE (c) MW v MACE (4TB)
Figure 27: Indifference points (tI) for the traditional GreenChip tool for ECP6, MACE 32,6,
and MACE WINDU (MACE 32,2) for 1TB PCM, except where noted.
∞ becomes <18 months. The MW versus MACE comparisons show similar adjustments
where Figures 28(b) and 28(c) report 1.3-4.5 years and 2.0-7.1 years, respectively, reflecting
approximately 60% and 2× lower indifference time for 1TB and 4TB memories, respectively.
Clearly, from Figure 28, MACE is the considerably more, sustainable choice than ECP, but
the choice of MACE WINDU versus MACE is more dependent on system configurations.
MACE WINDU is more sustainable for moderate to large memories with MACE being more
attractive for very large memories. This suggests a tradeoff between total capacity, effective
capacity (total capacity less correction overhead), and activity ratio of a server.
5.3 Conclusion
The LARS indifference analysis extends the indifference analysis of GreenChip to include
the memory lifetime. This permits a holistic study of the tradespace between activity,
capacity, and correction overhead in the context of nonvolatile memories. For PCM memory
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(a) ECP vs MACE (b) MW v MACE (c) MW v MACE (4TB)
Figure 28: LARS indifference points (tI) for the GreenChip tool for ECP6, MACE 32,6, and
MACE WINDU (MACE 32,2) for 1TB PCM, except where noted.
with AES-XTS encryption, the LARS indifference analysis demonstrates that the endurance
and energy benefits of MACE and MACE-WINDU are realized on a relatively short time
scale. The system designer can apply LARS analysis to explore the tradespace between
the techniques, to better meet their capacity and activity needs and still realize an energy
improvement within the system lifetime.
65
6.0 SFaultMap
6.1 SFaultMap Design
The central organizational concept of SFaultMap is that the fault data per-row is or-
ganized into row-indexed faultmap segments (row-segments), which pack fault data from
multiple adjacent rows together. The encoding for an individual 512-bit memory row (cover-
ing between zero and four faults) is shown in Figure 29. The first bit represents zero (‘0’) or
nonzero (‘1’) faults. If ‘0’, the row is fault free and the row encoding is complete. If ‘1’, two
bits record the number of faults (one to four). The same number of fault locations within
the row are stored with 9-bit pointers. In the case that four pointers were specified, the final
pointer is followed by another row entry that continues the current row entry, representing
an additional zero to four faults. Stacking entries in this manner allows an arbitrary number
of pointers to be encoded in a row. Fault entries for adjacent rows are stored in a single
row-segment (e.g., a 512-bit row) until the next row entry cannot fit.
Each row-segment stores its first row index (or “row-segment start” in Figure 30) to
identify the appropriate row-segment during a memory access. To access the fault map,
highest row-segment start that is less than or equal to the memory address determined.
Then the row-segment is read and parsed linearly to find the row of interest, returning the
fault information for that memory row.
An example of an implemented fault map for 8-bit rows (3-bit pointers) is shown in
Figure30. During an access to address 2, the row-segment start of 0 is selected as highest
row-segment start of ≤ 2. Rows 0 and 1 are parsed in succession, each showing a ‘0’ leading
bit and containing no faults. Row 2 has a leading ‘1’ followed by “00” indicating one fault,
with a pointer to bit 5 (“101”). This fault information is returned completing the search. A
second example would be an access to row 12, which identifies the row-segment start point
of 11. Row 11 has a leading bit of ‘1’ indicating faults, followed by “00” indicating one fault.
Since we are not concerned with row 11, the next three bits are ignored to move to row 12.
The leading ‘0’ returns that row 12 is fault free.
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0 1 0
1 12 1 0 0 Ptr1
2 21 1 0 1 Ptr1 Ptr2
3 30 1 1 0 Ptr1 Ptr2 Ptr3
4 40 1 1 1 Ptr1 Ptr2 Ptr3 Ptr4 0
9 bits 9	bits 9 bits 9 bitsFaults Encoding
Bits	
Figure 29: Encoding strategy for data-agnostic bit-level fault map.
…
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0
4
6
11
14
Fault Map (Each row in table is a Row-Segment)Row-Segment-Start
Figure 30: Example of the data-agnostic fault map, with a row-segment size of 10 bits and
a row size of 8 bits (3 bits per pointer). Even rows are orange.
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6.1.1 Performance Improvement 1: Offset Segment Lookup
Conducting a binary search to determine the row-segment start provides a relatively
efficient access rate into the relevant row-segment requiring 2 log2 S tests, where S is the
number of row-segments. However, maintaining an offset table for quickly indexed search
can further reduce the access latency as follows. First, the average number of rows per row-
segment (Rs) is calculated. Then the bit offset, B, is calculated where B = blog2Rsc. The
table is maintained for every 2B rows.
During an access, the lower B bits are truncated from the address and the table is
accessed to return a row-segment in the neighborhood of the address. The offset table
typically reduces the 2 log2 S search to between 1-3 row-segment checks.
6.1.2 Performance Improvement 2: Zero-fault Bit
While the representation of relatively high error rates, such as 10−3 and 10−4 are very
compact with the proposed fault map, this density causes significant lookup delays for many
rows. For these error rates, most rows in the memory are still fault free, which makes their
lookup wasteful. Thus, we propose the addition of a single “fault free indicator” auxiliary bit
to each memory row. Thus, for low fault rates the only entries which must traverse the fault
map are the few rows which have faults. Note, SFaultMap must still store ‘0’s for fault-free
rows to ensure correct indexing. This approach adds a memory storage overhead of only
0.19% (1/512) while enabling considerable performance improvement for the fault map. We
refer to the version of SFaultMap that employs these extensions as SFaultMap+, which we
will discuss further in Section 10.2.
6.1.3 Fault Map Extensions and Discussion
SFaultMap enumerates the locations of potential faults. This allows error mitigation
schemes to make decisions about how to store their data to avoid these faults. For example,
the data may be able to be encoded to avoid bad data patterns which coincide with faulty cells
such as bad patterns for write disturbance in PCM [31] or bitline crosstalk in DRAM [12].
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Furthermore, knowing the location and number of faulty cells could allow compressed data
using a lightweight compression technique [81] to be stored in order to skip faulty cells.
However, SFaultMap can be extended to serve as the fault tolerance approach directly.
Each pointer can be extended with a replacement bit value (e.g., a pointer for a 512-bit
block can be extended to ten bits). During a write to the location, the fault map is updated
with data corresponding to the bits that would be stored in the faulty cells. If the fault map
is initialized by saving space for these data bits, the fault map can be updated during each
write without causing a change in structure.
In addition, SFaultMap is a static map that assumes faults are discoverable at test
time and do not change (such as for cells vulnerable to wordline crosstalk [14] and bitline
crosstalk [17]). However, for some forms of faults, such as endurance faults in technologies
like PCM, the map must be adjusted over time as new faults are added. The compact
nature of the fault map would require an entire rewriting process whenever an additional
fault occurs.
6.2 Experimental Setup
To model weak cells of the memory, 4GB maps of weak cells were created using a
Bayesian distribution to mimic the impact of process variation and include spatial corre-
lation of faults [21, 82]. In particular, the model described in [21] was used to generate weak
cell maps for a 4GB DRAM. These maps are appropriate to model weak cells for wordline or
bitline crosstalk as well as low retention time. Similar to ECP, it is assumed ECC-1 would
be used to protect against unrelated transient faults such as single event upsets.
A custom fault map simulator, based on the SNIPER full system simulator [65], was cre-
ated to implement recovery schemes that utilize these weak cell maps. From the simulator,
the number of bits required to represent the weak cells in the fault maps (static form), the
average number of rows represented per row-segment, and other statistics for each configu-
ration of SFaultMap can be generated. The simulator was also extended to allow inclusion
of the binary/offset-based row-segment lookup and the flag bit indicating whether the row is
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fault free (SFaultMap+). Additionally, the row-segment size can be varied in the simulator
to study the area and performance tradeoffs for a given fault map.
To study the detailed performance and power implications of the fault map, a design
for the SFaultMap decoder was created in VHDL, and synthesized using Synopsys Design
Compiler targeting a 45nm FreePDK [83]. Because the power and delay of the circuit per
access depends on the row address and the average number of addresses to traverse in the
row-segment, the reported energy and delay correspond to traversing half of the average rows
per row-segment. The access delay from the hardware implementation was combined with
the row access time and decoding time (unless the fault-free bit was used and set) for the
fault map entry once located from the row-segment. The simulator was tested on workloads
from the SPEC CPU benchmarks [84]. The detailed parameters of the system simulated are
shown in Table 11.
6.3 Evaluation
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed sustainable fault-map we examine the
area, power, and performance impacts and tradeoffs of the different fault map configurations
in comparison to ECP and ArchShield. Based on these results we present holistic energy
analyses of the tradeoffs in order to determine the configurations which provide the most
sustainable solution for different workloads and usage lifetimes.
Table 11: Architecture parameters.
CPU Cache
4 out-of-order cores Private L1 32KB Inst, 32KB Data
4 issue width, 4GHz clk Private L2 2MB/Core
45 nm Technology Associativity: 8 (L1 data and L2 caches)
1GHz Frequency Block Size: 64B
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Figure 31: IC (Area) Overhead for ECP, ArchShield, and the Fault Map at different initial
weak cell rates.
6.3.1 Area Overheads and Embodied Energy
Figure 31 displays the IC overhead required for SFaultMap, ArchShield, and ECP in
order to guarantee correct operation for different fault frequencies. In order to determine
the number of ECP pointers required for each fault frequency, a probabilistic weak cell map
(see Section 6.2) was generated for each of several incidence rates. Due to the probabilistic
nature of the weak cell map generation and in order to not overly penalize ECP, a 25% larger
fault map (5G) was generated to select a 4G weak cell map with best case fault distribution
for ECP. To maintain spatial correlation the weak cell map is generated in 256M portions.
This requires that a total of 20 portions are generated and the worst four are pruned. Based
on these tests, the minimum required ECP pointers were 11, 4, 3, and 2 pointers for 10−2,
10−3, 10−4, and 10−5 incidence fault rates, respectively.
To model the overhead for ArchShield, two configuration bits were added per row for
the memory to indicate if the row contains zero, one, or two or more faults. Additional
redundant rows (spare rows) were allocated for faulty rows. We did not penalize ArchShield
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for the overhead of SECDED ECC in our experiments as it is often available by default in
many systems to address transient errors.
For SFaultMap we specify a 512- or 256-bit row-segment size (SFaultMap512 and SFault-
Map256, respectively). Recall that the row-segment size is the number of bits that sequen-
tially packs fault descriptions for a variable number of memory rows (see Section 6.1). A
smaller row-segment size requires a higher IC area overhead than a larger size due to its
higher wasted bit ratio from packing faults into segments (analogous to padding in memory).
Additionally, the area overhead required by SFaultMap scales proportionally with the num-
ber of faults. For example, SFaultMap512 ranges from 0.214% to 7.46% for incidence fault
rates between 10−5 and 10−2, while SFaultMap256 ranges from 0.227% to 8.29% over the
same fault incidence interval.
Recalling that the “improved” versions of those two segment sizes include both the offset-
segment lookup and a fault-free flag bit per row. The area investment required by SFault-
map+ ranges from 1.08–2.14× over SFaultMap512 and from 1.11–2.28× over SFaultMap256
for fault incidence rates from 10−2 to 10−5) . Despite this additional area investment, the
least area efficient SFaultMap (SFaultMap256+) still saves between 2.35–10.16× the area
over the corresponding ECP protection for fault incidence rates of at 10−2 to 10−4. Within
ArchShield’s intended fault-incidence range the area overhead of ArchShield is between 1.3×
higher (corresponds to 10−5 fault rate) and 5.8× higher (corresponds to 10−4 fault rate) than
the largest overhead SFaultMap+ schemes.
This area savings has significant implications for the indifference times of the fault map,
which will be discussed in the next subsection.
6.3.2 Runtime Overheads and Operational Energy
Figure 32 displays the energy consumption of the decoding circuitry for both ECP and
SFaultMap. Note that SFaultMap+ and SFaultMap have nearly indistinguishable energy
consumption when the row-segment is inspected. The decoding implementation of ECP
looks up and flips bits from its valid pointers in parallel, while by design each row-segment
in SFaultMap must be searched linearly to find the desired row. An interesting trend is that
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Figure 32: Energy consumption for decoding ECP and the improved fault map at different
sizes and initial fault rates. 10−2 cannot have a fault map size of 192 or lower because certain
rows require at least that many bits alone.
as the fault rate increases, the resulting ECP energy required increases, while the SFaultMap
energy decreases. This is because as the SFaultMap becomes more dense, fewer traversal
operations are required to find the average element within the row-segment.
When considering SFaultMap+ we recall that the fault-free flag from SFaultMap+ can
prevent the row-segment inspection altogether. Specifically, the row-segment inspection can
be bypassed for 8%, 77%, and 97% of accesses for fault incidence rates of 10−2, 10−3, and
10−4, respectively. Further, for the fault map structures, the reduction in row-segment size
causes a reduction in average access power, since the reduced amount of searching within a
row-segment dominates the small increase in effort required to index the row-segment. This
has a clear area/power tradeoff, which we discuss in the larger picture of holistic sustainability
in the next subsection.
Figure 33 shows the relative impacts of instructions per cycle (IPC) for SFaultmap256 at
different fault incidence rates. Certain SPEC CPU benchmarks, specifically calculix, gobmk,
hmmer, namd, and sjeng are fairly memory performance invariant. In contrast, memory
performance dependent benchmarks, such as bzip2, cactus, lbm, leslie3d, libquantum, mcf,
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Figure 33: IPC impact of 256 bit block fault map designs across SPEC benchmarks normal-
ized to a fault-free IPC at different fault incidence rates.
and milc see dramatic slowdowns. On average, the degradations for SFaultMap256 are 2%,
3.5%, and 9.3% for 10−2, 10−3, and 10−4 incident fault rates, respectively, but the dramatic
slowdowns for a large segment of benchmarks (as much as 15%) is clearly problematic. Thus,
moving forward we consider averages of memory performance dependent benchmarks from
SPEC to highlight solutions to this performance bottleneck. The higher IPC for higher fault
maps occurs because of the reduced search time within the row-segment for high fault rates,
which comes at the cost of higher area (Figure 31).
Figure 34 shows the average IPC for memory dependent (mem-dep) and invariant groups
(mem-inv) of SPEC benchmarks for both SFaultMap and SFaultMap+ at various fault in-
cidence rates. For all fault rates, SFaultMap performs adequately for mem-inv benchmarks.
For mem-dep benchmarks, particularly at the lower 10−4 fault rate, SFaultMap has a 15-25%
IPC reduction depending on row-segment size. SFaultMap+ reduces this to a 5-10% degra-
dation. Moreover, for higher fault rates, SFaultMap+ keeps IPC within 2-3% of a system
without a fault map and comparable to ArchShield at lower fault rates.
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6.3.3 Holistic Energy Analysis
To evaluate sustainability, we use indifference analysis from GreenChip. The indifference
time is the time when the total energy, including embodied and operational energy, of two
different designs or architectures are equivalent according to Eq. 6.11. Mx and Px are the
manufacturing energy and use-phase power of one of the two designs. We compute oper-
ational power from Eq. 6.2 where rS is the sleep ratio, rA is the active to idle ratio when
awake, and PD, PS, and PL are the dynamic, static, and sleep power, respectively, reported by
McPAT[42]. We calculate indifference points for three system scenarios: a high-performance-
computer (HPC) (rA=0.95,rS=0.05), a mobile computing system (rA=0.9,rS=0.92), and a
cloud server (rA=0.3,rS=0.05) [5]. To account for the performance impact of difference
design choices we adjust rA in Eq. 6.2 in the system with a fault map to r′A = rA( IPC0IPC1 ) [5].
1This equation can result in a negative result, indicating there is no indifference point. In this case the
system with the lower embodied energy also has a lower operational energy and thus, should always be
selected.
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Figure 35: ECP vs. SFaultMap indifference times for different initial fault ratios, usage
scenarios, and row-segment sizes.
tI =
M1 −M0
P0 − P1 (6.1)
P = (1− rS)(rA(PD + PS) + (1− rA)PS) + PL (6.2)
Figure 35 reports the indifference times of SFaultMap compared to ECP with the storage
overheads sized to satisfy each fault incidence rate for each of three usage scenarios. Across all
scenarios, the comparisons at a 10−2 incidence fault rate resulted in an infinite indifference
time making SFaultMap always the most energy efficient solution. In fact, SFaultMap is
always more energy efficient for ECP-4 at 10−2 or higher, not just ECP-11, even though
ECP-≤10 will not guarantee fault tolerance. At 10−3 the most sustainable strategy depends
on scenario and row-segment size. If the product lifetime is estimated at ten years or less,
than SFaultMap is more sustainable for all scenarios and segment sizes other than an HPC
system with a 512-bit row-segment size, which has a indifference time of 4.8 years before
ECP-4 becomes superior.
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Figure 36: Indifference times SFaultMap and SFaultMap+. SFaultMap has the lower em-
bodied energy.
Figure 36 shows the indifference times between SFaultMap and SFaultMap+. At 10−4, all
indifference times are less than two years before SFaultMap+’s operational energy advantage
overcomes its embodied energy overhead. For 10−3, the indifference times are mostly under
5 years, with the exception of the mobile scenario with the 256-bit row-segment size, where
the use phase improvements might not be worth their incurred embodied energy overhead.
At 10−2, the HPC scenario benefits from the performance optimizations, but a mobile device
does not, with the latter’s indifference time for a 256-bit row-segment requiring over 50 years.
In this particular scenario, SFaultMap would be the most sustainable solution.
6.4 Conclusion
SFaultMap provides a holistically energy-efficient solution to high fault rates in next
generation memory devices. Like ECP, SFaultMap can be used for tolerance of faults caused
by process variation such as bitline and wordline crosstalk in DRAM and endurance faults
in PCM. However, it provides this fault tolerance with a minimal area footprint at the cost
of some additional runtime energy consumption. Making small additions to the minimal
area footprint in SFaultMap+ can greatly benefit performance, to the extent that it can be
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the more sustainable solution within typical usage lifetimes. In other cases, e.g., high error
rates, performance adjustments are insufficient to warrant the additional embodied energy.
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7.0 FLOWER
7.1 The FLOWER Fault Map
FLOWER is a bit-level fault map which scales to extremely high fault rates to enable
protection of bits which are either susceptible to faults (i.e., weak) or have permanently
failed. This allows FLOWER to be applied to many memory technologies and fault types.
A particular strength of FLOWER is its relatively low area overhead compared to other
techniques which protect against very high error rates due in part to its Bloom filter-based
design. However, FLOWER provides several key innovations to the Bloom filter concept to
make it suitable for high fault-rate memory instrumentation.
FLOWER is implemented using a Bloom filter and returns a fault vector that is the same
width as the memory row. Each location with a fault is represented with a ‘1’ and fault free
cells with a ‘0.’ In a conventional Bloom filter design a unified array is used to store each
dimension of the filter. As such, a memory row addressed with N bits is mapped to an array
of rows addressed by k bits, such that k < N . The Bloom filter uses a hash function to map
each of the 2N memory rows to the 2k rows of the Bloom filter storage. Of course, as k < N ,
multiple memory rows will map to the same row in the Bloom filter storage. Thus, faults
recorded in the Bloom filter will always be reported for the row in which they exist, but false
positives will also be inadvertently reported for other rows that map to this location.
To minimize false positives with d-dimensional Bloom filters, d independent hash func-
tions map each row to d different locations, effectively superimposing d Bloom filters into
a unified array. For a fault to be reported, all hash functions, each of which returns a par-
tial fault vector (PFV), must agree the fault is present in the row into which each hash is
mapped. False positives are dramatically reduced, although not entirely eliminated, using
this method.
A two-dimensional example of this mapping to faults is shown in Figure 37. Row 1024
has faulty bits at columns 1 and 5 and row 16880 has faulty bits at columns 1, 3, and 4.
Row 1024 is translated to rows 417 and 780 by hash functions one and two, respectively.
79
Main Memory
FAULT FAULT
FAULT FAULT FAULT
Row 1024
Row 5092
Row 16880
Fault Map
2N Rows, M Columns Per Row
2K Rows, M Columns Per Row
Hash1 (1024),    Hash2 (5092)      = 417
Hash2 (1024),    Hash1 (16880)    = 780
Hash1 (5092),    Hash2 (16880)    = 921
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0
Row 417
Row 780
Row 921
Corresponding Fault Map Interpretation
FAULT FAULT
FAULT
FAULT FAULT FAULT
Row 1024
Row 5092
Row 16880
0      1        2        3        4        5
0      1        2        3        4        5
Figure 37: Two-Dimensional, unified-array FLOWER example. Red represents faulty cells.
M is the length of each row, N are the bits in the address space for the memory, and k are
the bits which result from the hash function
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Thus, for these rows, bits 1 and 5 are set to ‘1.’ Row 16880 maps to row 780 and 921 for
hashes one and two, respectively. In these rows, bits 1, 3, and 4 are set to ‘1.’ In general, for
a d-dimensional Bloom filter, each faulty cell will result in d cells set to one in the Bloom
filter, one for each hash.
Returning to the example, row 5092 in the memory has no faults, but maps to rows
417 and 921 in the Bloom filter. Because bit position 1 is set in both of these rows in the
filter, when accessing this row in the fault map, it reports a false positive: that location 1
is faulty due to the collision of data from rows 1024 and 16880. For a d-dimensional fault
map, fault vectors for a given row are constructed through the AND function of the PFVs
accessed from each of the d hash functions in the filter. Note, the faults for rows 1024 and
16880 are still reported correctly. The prevalence of false positives directly correlates to the
scalability and effectiveness of FLOWER; thus we will discuss techniques to minimize them
in the next section followed by a discussion of the FLOWER architecture along with an
in-memory processing extension in Section 7.1.2.
7.1.1 MinCI: A Tuned Hash for FLOWER
The application of a Bloom Filter for constructing a fault map that reaches high fault
rates can create more dense structures than commonly employed in other applications. Thus,
it is important to develop tuned hash functions that maximize the amount of information
retained in the hashes to minimize collisions in the filter. Moreover, there are several oppor-
tunities to tune the hash function to support architecture implementation. First, dividing the
d-dimensional Bloom filter storage into d smaller, independent subarrays, one for each of the
d hash functions, has some advantages for access latency through parallelism. Second, em-
ploying simpler hashing functions can further streamline the implementation of FLOWER.
In this section, we discuss these techniques to adjust our Bloom filter implementation to be
more efficient.
In order to motivate our approach we simulated several fault maps with different storage
capacities to study the use a unified array versus multiple arrays, one for each dimension.
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Maps of faulty cells were created using normal distributions to mimic the impact of process
variation and include spatial correlation of faults [85] (more details in Section 11.4).
First we consider the impact of using a Bloom filter using Murmur hashes with separate
subarrays. Using a block-based partitioning where for a d-dimensional fault map, each
dimension was allotted 1d the storage space as the unified array. The comparison of unified
vs separate subarrays for the Murmur hash in a FLOWER fault map are show in the blue and
orange bars, respectively, of Figure 39. The results show that multiple independent arrays
performed at least as well as the unified array often reducing false positive rates. Moreover,
this allows partial fault vectors for different hashes to be stored in separate sub-arrays in-
memory which can support parallel combination (e.g., using in-memory processing).
Murmur hashes, essentially pseudorandom hash functions, were designed to minimize
collisions in the unified array Bloom filter. In separate arrays, the d hashes no longer have
to consider collisions/overlap with one another to minimize false positives. They can in-
stead focus on collectively retaining the most information possible. Moreover, while simple
for software, most efficient Murmur hash implementations still require approximately 50 in-
structions, which is a significant complexity overhead for a hardware implementation. Thus,
to simultaneously minimize the complexity of the hashes while maximizing the information
retained by the filter we propose a minimum cumulative intersection (MinCI) of the address
space.
Our MinCI hashes are designed oﬄine for a particular memory size and fault map over-
head and are implemented at runtime by simple address bit masking. We define MinCI for
a given number of dimensions (d), address range (N), and hash size (h = k− log2d) to obey
the following properties. Each bit in the address space is used a (or a− 1) times. Each hash
shares b (or b− 1) bits with each other hash. Each hash shares c (or c− 1) bits total, across
all hashes. a, b, and c are minimized given the particular d, N , and h. These conditions for
the minimum cumulative intersection can be intuitively explained using an overlap matrix,
which shows how many times each hash overlaps with each other hash. An example of an
overlap matrix is shown Figure 38. Each cell contains the bi,j value corresponding to the
intersection of two hashes specified by the matrix row and column, while c refers to the sum
of overlap for a particular hash along each column (or row). When the conditions on a, b,
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and c are met, the sum of the elements of the overlap matrix will be minimized and equal
to the value given by Eq. 7.1:
overlapminci = 2 ∗
d−1∑
i=1
H(h ∗ d− i ∗N) ∗ (h ∗ d− i ∗N) (7.1)
where H refers to the Heaviside function [86]. Once MinCI masks are computed for a
particular N , d, and h, they can be used for any system which uses the same N , d, and h.
A simple MinCI example is also shown in Figure 38. In this example, d = 4, N = 9,
and h = 4. Each of the N bits is used by either one or two hashes, thus a = 2. Hash1
shares two bits with Hash2, and one bit with both Hash3 and Hash4, for a total of four
bits shared. Hash2−4 have similar overlaps such that b=2 and c=4. The gray and yellow
bars in Figure 39 show the false positive rate for the MinCI for both single (unified) and
multiple arrays, which indicate the MinCI approach considerably reduces false positives over
Murmur hashes. The multiple arrays version of MinCI degrades slightly over the unified
array; however, the difference is small compared to the improvement of MinCI over Murmur.
Thus, using the multiple array version of MinCI allows for several efficiency optimizations in
the memory architecture while providing effective false positive minimization for FLOWER.
7.1.2 FLOWER Architecture
FLOWER uses the memory it is protecting to store the fault-map. An example of this is
illustrated in Figure 40, where FLOWER is stored in one bank of a DRAM chip, protecting
the other banks in the chip. Efficiently storing and accessing FLOWER directly within the
memory also requires several adjustments to the memory system architecture. A traditional
solution for implementing d dimensions requires d memory reads, each retrieving a PFV
corresponding to each hash function. These PFVs can be combined with an AND operation
directly at the memory controller. These fault-map memory accesses are a considerable
overhead for each memory access; therefore we propose an in-memory approach to reduce
this overhead where possible for both DRAM [87, 88, 89] and PCM [90]. In our experimental
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Figure 38: 4 masks for MinCi hash functions assuming N = 9 address bits, d = 4 dimensions,
and h = 4 hash bits.
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Figure 40: DRAM Organization for FLOWER using in-memory logical operations.
evaluation we compare the performance of both memory controller and in-memory based
combination of FLOWER PFVs.
7.1.2.1 In-Memory FLOWER Access for DRAM To avoid the latency and energy
of multiple DRAM accesses on the memory bus we leverage in-memory cloning and logical
operations, proposed by [89]. A row can be cloned if the row is read into the row buffer and
then a second row is activated as the row buffer will override what is stored in the row [87].
Logical operations can be conducted by activating two rows simultaneously, along with a
third control row [88]. Along each bit line the voltages are combined such that if ≥2 of the
three rows contains a VDD the voltage will be driven to VDD and if ≤1, the value is driven
to VSS.
Reading from the in-DRAM FLOWER fault-map is shown in Figure 41. First in steps
1 and 2, the two DRAM rows corresponding to PFVs from the first two hash functions, H1,
H2–in the example rows A1, A2–are cloned to reserved rows R1 and R2. In step 3 the control
row Ctrl is initialized to ‘0’s. In step 4, rows R1, R2, Ctrl are opened simultaneously to
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Figure 41: In-memory 4D FLOWER reading example.
conduct the AND operation. Note the result of the AND operation is left in all three rows
and the row buffer [88]. Subsequent AND operations can be accomplished by cloning the
next dimension’s (e.g., H3) PFV, row A4 in the example, into one of the two reserved rows
(e.g., R2) [Step 5], resetting the ‘0’ row [Step 6], and completing the AND operation [Step 7].
In the example, after Step 10 the complete fault vector from a 4D map is available in the
row buffer and can be returned to the memory controller [Step 11]. For d dimensions, this
method requires d cloning, d− 1 AND, and d− 1 zeroing operations.
When applying MinCI in separate arrays to FLOWER with in-memory operations for
the example in Figure 41, steps 1-4 for dimensions 1 and 2 can be completed in parallel to
similar steps for dimensions 3 and 4 in independent subarrays. Then using similar steps to
5-7 the partial fault vector of dimensions 1 and 2 can be combined with the partial fault
vector for dimensions 3 and 4 and steps 8-10 can be eliminated. For d dimensions this reduces
the depth of computation from d-1 AND operations to log2 d AND operations.
7.1.2.2 In-Memory FLOWER for PCM In-memory logical operations in PCM can
be completed by simultaneously opening multiple rows, as in the DRAM case, using the
technique developed in [90]. However, rather than using a control row, the result of the AND
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function can be obtained by shifting the sensing threshold. For example, standard PCM
sensing tests between resistance (Ω) Ωhigh and Ωlow. By opening two rows simultaneously
each cell resistance is combined along the bitline and can be tested in parallel. By adjusting
the threshold to be halfway between Ωlow+low and Ωlow+high allows computation of the AND
operation [90]. Theoretically, more than two AND operations can be completed in a single
operation [90]. One key advantage of PCM in-memory logical operations over DRAM is that
no initial copying is needed prior to activating two rows directly. Thus, in-PCM memory
access of FLOWER functions in a similar fashion to the in-DRAM access from Figure 41 with
some simplifications due to the non-destructive read operation. Consequently, the process
of receiving a FLOWER result from PCM simply requires d − 1 comparisons. Similarly to
DRAM, in-memory PCM bitwise operations can function across rows in different sub-arrays
or banks on the same memory chip with a longer latency.
7.1.2.3 Updating the Fault Map While many faulty cells can be determined at the
time of manufacturing and testing memory devices, endurance-based faults typically occur
throughout the lifetime of the memory. PCM, Flash, and even DRAM can experience cells
that fail due to use. FLOWER naturally supports adding new faults into the fault map.
Once a new fault is detected, the previous fault vector (fv) for that row is updated with
the new fault (fv′). The Bloom filter is updated by replacing each hash function’s par-
tial fault vector (pfvi) with pfv′i = fv′ OR pfvi. Similarly to Sections 7.1.2.1 and 7.1.2.2,
this can be accomplished using in-memory OR operations, possible in both DRAM [88] and
PCM [90]. However, when using FLOWER with volatile main memory such as DRAM,
upon system startup, the DRAM map must be populated from secondary, non-volatile stor-
age. Thus, to protect against resident data loss, any new faults added to FLOWER have
a write-through policy, and must immediately write updated FLOWER addresses to sec-
ondary storage. While this might seem expensive, for all relevant fault modes new failures
occur very infrequently with respect to the lifetime of the device in question. Thus, fault
map updates have only a minor, negligible impact on performance.
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7.1.3 Implementation Details
The in-memory architecture, including combination of multiple partial fault vectors using
in-memory logical operations is about 20% faster and upwards of 40× more energy efficient
for DRAM [89], with potentially even higher speedups for PCM, compared to combining
partial fault vectors at the memory controller. However, FLOWER access is still a significant
overhead. Moreover, using a potentially faulty memory to store the fault map creates a
challenge to ensure that the fault map itself does not accrue faults.
7.1.3.1 Improving Performance Whether performing the join of FLOWER dimen-
sions in-memory or at the memory controller, the cost of accessing the fault map for every
address would be prohibitive, and unreasonable at low error rates. Thus, FLOWER imple-
mentations for low-fault rates and for faults which accrue over time should have an address
filter at the memory controller. This address filter is a simple, small, and fast first-level
Bloom filter that tracks which rows have at least one fault [32]. If a row does not hit in
the address filter, the row is fault free and accessing the fault map can be skipped. This
filter allows the fault map to avoid significant performance degradation through a 10−4 fault
incidence rate. The 10−4 fault rate is an important threshold, as it is the tolerable limit
for many existing schemes. Beyond this limit, the FLOWER fault map is still capable of
effectively representing fault rates of as much as 10−2 where the first level filter is less ef-
fective. Detailed performance results demonstrating the fault rate and performance tradeoff
are presented in Section 7.3.2.
7.1.3.2 Storing FLOWER Reliably Storing FLOWER within the memory device it is
protecting raises the question of reliable operation in a potentially faulty memory. However,
for most cases, the special operation of the fault map makes it unlikely to experience these
faults. Endurance-based faults and faults dependent on excessive write operations (such as
wordline crosstalk in DRAM) can be safely ignored due to insufficient write activity in the
fault map segment of the memory. Each row of the fault map would be written to at most M
times (where M is the number of bits in the row) over the course of the memory’s lifetime.
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Moreover, each cell is only ever initialized to ‘0’ and written one time to ‘1’ to represent
a faulty cell. Memories with high vulnerability to read disturbance can use probabilistic
refresh [14] or counter-based trees [16] to protect FLOWER without additional overhead.
Furthermore, a FLOWER implementation that combines partial fault vectors at the
memory controller can use ECC for protection. However, when electing to use in-memory
logical operations for FLOWER, these operations may introduce transient faults and cannot
be directly protected by ECC [89], because the ECC correction is not preserved over the AND
operation required to combine the Bloom filter dimensions together. Our FLOWER-specific
solution to this problem will be discussed in the context of FaME in Section 11.3.2. The next
section describes how FLOWER can be used to support existing fault tolerance techniques
for various types of technology specific faults (e.g., endurance faults) or those due to deep
technology scaling (e.g., crosstalk).
7.2 FLOWER for Fault Tolerance
There are several fault tolerance techniques [12, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 11] that assume a priori
knowledge of fault locations in order to provide fault tolerance. Most of these techniques
assume a runtime method to detect the faults (such as read after write) [96] and possibly
employ a fault cache to avoid adding these expensive tests [93, 17, 94, 95]. ArchShield uses
a word-level fault map [11]. Unfortunately, for high fault rates, fault caches and word-level
fault maps are ineffective. Additionally, read after write tests are often unreliable as faults
can be probabilistic or instigated by unrelated accesses. Moreover, they can accelerate further
cell failures in the case of endurance failures. Thus, FLOWER provides an alternative which
we discuss in the context of two examples, bitline crosstalk in DRAM and stuck-at faults in
PCM.
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7.2.1 DRAM Bitline Crosstalk
Recall from the background, bitline crosstalk in DRAM occurs probabilistically when
a “weak” cell and its surrounding cells are written with the same charge (“111” or “000”),
which we refer to as “bad patterns.” These weak cells are discoverable through system
testing [17] and can be used to populate the FLOWER fault map. Periodic Flip Encoding
(PFE) [12], is a technique to mitigate these bad patterns and significantly benefits from
knowledge of weak cell locations. As shown in Figure 42, PFE either flips the first, second,
or third bit (or no bits) of each 3-bit grouping to break up bad patterns. Red cells show
a bad pattern overlapping with a weak cell (high probability for a fault) and gold show a
bad pattern without a weak cell (no fault). PFE successfully avoids the fault in the (c)
“10” encoding even though some bad patterns exist in the encoding, due to the knowledge
of the location weak cells from the fault map. The authors of PFE specifically discuss the
need for a bit-level fault map for fault-aware protection [12], which provides an 100, 000×
improvement over fault-oblivious protection at a 10−4 fault incidence rate.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Weak
Cell
Weak
Cell
Weak
Cell
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1
Figure 42: Encoding “0x5D5” into a 12-bit (11...0) with weak cells as positions 7, 5, and 3,
using PFE.
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7.2.2 PCM Stuck-at Faults
Yielding optimized dependability assurance (YODA) [91] is a technique to use stuck-at
fault information to extend ECP from correcting p to 2p+1 faults1, where p is the number of
pointers, by adding one bit for inversion. YODA matches data to faults to determine stuck-
at right (SA-R) or wrong (SA-W) and points only to the SA-W values. YODA dynamically
writes rows of ‘0’s and ‘1’s to discover the faults, significantly degrading lifetime (between
2×–3×).
FLOWER can keep separate maps for different errors, such as stuck-at ‘1’ and stuck-
at ‘0’ faults, which can avoid lifetime reduction. However, in this instance, a single fault
vector of generic stuck-at locations along with the data currently stored is a sufficient, lower
overhead method to identify stuck-at ‘1’ and stuck-at ‘0’ faults. Nonetheless, the ability to
segregate types of faults that must be handled differently, such as stuck-at faults and cells
susceptible to write disturbance in PCM [97], is a useful capability of FLOWER.
7.3 Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of FLOWER and its capabilities in context of existingfault
tolerance schemes we conducted simulations of error rate analysis, lifetime improvement in
endurance limited memories (e.g., PCM), and performance impact. The lifetime results will
be left for the discussion of FaME (Chapter 11).
We first conducted a sensitivity study on the false positive rates when using one, two,
four, and eight fault map dimensions for both Murmur and MinCI hash functions. In general
we found that eight dimensions best minimized false positives while one and two dimensions
performed significantly less well. However, four dimensions performed nearly as well as eight,
while reducing the number of in-memory logical operations making four the best compromise.
A comparison of Murmur and MinCI hashing for four dimensions is shown in Figure 39.
The figure also shows at which area overhead point the adopted MinCI hash achieves fault
1This is classified as YODA1 [91]
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reporting rate with minimal false positives—i.e., approaching the stated incidence fault rate
indicated by a dashed line. Thus, unless otherwise specified, further results are reported for
4D MinCI hashes targeting separate arrays.
7.3.1 FLOWER for Enhanced Fault Tolerance
To begin, we analyze the improvement FLOWER-augmented fault tolerance provides to
uncorrectable bit error rate (UBER). We focus on the two cases from Section 7.2, Bitline
Crosstalk Correction in DRAM, and Stuck-at Fault Correction in PCM.
7.3.1.1 Bitline Crosstalk Correction (DRAM) Figure 43 provides an iso-area study
of the PFE algorithm [12] with and without FLOWER for a faulty cell rate of 10−3. It
also provides a comparison with a perfect “ideal” fault map for the same instantiations of
the FLOWER fault map. The PFE labels indicate the encoded block size. For example,
PFE16 adds two auxiliary bits for each 16-bit block resulting in a 12.5% overhead, with
PFE32, PFE64, and PFE128 requiring 6.25%, 3.13%, and 1.56% overhead, respectively.
When utilizing FLOWER, half of the auxiliary bits are repurposed for storing a fault map
of the same size. For example, the 4D fault map for PFE32 uses 6.25% overhead to encode
faults and 6.25% to store a fault map, making it comparable to PFE16 without a fault map.
For 12.5% total area overhead, fault-aware PFE32 with FLOWER outperforms fault-
oblivious PFE16 implementation by >125×. Comparing the achievable correction capabil-
ity of FLOWER to an perfect (100% overhead) bit-level fault map, PFE32+FLOWER is
within 50% of the ideal fault map with over 8x less area. At 6.25% total area overhead,
PFE+FLOWER has a similar advantage over no fault map and is close to the ideal map.
At the more coarse granularity dictated by 3.13% total overhead, PFE+FLOWER provides
less than an order of magnitude advantage. In this case, the loss of fault tolerance seems
to originate from significant reported false positives from FLOWER, as using an ideal fault
map would improve this result by two orders of magnitude.
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7.3.1.2 Stuck-at Fault Correction (PCM) Figure 44 demonstrates the benefits of
adding FLOWER to fault pointers for permanent faults for a 10−3 fault incidence rate. The
areas are set approximately equal by replacing some pointers with two fault maps (SA-
‘1’s and SA-‘0’s) and an additional “flip” auxiliary bit (see Section 7.2.2). For example,
ECP4 dedicates four pointers and spares (8% overhead) but can only handle four total
faults. YODA uses one, two, and three pointers with two 6.25%, 3.13%, and 1.56% over-
head FLOWER maps, respectively, while having the ability to handle three, five, and seven
reported faults, respectively. Total fault tolerance overheads are varied from 8% to 14%.
At 8% area overhead, YODA-2 and YODA-3 with FLOWER are superior to ECP4, with
the latter nearing two orders of magnitude improvement. By 10% area overhead, YODA-4
with FLOWER was sufficient to correct all possible faults in our SPEC [84] benchmark sim-
ulations, which without FLOWER requires ECP9. Thus, at this fault rate YODA (unlike
PFE) is tolerant of FLOWER’s false positives, making lower investments in fault map size
and higher investments in auxiliary bits appropriate for this scenario.
7.3.2 Performance Impact (DRAM)
The fault tolerance enabled by FLOWER does come at a cost. In addition to the area
overhead, there is a performance overhead from accessing the fault map. While somewhat
mitigated by filtering rows at low fault rates and leveraging in-memory processing, FLOWER
access latencies are non-negligible and block subsequent fault map accesses. To quantify the
FLOWER performance impact we studied different overheads at different initial fault rates.
Performance was simulated with the SNIPER full system simulator [65] using the architecture
parameters from Table 12. Each memory access includes the delay of the first-level filter
and upon a hit indicating at least one fault, the detailed fault-map is accessed as described
in Section 7.1.2.1. In these results we assume a 4D FLOWER implementation. The results
shown are for an average of 10 different fault maps3 using MinCI with independent arrays,
and are reported for an average nine SPEC CPU benchmarks. Results are conservatively
reported for DRAM due to the longer relative latency of in-memory AND operations compared
to PCM.
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Figure 45 shows detailed performance results, in terms of instructions per cycle (IPC), for
MinCI with multiple arrays at 6.25% fault map area overhead at different represented fault
rates and compared to turning off the first-level fault filter, which has the same performance
independent of error rate. The striped bars indicate the additional IPC achieved by using
in-memory operations instead of bringing the four dimensions individually into the memory
controller. Certain benchmarks, such as h264ref and libquantum, are not significantly
impacted by the FLOWER detailed fault map access, while others, such as perlbench, gcc,
and gromacs, can have over 25% reductions in performance at 10−2. However, a general trend
across all of the benchmarks is that ≤10−4 fault rates, the performance impact of FLOWER
is within 2% of an unprotected system, while still benefiting from the fault map, due to
the first-level filter. At 10−6, this 2% degradation comes almost entirely from the access
overhead of the address filter. Thus, FLOWER is competitive with previous techniques that
attempt to reach 10−4 fault rates. Moreover, FLOWER can operate successfully at fault
rates up to 10−2, which for compute oriented benchmarks is still competitive with a fault
free system. The significant performance impacts only occur for some applications, and only
once the concentration of faults reaches the 10−4 threshold where other correction schemes
no longer operate. Compared to the performance of ArchShield, which was reported as a 1%
performance degradation and handled up to 10−4 incidence fault rates, FLOWER maintains
within 2% performance degradation through 10−4. In this way, FLOWER allows the system
to perform correctly in a gracefully degraded mode after a 10−4 fault rate threshold.
Figure 46 shows the average normalized performance in IPC as fault rates increase from
10−6 to 10−2. Note, smaller area budgets become ineffective when a sufficient fault rate is
reached. Missing bars are excluded intentionally as they represent fault maps that report
fault rates higher than 10−1, thus providing insufficient accuracy. Depending on the desired
level of fault tolerance, the figure can help guide what fault map area budget is sufficient.
There is <1% performance degradation for ≤ 10−5 fault rate for each of the fault map
storage overheads. At 10−4, the viable limit of many other proposed correction schemes such
as ArchShield [11], MinCI still maintains <2% performance overhead for fault map storage
overheads of ≥1.56%. For fault rates above 10−4, the performance degrades, as expected,
due to increased hits in the first-level filter requiring more FLOWER accesses. At 10−3, the
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performance of MinCI with multiple arrays sees a 7% to 10% degradation, depending on the
storage budget with the smallest fault map overheads now insufficient to provide sufficient
fault resolution. By 10−2, the first level filter no longer provides any benefit (all rows appear
faulty) and at least a 6.25% area overhead is required.
7.4 Conclusion
We present FLOWER, a low-overhead bit-level fault map that facilitates unprecedented
levels of fault detection while enabling previously infeasible correction schemes. Our novel
hashing technique tuned for FLOWER, MinCI, allows improved false positives and perfor-
mance over traditional (e.g., disk-level) hashes such as Murmur. Our in-memory strategy
for multi-dimensional fault maps allows faster and more efficient fault map accesses than
traditional techniques conducted at the memory controller. FLOWER greatly enhances the
correction capability of a leading DRAM bitline crosstalk correction scheme, PFE, providing
an UBER improvement of over 125×. Similarly, FLOWER enables a pointer-based PCM
endurance fault tolerance scheme, YODA, to operate with enhanced lifetimes. While fault
map accesses do have performance overheads, in the typical range of operation for existing
systems (fault rates reaching 10−4), FLOWER has an average IPC degradation of < 2% with
a 1.6% area overhead across SPEC benchmarks. In gracefully degraded DRAM operation,
FLOWER can tolerate up to 10−2 fault rates with approximately 80% and 83% of origi-
nal average performance, for memory controller and in-memory processing, respectively, at
6-12.5% area overheads.
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Table 12: Architecture Parameters
CPU Cache
4 out-of-order cores Private L1 32KB Inst, 32KB Data
4 issue width, 4GHz clk Private L2 256KB/Core
45 nm Technology Associativity: 8 (L1 data and L2)
1GHz Frequency Block Size: 64B
Memory: DDR3-1066 (8-8-8)[98]
2 channels, 1 rank per channel, 8 banks per rank
4KB address filter, 3ns latency [32]
50ns (Subarray), 155ns (Inter-Bank) RowClone [87, 88]
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Figure 46: Average IPC over 9 SPEC Benchmarks for different fault map area overheads
(0.39% to 12.5%) and error rates (10−6 to 10−2). Striped bars indicate IPC improvement
from using in-memory operations.
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8.0 HOTH and Neutron Radiation Experiments
8.1 The HOTH Faultmap
To address the aforementioned issues with overhead at scale and fault tolerance, we
propose a fault map with a more efficient mapping and built-in protection. Our HOTH fault
map is similar in structure to a set-associative cache, where each way contains an identifying
tag, a pointer to the weak cell location within the row, and a replacement bit. To access
a way, a hash function on part of the physical address of the row maps it to an entry in a
dedicated section of memory. The remaining address bits are used for the tag to identify
existing weak cell entries. Figure 47 demonstrates the process of mapping an address to an
entry. The structure of HOTH is similar to Archshield, but an important distinction is that
the table entries are bit-level and implement TMR in HOTH, as opposed to being word-level
replicas in Archshield. Each entry is reproduced in triplicate, in-place, such that the fault
map itself is protected from faults.
As with any hash function, or set associative structure, there is potential for collisions
that exceed the number of ways. In caches, this requires eviction. However, in this context,
if the number of collisions exceeds the number of ways, the fault map will fail. This can
be detected and resolved by rebuilding the fault map with a new hash function; this is an
expensive operation, but as we will show, it has an extremely low probability and would
require a one time cost to rehash. To estimate the probability of this scenario, we can apply
the binomial probability of having k entries in any one of m buckets over n trials:
m
(
n
k
)(
1
m
)k(
1− 1
m
)n−k
(8.1)
The expression in Eq. 8.1 counts any situation where one or more buckets have k entries
separately, but in this context, any such instance is a failure. To collapse these duplicates, all
duplicate entries can be captured in a series, and then removed via the inclusion-exclusion
principle as follows:
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To quantify the probability of failure and overhead for HOTH on our specific system,
the memory size, row size, fault map size, and associativity are relevant. For a 16 GB
memory with 64 byte (512 bit) rows, we have 34 bits of address, 5 of which are used for byte
addressing. If 15 bits are hashed to determine the fault map row index, then the remaining
14 bits are used as tag bits. Thus, each entry in the fault map needs to store a 14 bit tag,
a bit to indicate it is in use, and 9 bits for a pointer and 1 spare bit. After applying TMR,
each entry requires 75 bits, thus, 6 entries will fit in each memory row. Setting the overall
fault map size to 128k entries (<0.05% overhead), we then have d128k6 e = 21846 rows in the
fault map. Based on how many weak and failed cells we anticipate, we can determine the
probability of failure using Eq. 8.2. If we expect to see 200 weak or failed bits, the failure
condition is computed with m = 21846, k = 7, and n = 200, resulting in a probability of
2.1 · 10−14 of requiring a different hash function. Extending this to 1000 and 10k vulnerable
bits, we expect failure with probability of 1.7 · 10−9 and 0.011 respectively. Empirically, we
observed 239 weak cells, composing a fault incidence rate of 2.5 · 10−13. Given that the table
failure is correctable, and the probability is only computed once for a given memory and set
of hash bits, we conclude that this is a reasonable set of parameters for HOTH in our system
architecture.
Access to the HOTH fault map will be a significant overhead, as it requires a read from
memory followed by a search for the entry that must occur after the read is completed.
Other systems that rely on a fault map have reported significant performance degradation
and have developed solutions to address this performance bottleneck, such as address Bloom
filters that filter access to the fault map when no faults appear in the fault map [32], which
consume cache resources and are not performance and area overhead free. Given that HOTH
leverages a form of ECC in Chipkill, this replaces the need for an address filter. The HOTH
faultmap will only be accessed in the infrequent case of a reported ECC failure making the
aggregate performance overhead extremely low while improving system reliability.
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8.2 Procedure
To test our hypotheses we created a test rig consisting of the computation equipment
described in Table 13. We arranged the rig to allow multiple DRAM DIMMs and the chips
that comprise the DIMM to be placed into a linear path in a radiation beam at the Los
Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) as shown in Figure 48. The figure actually shows
the equipment from multiple concurrent experiments in the path of the beam, including the
exposure of Intel Optane (XPoint) Solid State Memory (in vertically oriented motherboard),
which we comment on further in Section 8.3.4. The motherboards with the DRAM under
test were at the front of the beam path arranged horizontally. The DIMMs are shown in
detail in Figure 49 and were oriented so that the path of the neutron beam was parallel to
the DRAM and the center of the beam was aligned through the middle of the center DIMMs,
which were arranged in rows of four. The objective of this organization was to minimize the
scattering and maximize radiation exposure of the motherboards and CPU while focusing
the beam on the DDR3 under test. A 1-inch collimator was used, and the average total
fluence of the neutron radiation per bin was 3.74 · 1010 J/cm2.
In order to test the memory function during the radiation exposure in as lightweight a
manner as possible, MemTest86 Pro version 7.5 [99] was used. This software runs at the
BIOS level before the full OS is loaded, minimizing the memory footprint required while
testing. The procedure was to run four sequential instances of MemTest86 Test 5 (moving
inversions, random pattern). During the test, any bitflips detected would be automatically
saved as part of the testing report to an external flashdrive connected via a 12 foot USB
extension cable (to be completely out of the path of the beam). At the conclusion of these
four sequential tests, the system would automatically reboot and begin the testing again, to
save into a separate log. On the very few occasions where the system crashed during testing,
it would be automatically rebooted without saving the failure log. This testing procedure
was also conducted before turning the beam on, to verify the memory we were using had no
observable faults and was fully functional in a standard operating environment.
Through the testing period, we observed two distinct phases: testing in the direct path
of the neutron radiation beam for three days, and testing the rigs outside the path of the
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radiation beam afterwords for four days. With this second test, we observed errors caused
by the decay of irradiated material without direct neutron bombardment in order to observe
if there were any noticeable differences in our hypothesis of weak cell existence and their
prevalence.
8.3 Results
In Section 8.3.1 we first discuss the observed results from our neutron radiation tests,
and then in Section 8.3.2 we use our observed results to approximate fault rate of HOTH
compared to standard ECC-based fault mitigation strategies.
8.3.1 Experimental Results
The results from the beam testing experiment are shown in Table 14. Byte-level errors
were only observed when the rig was placed in the beam (phase 1), despite the slightly
longer testing period out of the beam (phase 2). We can see in both phases that a very
small percentage of the total cells, weak cells, make up a majority of the errors observed.
The definition of a weak cell for a given threshold T is that the bit experiences a number of
faults F such that F > T . Some cells entirely failed, becoming stuck at a particular value,
which are reported separately from weak cells.
In the beam, 82 weak cells were responsible for 67.3% of the total (not including stuck-at)
errors observed, and all experienced at least 50 bitflips each (T=50). During the experiment
17 weak cells became effectively stuck. When combining weak and stuck-at cells, the total
percentage of single bit faults covered was >95%. “Random” bit flips are the total bit flips
minus the stuck-at and weak cell bit flips. Thus, as more cells are classified as weak, fewer
cells are random, and vice versa. For the total number of non-stuck errors experienced,
the expected probabilistic value of bit flips per bit is less than one, so T=3 (four or more
flips) is already a significantly higher percentage than random chance, making it a sufficient
threshold to weakness classification.
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One aim of the experiment was to test for an architectural relationship between the
locations of the weak and stuck cells. Figure 50 depicts a heat map in terms of number of bit
flips for T=3, where stuck-at cells were considered saturated at the highest number of weak
cell faults. Among these cells, there was no noticeable architectural trend (columns/chip
correlations), and each memory row had at most one weak cell. Accordingly, this heat map
and other heat maps of weak cells with other data groupings do not appear to have any
distinguishable patterns (such as repeated offsets) that might not be obvious from statistical
analysis. Thus, there is no evidence of any architectural relationship between the locations
of the weak cells or permanently failed cells.
Figure 51 shows the heat map of bit flips when the weak and stuck cells are excluded,
showing that byte-level errors dominate this distribution. We hypothesize that each byte of
every word belongs to the same chip, which experiences latch-up, which is why a noticeable
pattern of chip failures across rows is repeated every 64 bits. Using Chipkill, the codewords
would be interleaved across the chips, allowing it to tolerate byte-level errors from a single
chip. In this case, the repeating pattern of byte errors every 64 bits would not be observed
on the row level, but would be observed in adjacent rows.
In the next subsection, we use these frequencies of byte-level, weak/stuck cell, and ran-
dom faults in Table 14 to evaluate the impact of HOTH on expected UBER.
8.3.2 HOTH Fault Tolerance Results
To evaluate the correction capability of HOTH compared with traditional error correction
methodologies of SECDED and Chipkill, we probabilistically generated a larger fault stimuli
set using the frequencies of byte-level faults, weak-cell faults, and random faults reported in
Section 8.3.1. For modeling, we assumed byte-level, weak-cell, and random faults occurred
with independent probability and scaled linearly with the radiation flux.
Throughout the various UBER calculations, we use the same three thresholds for weak
cells (T=3,10,50) presented in Table 14. Naturally, as T increases, more faults are moved
into the random category, and the frequency of random faults increase, while the frequency
of a weak cell flipping also increases (though the total number of weak cells decreases).
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Figure 52 demonstrates the UBER per radiation flux for storing data in a row with
exactly one weak cell. The reported flux x is defined as a scaled factor from the radiation
in the beam experiment with an approximate time of 10s between accesses: x = 3.74 ·
1011 J/cm2/s. We report results scaled from 0.1x to 10x. Results are reported for a row with
a “typically” weak cell (circa T=10) with up error bars showing only extremely weak cells
(T >50) and down error bars showing borderline weak cells (circa T=3). While undergoing
neutron bombardment (phase one) for radiation rate x, the weak cells in the experiment
on average have a 1%-2% flip. This is considerably higher than observed random byte-
level faults and individual flips and why ”no correction” is so poor in these rows. Using
HOTH’s fault map alone, the UBER can be improved to close to 10−12. ECC1 slightly
improves upon this by also covering the random bit flips, though its correction capability is
hindered by its inability to protect the frequent byte-level faults that occur in the same chip
yielding a <1% improvement. Chipkill (CK) outperforms ECC1 with 38-87× improvement,
depending on cell weakness, due to its ability to tolerate byte-level latchup faults in addition
to single bit flips. Augmenting Chipkill with HOTH provides a substantial 7 ∗ 108 to 9 ∗
108 × UBER improvement, depending on cell weakness, over Chipkill alone. Essentially,
CK+HOTH provides an extremely low-overhead “poor man’s” ECC2 where at least one
fault is predictable. This highlights the value of weak cell knowledge in high radiation
environments. Figure 52 shows that as flux is scaled, the UBER magnitude follows the flux
trend, but the seven orders of magnitude in improvement of adding HOTH over CK scales.
Using TMR for the HOTH faultmap at x flux results in a HOTH access UBER of
5.3 · 10−26, which is significantly better than the best case UBER of weak cell DRAM data
protected HOTH+Chipkill (10−22).
The error rates observed after the devices were removed from the beam and subject to
secondary radiation (phase 2) are shown in Figure 53. Scaling x assumes a scaled dose of that
magnitude to generate the secondary radiation. HOTH alone achieves an UBER between
4 · 10−13 and 8 · 10−14, depending on cell weakness. ECC1 only protects slightly better than
HOTH alone. ECC1 and Chipkill are indistinguishable, as there are no longer multi-bit
latchup faults. However, the correction capability of HOTH combined with Chipkill (similar
to HOTH+ECC1) yields a 7 · 108× to 2 · 108× improvement, depending on cell weakness,
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reducing the probability of error to the probability that two or more random errors occur
in the same word. The out-of-beam UBER with TMR and Chipkill to protect the HOTH
fault map is 3.3 · 10−30, which, again, is many orders of magnitude better than the UBER of
HOTH+Chipkill, and thus can be safely used to protect it.
8.3.3 Correlation Non-Radiation Reliability Concerns
To test if the weak cells due to radiation were correlated to other sources of reliability
concerns, we attempted to determine cells due to cross talk discovered through row ham-
mering. We relaxed the refresh rate of the DRAM and performed the rowhammer memory
test to observe the locations of these weak cells from crosstalk. Using a threshold of T=3
over 28 tests, we observed 2,639 cells weak to rowhammering, and for a threshold of T=10,
we observed 324 cells. None of these weak cells overlapped with any of the hundreds of cells
weak or stuck due to radiation, indicating no apparent correlation between these forms of
weakness. This result is not entirely unexpected, as prior work showed there was no correla-
tion between other forms of weakness, such as cells with lower retention time and cells weak
to rowhammering [14].
8.3.4 Secondary Qualitative Results
We observed BRAM (SRAM-based) memory in four Xilinx Zynq FPGAs. In total, there
were fewer faults observed over six days in the beam (double the DRAM time) with 4,605
total bit flips. There was no apparent architectural pattern associated with bit flips, and no
bit flipped more than twice. We also tested an Intel Optane Memory [29]. Over a 2.5 day
period of consecutive reads and writes, we observed no faults. Unfortunately, the rig failed
due to radiation scattering. In post-experiment testing, the Optane was still fault free.
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8.4 Conclusions
As process scaling continues, resulting in increased process variation, it has been observed
that DRAM and other memories have “weak cells,” which are significantly more vulnerable
than other cells to a particular type of fault. While this has been demonstrated for retention
and cross talk, in this work, we provide evidence that radiation is another fault mode that has
an imbalance of vulnerability in DRAM cells leading to “radiation weak cells.” We propose
a new, low-overhead fault map, HOTH, to redundantly represent these cells, thus providing
substantial benefits to UBER both during radiation exposure and due to secondary radiation
after exposure (≥ 108×). This demonstrates the potential to leverage COTS memory in
radiation compromised environments. Our future experiments will explore more types of
radiation exposures and additional memory technologies and architectures.
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Hash
Compare &
Select
V0 V1 V2 Tag0 Tag1 Tag2 Ptr2Ptr1Ptr0 R0 R1 R2
V0 V1 V2 Tag0 Tag1 Tag2 Ptr2Ptr1Ptr0 R0 R1 R2
V0 V1 V2 Tag0 Tag1 Tag2 Ptr2Ptr1Ptr0 R0 R1 R2
V0 V1 V2 Tag0 Tag1 Tag2 Ptr2Ptr1Ptr0 R0 R1 R2
V0 V1 V2 Tag0 Tag1 Tag2 Ptr2Ptr1Ptr0 R0 R1 R2
V0 V1 V2 Tag0 Tag1 Tag2 Ptr2Ptr1Ptr0 R0 R1 R2
TMR TMR
Physical
Address Ptr & R
TMR
Figure 47: Architecture for the HOTH fault map. A masked physical address is hashed to
table rows, each bin has 6 “ways.” Each way uses remaining physical address to test “tag”
bits for valid “V” entries. The payload is the appropriate pointer and spare bit. Entries are
protected with TMR as indicated.
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Figure 48: Neutron beam test at Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE).
Figure 49: Detailed rig with DIMMs parallel to beam path highlighted in white.
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Table 13: Devices under test
Motherboard 2 ASUS Q87M-E/CSM, DDR3 1600MHz, LGA 1150
DRAM 8 Patriot Viper 3 Series, Black Mamba, 4GB (Micron)
Processor 2 Intel Core I3-4160, 3.60 GHz, 2-Core Hyper-Threading
Table 14: Results from neutron radiation experiment
In Beam Out of Beam
Total Bits Written 9.42374E+14 2.61051E+15
Byte-level Errors 754 0
Number of Weak Cells, T=3 239 174
Number of Weak Cells, T=10 155 141
Number of Weak Cells, T=50 82 101
Weak Cells T=3 Total Flips 31948 122689
Weak Cells T=10 Total Flips 21128 111873
Weak Cells T=50 Total Flips 19394 98352
Permanent Failed Bits 30
Random (T=3) Flips 1027 90
Random (T=10) Flips 1453 297
Random (T=50) Flips 3187 1376
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Figure 50: Weak and stuck-at cell heatmap (T=10) over groups of rows for 16 adjacent 32
bit word accesses. Rows split evenly according to address space.
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Figure 51: Heatmap of all bitflips excluding weak cells and stuck-at cells over groups of rows
for 16 adjacent 32 bit word accesses.
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Figure 52: UBER for rows with one weak cell based on frequency of failures in the neutron
radiation beam assuming different weak cell thresholds. Error bars show range based on cell
weakness.
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Figure 53: UBER for rows with one weak cell based on frequency of failures after the
neutron radiation beam assuming different weak cell thresholds. Error bars show range of
cell weakness.
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9.0 PFE: Periodic Flip Encoding
9.1 Design
PFE is a simple and effective solution to reduce the number of ‘000’ and ‘111’ sequences in
data to be written, which is based on flipping ‘0’ and ‘1’ of sub blocks interleaved throughout
the data. Specifically, to write an N -bit data word, W = x0, ..., xN−1, we propose a low
overhead PFE technique that reduces the occurrence of bad patterns by partitioning W into
3-bit groups. We either keep the original data unchanged or flip a specific bit (1st bit, 2nd
bit, or 3rd bit) in all groups to obtain three possible code words, W1, W2, and W3. The
code word that minimizes the number of bad patterns is selected. To decode the generated
code word, the encoder should supplement the data word with two auxiliary bits to record
which of the four code words were used and enable the decoder to retrieve the original data
word through simple logic operations.
We use the idea of PFE to tolerate crosstalk errors via two different modes: fault-
oblivious PFE and fault-aware PFE. In fault-oblivious PFE, all four code word candidates
are generated and the code word containing the minimum number of bad patterns is written
in memory without knowing the location of weak cells. In fault aware PFE, a generated
off-line map of weak cells maintains information about the location of weak cells and is used
to minimize or avoid the overlap of bad patterns and weak cells. We describe the two modes
of PFE in the following sections.
9.1.1 Fault Oblivious PFE (PFEFO)
Figure 54 depicts fault-oblivious PFE. Figure 54(a) shows the original data word ap-
pended by two auxiliary bits set to ‘00’ to indicate that no bits are flipped in the encoded
data word. In addition to the bad patterns in the original data word, the last bit of the
data word and the two auxiliary bits are concatenated, and thus may introduce a new bad
pattern. For example, concatenating ‘000’ and ‘00’ in Figure 54(a) increases the number of
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‘000’ sequences from two to four. Note that if k consecutive zero (one) bits are concatenated
with ‘0’ (‘1’), the number of ‘000’ (‘111’) sequences is k+1. Figure 54(b) shows the code
word when flipping the first bit of each group. While flipping the first bit of each group
breaks up the first ‘000’ sequence, it introduces other ‘111’ sequences that are equally prob-
lematic. Figure 54(c) flips the second bit of each group and removes all bad patterns from
the data word. Finally, Figure 54(d) toggles the third bit of each group which results in four
bad patterns. Hence, PFE examines four possible code words and selects the one with the
minimum number of bad patterns to be written into memory. Note that this type of PFE
does not require any information about the location of weak cells.
9.1.2 Fault-Aware PFE (PFEFA)
In contrast to fault-oblivious PFE where the encoded candidate with the minimum num-
ber of bad patterns is chosen, fault-aware PFE utilizes weak cell information to select the
code word that minimizes (or eliminates) the occurrence of crosstalk errors. As will be shown
in Section 9.3, PFEFA has the additional advantage of being able to guarantee the mitigation
of at least three weak cells in a block. When writing an N-bit data word, W = x0, ..., xN−1
onto N DRAM cells c0, ..., cN−1, PFEFA uses information about the weakness of cells to select
the code word that avoids the overlap of the center of a 3-bit bad pattern with a weak cell.
(a)	
(b)	
(c)	
(d)	
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
Figure 54: Encoding W = 0x638 using PFE.
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A map of weak cells can be discovered as part of memory regression tests during the
memory testing phase. For example, this testing can write bad patterns (all zeros, all ones,
alternating 01’s, etc.) many times to map out the locations of weak cells or by using well-
known testing algorithms [17, 25, 100]. The weak cell information can be stored in resident
memory and cached in the on-chip cache on-demand, as was proposed in [11]. Alternatively,
the weak cell information can be stored in a ROM that can be accessed by the hardware.
9.2 Memory Controller Implementation
Figure 55 shows the implementation flow of fault-aware PFE in a memory controller.
The memory controller first computes the address of the fault map entry and then checks ¬
whether the entry exists in the last level cache or not. If not, a request is issued to the main
memory ­ in order to bring and store the fault map entry of the corresponding address in
the last level cache [11]. The location of weak cell(s) is temporarily recorded in a weak cell
Map (WCM). The 512-bit original data and WCM ® are then divided into 32-bit blocks
and sent to 16 encoding modules that leverage the weak cell information to map each 32-bit
block to 34-bit code words. The encoding module utilizes a priority encoder ¯ to select the
code word which avoids the overlap of bad patterns with the location of weak cells. The 16
encodings are done in parallel and the final 16 generated code words are concatenated and
sent °, along with the memory address, to be written in memory ­.
The PFEFO encoder implementation is similar to the PFEFA encoder implementation
except that it does not include the fault map generator. Furthermore, it requires 5-bit
counters in the encoding modules to count the number of bad patterns in each of the four
generated code words to select the code word with the minimum number of bad patterns.
For a 512-bit cache line, PFEFO encoder requires 64 5-bit counters that produce an extra
cost area overhead in comparison to PFEFA encoder.
Note that an additional step may be required to unscramble the logical bit locations in
order to determine the logical locations of physically neighboring bits, which are subjected
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Figure 55: Memory controller implementation of fault aware PFE.
to the highest levels of crosstalk. This information, which is known to vendors, can also be
discovered [17].
9.3 Tolerance Capability
Given the four code word candidates from PFE, in PFEFA there are some guarantees
that can be made about the protection capability. In what follows, we will first prove that
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PFEFA can tolerate atleast three of the weak cells storing the data bits, then we will present
an extension which will enable PFE to tolerate at least three weak cells in either the data
bits or the auxiliary bits.
Theorem 1. If an N -bit data word, W = x0, ..., xN−1, is to be written to N cells,
c0, ..., cN−1, then using PFEFA encoding will tolerate at least three weak cells assuming that
the auxiliary bits used in the encoding are stored in a reliable memory.
Proof: Given any sequence of three consecutive bits p = “xi−1 xi xi+1”, applying
the three PFE transformations will change this sequence to p1 = “x′i−1 xi xi+1”, p2 =
“xi−1 x′i xi+1” or p3 = “xi−1 xi x′i+1”, where x′ is the complement of x. Table 15 indicates
that for any sequence, p, at most one of p, p1, p2 and p3 will be equal to ‘000’ or ‘111’.
Hence, if ci is a weak cell, then three of the four sequences p, p1, p2 or p3 (and thus three of
the four PFE code words) will tolerate the weakness of this cell. Consequently, if three cells
ci, cj and ck are weak, 0 < i, j, k < N − 1, then at least one of the four PFE code words
will tolerate the weakness of the three cells. 
If two auxiliary bits xN and xN+1 are used to indicate which of W , W1, W2, or W3 is
used in the encoding and these bits are written to the two cells cN , cN+1 following the data
cells, then it is only possible to prove that PFE can tolerate the weakness of at least two of
the cells c0, ..., cN+1. This is because the two auxiliary bits can generate a bad pattern in
more than one of the four possible encodings. However, we will prove in the next theorem
that by using three auxiliary bits, xN , xN+1 and xN+2 to record which of the code words,
W , W1, W2, or W3 is used, and storing these bits in the three cells cN , cN+1 and cN+2, it
is possible to tolerate the weakness of at least three of the N + 3 cells storing the data and
the auxiliary bits. Specifically, we define PFE+ as a PFE scheme which uses three auxiliary
bits such that ‘000’ indicates the original data word, ‘100’ indicates the encoding in which
bit xN−3 is flipped (call it W1), ‘010’ indicates the encoding in which bit xN−2 is flipped (call
it W2) and ‘001’ indicates the encoding in which bit xN−1 is flipped (call it W3). With this
scheme, we prove the following:
Theorem 2. If an N -bit data word, W = x0, ..., xN−1, is to be written to N cells,
c0, ..., cN−1, then using fault aware PFE+ encoding with the three auxiliary bits xN , xN+1
116
and xN+2 written into cells cN , cN+1 and cN+2, will tolerate at least three weak cells ci, cj
and ck, 0 < i, j, k < N + 2.
Proof: It was shown in the proof of Theorem 1 that if ci, 0 < i < N − 1, is a weak
cell, then three of the four code words, W, W1, W2 and W3 will tolerate the weakness of
this cell. Here, we will prove that the same applies to any weak cell, ci, N − 1 ≤ i < N + 2.
For this, we observe that the five bits xN−2 ... xN+2 will have one of four possible forms:
“xN−2 xN−1 000” (if W is used), “xN−2 xN−1 100” (if W1 is used), “x′N−2 xN−1 010” (if W2
is used), “xN−2 x′N−1 001” (if W3 is used). We consider the following three cases:
1. Cell cN+1 is weak: the three bits xN , xN+1, xN+2 can produce a bad pattern (000)
only if W is used in the encoding. Hence, the three other encodings can tolerate a weak
cN+1.
2. Cell cN is weak: the 3-bit sequence xN−1, xN , xN+1 can equal “xN−1 00”, “xN−1 10”,
“xN−1 01” or “x′N−1 00” if W,W1,W2, or W3 are used for the encoding, respectively. Hence,
“xN−1 xN xN+1” cannot be equal to 111 and can only be equal to 000 either if W is used
(when xN−1 = 0) or if W2 is used (when xN−1 = 1). In other words, for any value of xN−1,
three encodings can tolerate a weak cN .
3. Cell cN−1 is weak: the 3-bits sequence xN−2, xN−1,
xN can equal: “xN−2 xN−1 0,” “xN−2 xN−1 1,” “x′N−2
xN−1 0,” or “xN−2 x′N−1 0” if W, W1, W2, or W3 are used for the encoding, respectively. It is
straightforward to check that for any specific values of xN−2 xN−1, only one of the encodings
W, W1, W2, or W3 will produce 000 or 111. Hence, the three other encodings can tolerate
a weak cN−1.
Consequently, if three cells ci, cj and ck are weak, 0 < i, j, k < N + 2, then at least one
of the four encodings will tolerate the weakness of the three cells. 
Clearly PFE relies on the specific information about the nature of the faults to largely
outperform more general error correcting codes. Specifically, at least 2logN and 3logN
auxiliary bits have to be used when ECC-2 and ECC-3 are used to tolerate the errors resulting
from two or three weak cells, respectively. In contrast, only 2 or 3 auxiliary bits (independent
of N) are needed to tolerate two or three faults using PFE or PFE+, respectively. Moreover,
ECC-k cannot tolerate more than k faults while PFE and PFE+ can tolerate more than two
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Table 15: PFE transformations of 3-bit sequences.
p 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
p1 100 101 110 111 000 001 010 011
p2 010 011 000 001 110 111 100 101
p3 001 000 011 010 101 100 111 110
or three faults, respectively, with some probability. This is because when q instances of the
same 3-bit bad pattern overlap q weak cells, the same code word in PFE/PFE+ will tolerate
all q weak cells. Note, however, that PFE/PFE+ are designed to tolerate errors induced by
crosstalk faults, while ECC can tolerate errors due to any type of faults, including transient
faults. To overcome this limitation, it is possible to combine PFE+ with ECC-k to tolerate
k transient and three crosstalk faults. This will be more efficient than using ECC-(k + 3)
to tolerate the same faults. Finally, PFE/PFE+ encoding and decoding are much simpler
than ECC-2/ECC-3 and leads to a much simpler implementation as described next.
9.4 Experimental Methodology
To evaluate the fault tolerance capability of ECC, ECP, FFE, and PFE, we developed a
PIN-based simulator [101] to model the cache hierarchy in order to determine the accesses to
main memory. We also used the Gem5 full system simulator [66] to evaluate the performance
overheads of the PFE fault aware scheme. The system parameters were designed to be
similar in both simulation environments and a listing of the relevant parameters for Gem5
are shown in Table 16. The PIN simulator uses a similar L1/L2 cache configuration. To
evaluate the fault-rate, the PIN simulator evaluates main memory writes by encoding the
data and recording a fault if the center bit of a bad pattern in the encoded block is aligned
with a weak cell. To model weak cells of the memory, maps of weak cells were created
using Bayesian distributions to mimic the impact of process variation and include spatial
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correlation of faults [21, 85]. We followed the model described in [85] to generate maps of
weak cells.
Errors can be mitigated by (1) reducing the probability that bad patterns coincide with
weak cells by reducing the number of bad patterns, as in FFE (Four-to-Five Encoding) and
PFEFO, (2) avoiding bad patterns that coincide with weak cells, as in PFEFA or (3) correcting
faults, as in ECC. ECP can be used to protect against potential faults by pointing to weak
cells and providing reliable storage for their content (will be called ECPFO). Alternatively,
ECP can be used to correct faults by pointing to and storing the values of weak cells that
overlap with the center of any bad pattern (will be called ECPFA). We consider both
approaches.
In our experimental tests, we measure UBER when applying FFE, PFE, ECP, or ECC.
The amount of storage overhead for all of these schemes is summarized in Table 17 where
k, in ECC-k and ECP-k, refers to the maximum number of errors that can be corrected by
the scheme. We consider 512-bit cache lines that are divided into n-bit protected blocks.
For FFE, n is always 4 and for PFE we use n=32. We use ECC-132 and ECC-1128 to denote
single error correcting ECC with n = 32 and n = 128, respectively. Finally, we use n =
512 for ECP because it results in 10-bit pointers, compared to 6-bits for 32-bit blocks. This
makes the overhead of ECP-3 comparable to the overheads of PFE and ECC-1128, and the
overhead of ECP-12 comparable to the overhead of FFE.
We model our fault-aware implementations as described in Section 9.2, where the memory
controller must obtain the fault map entry. If the fault map entry is not cached, this can
increase traffic on the memory bus, impacting performance. To illustrate this performance
overhead, we compare a conservative system without a fault map cache (MemCTRL) to an
Table 16: Simulator Parameters
CPU 4-core, 8-issue width per core, out of order
L1 Cache 16K private Inst. & Data, 8-way set-assoc.
L2 Cache 1MB shared 16-way set-assoc.
Cache Block 512-bits
Write Buffer 64-entries
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Table 17: Bit overheads for fault tolerance schemes.
ECC-k FFE PFE ECP-k
Overhead per n-bit block k(dlog(n)e+ 1) dn4 e 2 k(dlog(n)e+ 1) + 1
ECC-132 ECC-232 ECC-1128 FFE PFE ECP-3 ECP-12
Block size 32 128 4 32 512
Overhead bits per block 6 11 8 1 2 31 121
Overhead % 18.75% 34.37% 6.25% 25% 6.25% 6.05% 23.63%
ideal system (MemDIMM). The conservative system requires access to the memory bus for
each encoding operation while the ideal system knows the fault map and can encode the
data on the memory DIMMs directly, without incurring additional memory traffic due to
querying the fault map.
We performed our evaluations for workloads from the PARSEC [70] and selected SPEC
CPU2006 [71] benchmarks1 for different maps of weak cells including the moderate and high
weak cell rates of 0.01% and 1%, respectively. In this context, the weak cell rate is defined
as the fraction of weak cells relative to the total number of DRAM cells.
9.5 Results
9.5.1 Fault-Oblivious Effectiveness
Knowledge of both the location of weak cells and bad patterns is necessary for a fault-
aware scheme in the context of intra-row crosstalk. FFE and PFEFO attempt to minimize
the number of bad patterns without regard to the location of weak cells. Thus, it selects the
encoding with the fewest bad patterns and upon a tie selects a candidate arbitrarily.
FFE requires a 25% encoding overhead (see Table 17). For an iso-storage-overhead
comparison, we combined PFE with ECC-132 (PFEFO+ECC-132), which requires the same
overhead of eight bits (2+6) required for FFE. We also compare with the ECPFO-12 approach
1The benchmarks selected were those we were able to run successfully within gem5. All SPEC CPU2006
benchmarks were tested using the PIN tool for fault tolerance and are consistent with the results presented
here.
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Figure 56: Comparison of “moderate-overhead” (∼25%) fault-oblivious approaches of FFE
with ECPFO-12 and PFEFO+ECC-132.
with similar overhead (24%). Figures 56(a) and 56(b) show this comparison for weak cell
incidence rates of 0.01% and 1%, respectively. For the 0.01% rate of weak cells, the UBER
of FFE is 1.2 × 10−5. However, for the same overhead, ECPFO-12 does a much better job
achieving an UBER of approximately 2.3 × 10−6 while PFEFO with ECC-132 is even more
effective with an UBER of approximately 2.5 × 10−7. FFE demonstrates its scalablility to
higher numbers of weak cells reaching an UBER of approximately 6× 10−3 with a weak cell
incidence rate of 1%. ECPFO-12 degrades UBER to match FFE at the UBER of 8.3× 10−3.
In contrast, PFEFO+ECC-132 still provides an UBER of 5× 10−5.
Although the proposed techniques decrease the susceptibility to crosstalk through avoid-
ing bad patterns, they cannot completely guarantee tolerance to crosstalk faults. Addition-
ally, bad patterns may be formed when consecutive blocks are concatenated or when the
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number of weak cells is larger than what can be tolerated. A single parity bit can also be
added to provide a capability to detect an uncorrectable fault similar to the addition of a
parity bit in ECC-k to detect a (k + 1)th fault. However, the greatest value of using PFE
in combination with an ECC-k is to increase the effectiveness of ECC with a much lower
overhead than moving to ECC-(k + β) for β > 1.
9.5.2 Fault-Aware Effectiveness
In this section, PFEFA is compared to ECC-1128 and ECPFA-3. Each scheme has a storage
overhead of approximately 6% additional bits (see Table 17). ECP can be fault-aware in a
similar fashion to PFEFA by similarly retrieving the fault locations from the on-chip cache
and using the pointers only to store the corrected values for locations at which a bad patterns
and weak cells intersect.
Figures 57(a) and 57(b) show the comparison of PFEFA with ECC-1128 and ECPFA-3 for
a weak cell incidence rate of 0.01% and 1%, respectively. For the 0.01% weak cell incidence
rate, ECC-1 achieves an UBER of 6.8×10−6 while ECPFA achieves an UBER of 1.4×10−6. In
contrast, PFE at 0.01% error produced no errors during our experiments. From the number
of writes and repeated experiments, this guarantees that in the worst case it has an UBER of
at most 3× 10−12. This actually exceeds the capability of PFEFO+ECC-132 with a 75% less
storage overhead. For the 1% weak cell incidence rate, even with fault-awareness, ECP is
only able to correct one-third of the faults dropping below ECC-1’s roughly 50% correction
rate at the UBER of 2.5× 10−3. In contrast, PFE still reaches an UBER of 1.3× 10−5 and
corrects 99.7% of the faults.
9.5.3 Impact on Performance
To enable a fault-aware implementation of PFE and ECP requires additional memory
accesses to query the weak cell locations if they miss in the cache, which is an overhead.
This is described in Section 9.2. The performance overhead only impacts writing, while read
operations proceed normally with a small increase in delay due to decoding (see Table 18).
The encoding overheads for fault-oblivious schemes of 2ns or less (see Table 18) combined
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with the fact that this encoding could occur in the write-buffer, which masks write latency,
resulted in a negligible impact on performance. Thus we only report the performance im-
pact of the fault-aware schemes, which also include this encoding delay in addition to the
access to the weak cell map. These performance overheads are reported as instructions per
cycle (IPC) in Figure 58 and compared against the performance of a fault-oblivious scheme
that does not query the fault map (Baseline). The write-buffer seems to still mask much
of the additional latency from the fault-aware schemes. In general, a controller level (Mem-
CTRL) implementation does have a slightly higher performance degradation than a ideal
one implemented at the memory chip level (MemDIMM). However, in most benchmarks,
the degradation from either scheme is not dramatic. Only in a handful of applications,
vips, gobmk, sjeng, gemsfdtd, and milc, do we see a noticeable reduction of IPC for MemC-
TRL. Overall, the fault-aware MemCTRL and MemDIMM implementations see a 2.3% and
1.1% degradation, respectively, in IPC. However, the improvement in fault-tolerance with a
fault-aware scheme makes it a good choice given a minimal performance overhead.
9.5.4 Comparison of different fault mitigation schemes
As the number of weak cells increases in newly fabricated memories as a result of in-
creasingly smaller technology nodes, fault mitigation strategies will have to scale with the
increased propensity for faults. In Figure 59, we compare fault-oblivious and fault-aware
versions of ECC-1 and 2, FFE, PFE, ECP-3 and 12, and PFE+ECC-1 for weak cell rates
ranging from 0.01% to 1%. The figure shows that PFE approaches the desired system UBER
(10−14 [14]) at a weak cell rate of 0.01% while continuing to outperform other baseline cor-
rection schemes at higher weak cell rates (e.g., 1%). Hence, PFE shows propensity for being
effective at moderate weak cell rates (e.g., 0.01%) while being extremely valuable for high
weak cell rates (e.g., 1%).
For a 0.01% weak cell rate, ECC-1128 only achieves an UBER of 6.8×10−6 while ECC-232
achieves an UBER of 1.3× 10−6. Moreover, the UBER drops dramatically as the number of
errors increases, to 2.5× 10−3 and 1.3× 10−3, respectively at a 1% weak cell incidence rate.
For FFE, the UBER changes linearly with respect to the incidence rate. In other words, the
percent of faults corrected by FFE remains invariant as the weak cell rate increases. As a
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result, while FFE has a worse UBER at lower error rates than traditional correction schemes
such as ECC, it becomes the more effective correction scheme at high error rates.
ECPFO-3 and ECPFA-3 achieve relatively good UBERs of 2.3 × 10−6 and 1.4 × 10−6,
respectively, at a 0.01% weak cell incidence rate. However, like ECC, ECP’s fault tolerance
drops off sharply as weak cell incidence rate increases. With a larger overhead, ECPFO-12
and ECPFA-12 are very effective for low weak cell incidence rates. With this higher overhead,
ECP has a similar overhead to FFE and is slightly less effective at lower weak cell incidence
rates (e.g., 0.01%) for similar reasons.
While for a 0.01% weak cell incidence rate, PFEFO achieves an UBER close to that of
ECPFA-12, the effectiveness of PFEFO increases at higher weak cell incidence rates. Moreover,
the results show that adding ECC-1 to PFEFO improves the UBER by an order of magnitude
versus PFEFO for different ranges of weak cell incidence rates. PFEFA reaches an UBER that
is less than 3×10−12 for a 0.01% weak cell incidence rate and is about five orders of magnitude
more effective than PFEFO+ECC-1. When adding ECC-1 on top of PFEFA, the PFE scheme
reaches the best fault mitigation efficiency (at least one order of magnitude) for 1% weak cell
incidence rate against all fault mitigation schemes shown in the figure. PFE clearly provides
the best fundamental protection against intra-row cross talk and when coupled with ECC-1
can achieve reasonable error rates even with extremely large numbers of weak cells.
9.5.5 Sensitivity to block size
PFE is also effective for a variety of block sizes. Figure 60 shows the impact of varying
the block size for PFE. For the fault-oblivious case, as the size of the block covered by PFE
increases, the ability of bad pattern reduction decreases linearly. However, even for a 512-bit
block with 1% weak cells, PFE reaches an UBER of 4.8× 10−4.
For the fault-aware approach, the UBER of PFE is at most 3 × 10−12 for low weak cell
rates and 512-bit blocks. For a 1% weak cell rate, a 32-bit block size results in an UBER of
1.3× 10−5, but as the block size increases, the effectiveness drops, achieving only an UBER
of 8.2× 10−5 for 512-bit blocks.
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9.6 Conclusion
We discussed how the presence of specific patterns of stored data exacerbates the like-
lihood of crosstalk occurrence in DRAM cells and triggers crosstalk faults. Reducing the
number of bad patterns can decrease the occurrence of crosstalk incurred by process vari-
ation. We studied two orthogonal crosstalk mitigating techniques for DRAM cells. Ex-
perimental results conducted on PARSEC and SPEC benchmarks showed that the effects of
crosstalk can be destructive, especially as the percentage of weak cells increases. The results,
however, showed that the proposed PFE scheme is effective at avoiding the occurrence of
crosstalk faults and, if combined with single error correcting ECC, may eliminate crosstalk
faults completely when fewer than 0.01% of the cells are weak. Furthermore, combining
PFE with ECC provides tolerance to other types of faults, such as transient faults, that are
traditionally tolerated through ECC.
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Figure 57: Comparison of PFE to other “low-overhead” (6.25%) fault-aware approaches.
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Figure 58: Performance impact of run-time determination of weak cells at the memory con-
troller (MemCtrl) or within the memory DIMM (MemDIMM) compared to a fault-oblivious
baseline that does not query the weak cell map.
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Table 18: The overhead of different schemes with latency optimization and power optimiza-
tion.
Scheme
512-bit block size
Latency Optimization Power Optimization
Latency (ns) Power (mW) Area (µm2) Latency (ns) Power (mW) Area (µm2)
Enc. PFEFA 0.66 9.90 32348.38 0.84 7.50 30223.86PFEFO 1.65 20.46 84268.44 2.02 8.25 76139.23
Dec. PFEFA 0.17 2.57 4835.67 0.40 1.40 2905.91PFEFO 0.17 2.57 4835.67 0.40 1.40 2905.91
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Figure 59: UBER for different fault mitigation schemes as weak cell incidence rate varies
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10.0 Counter Advance
10.1 Design
Counter advance leverages the property that encryption of plaintext with a new counter
generates a new random ciphertext. Recall that data that matches the stuck-at value is
SA-R and data opposed to the stuck-at value is SA-W. When writing a ciphertext candidate
in the presence of stuck-at faults, each faulty cell has a 50% probability of being SA-R, and
similar for SA-W. Thus, by incrementing the counter, it is possible to improve fault tolerance
by finding a ciphertext candidate that maximizes SA-Rs.
Consider the example in Figure 61 for a row with two stuck-at faults such that, given the
ciphertext, the first is SA-R and the second is SA-W. Advancing the counter (Counter+1)
resulted in the first fault becoming SA-W and the second becoming SA-R. This is due to the
property that each fault in each ciphertext candidate has a 50% chance to be SA-R, but is
equally likely to be SA-W. Advancing the counter again (Counter+2) was unlucky, resulting
in two SA-Ws. The probability of finding an error free candidate with f faults is 2−f , or 25%
for f=2, which required multiple advancements in the example. Both word-level encryption
and error correction can dramatically reduce the number of advancements to find an error
free candidate. For example with single bit error correction (e.g., ECP-1), the example of
Figure 61 would have been successful without counter advancement. If SECRET is used
with independent sub-counters per block and assuming all blocks were dirty, blocks zero to
two would have been written with Counter and block three would have used Counter+1.
We explore counter advance with block level encryption and error correction in Fig-
ure 62. Figure 62(a) expands on Figure 3 with sub-counters per 128-bit block in the style
of SECRET [52]. Counter advance applied in this context examines the stuck-at bits inde-
pendently between blocks and only advances the counter when SA-W bits appear. Stuck-at
faults can be determined by storing and reading patterns of all ‘1’s and ‘0’s or using a fault
cache [93]. It is straightforward to extend block-level encryption with ECC as the parity bits
(e.g., SECDED (64,72) ECC) would not cross blocks. In this case, counter advance could
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Block0	 Block1	 Block2	 Block3	 Counter	
Block0	 Block1	 Block2	 Block3	 Counter+1	
Word3	 Word3	
Word3	 Word3	
Block0	 Block1	 Block2	 Block3	 Counter+2	 Word3	 Word3	
Block0	 Block1	 Block2	 Block3	 Counter+k	 Word3	 Word3	
Figure 61: Counter advance example. Green indicates a SA-R fault and orange a SA-W
fault. Purple blocks are error free and red blocks contain an error.
protect fewer SA-W errors and allow ECC protection to correct others at the cost of reduced
transient error protection.
ECP, in contrast, uses pointers that are shared by the blocks of a given row. Block-level
counter advance faces the trade off of using a pointer or advancing the counter to mitigate
a fault. Using a pointer will reduce the availability of pointers to tolerate faults in other
blocks. The algorithm for selecting the appropriate write candidate for ECP with counter
advance is shown in Figure 62(b).
Assuming a counter advancement epoch window w where w = 2b and b is the number
of bits for each sub-counter, w serves as a threshold of how many counter values will be
explored to accomplish a particular write successfully. If the encrypted data experiences E
errors (i.e., SA-Ws) but E is less than a threshold T , the write proceeds with the current
c value. Otherwise, if this is the “best” candidate (i.e., fewest SA-Ws) so far it is retained.
If c is still within the epoch w, c is incremented and the next candidate is evaluated. If c
reaches the limit of the epoch without finding a candidate within the error threshold, the
best candidate is written if sufficient ECP pointers are available, otherwise the write fails. In
our evaluation we consider two schemes: the counter minimization (CM) approach sets T to
the number of available ECP pointers, allowing a write to proceed with the minimum counter
value that discovers a possible solution, while the pointer minimization (PM) approach sets
T=1 requiring a fault free solution to write immediately.
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10.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of counter advance we studied a 4GB main memory, with
64-bit words, and 512-bit rows organized in 4KB pages using eleven SPEC CPU 2006 bench-
marks [71]: bzip2, cactus, gamess, gcc, gobmk, gromacs, leslie3d, mcf, namd, pearl, and
zeusmp. Each workload was executed for at least 1 billion write accesses. Three bits were
allocated as a sub-counter for each block, setting w = 8. High cell failure rates ( 10−3, and
10−2) representing different points during the memory lifetime, as shown in Figure 63, were
used as stimuli for counter advance. To model the stuck-at faults, we created fault maps,
including fault bits stuck at ‘0’ or ‘1,’ at these cell failure rates using Bayesian distribution
to mimic the impact of process variation with spatial correlation of faults [21]. As process
variation increases with scaling, the memory will incur cell faults more quickly and better
error correction will be necessary to maintain effective lifetimes. For example, at a coefficient
of variation (CoV) of 0.2, increasing fault tolerance to handle cell failures of 10−2 instead
of 10−4 will extend the lifetime by 1.1×. For CoV of 0.25 and 0.3 effective lifetime can be
extended by 3.8× and 16.4×, respectively, making operation in this failure range critical to
reasonable memory lifetimes as scaling increases.
Figure 64 shows a summary of the uncorrectable bit error rate (UBER), defined as the
number of bit errors that occur per bit written, for both row and block-level encryption with
different strengths of error correction used to protect the data and counter bits. A “word-
level” 64-bit block size was selected to match the word size in modern architectures. With
no error correction, word-level counter advance (word CA) provides two orders of magnitude
improvement in UBER compared to word-level encryption alone, such as SECRET [52],
for as high as a 10−3 cell failure rate. As error correction is employed the improvement is
amplified, providing 3–5 orders of magnitude improvement by introducing one ECP pointer
(ECP1). At a cell failure rate of 10−3, an UBER of ≤10−10 required only ECP4 for word
and row CA. Employing PM reduced the requirement to ECP3. In contrast, SECRET with
ECP6 can only achieve a 10−7 UBER.
At a cell failure rate of 10−2, unsurprisingly, UBER is drastically reduced. For ECP6, the
protection proposed by SECRET [52], counter advance achieves a 10−7 UBER versus 10−4
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for ECP6 alone. Relaxing counter advance to explore eight epochs allowed word CA with
PM to function at a <10−10 UBER with ECP6. This indicates that while a device might
operate using the CM approach initially to minimize counter advancements, it could switch
into PM and expand the searching window for gracefully degraded operation mode when the
cell failure rate became sufficiently high.
Counter advance is sensitive to block size. Small block sizes will increase the flexibility
to eliminate faults. Our block-size sensitivity study indicates counter advance is nearly as
effective for 64-bit blocks as 32-bit blocks. 128-bit blocks have a noticeable degradation
(0.5-1 orders of magnitude UBER), particularly with ECC and ECP, however, the counter
advance improvements are still dramatic.
A logical concern about counter advance is the impact to performance from evaluating
multiple ciphertext candidates and the potential to saturate the encryption counter more
quickly. Figure 65 shows the number of counter increments per write operation. Word-level
encryption naturally reduces the average counter advancements per write (A) to A=0.98
compared to the row-level baseline of A=1, as each write only advances the dirty words’ sub-
counters. This provides sufficient “room” for word-level fault-induced counter advancements
for lower fault rates (e.g., ≤10−4) without exceeding the row-level counter lifetime. At
10−3, for ECP ≥3, A<1. At 10−2 there are significant fault-induced counter advancements,
owing to gracefully degraded operation. However, increasing the number of epochs searched
for larger numbers of ECP pointers, especially ECP6, provides significant improvements in
protection, with only slight increases to A. To achieve an UBER of 10−10 only requires
A=1.2 with ECP6 after a cell failure rate of 10−2.
As this gracefully degraded mode would only occur very late in the memory lifetime, these
counter advancements would only saturate the counter nominally sooner while extending the
usable life dramatically. If the system is reset with a new encryption key or the data is moved
for another reason (e.g., wear-leveling [102]), the counter can also be reset. Moreover, given
that writing is not typically on the performance critical path, our experiments indicate that
these additional encryptions (A=1.2) do not significantly degrade performance.
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10.3 Alternative Implementations
Counter-mode encryption has a downside that it requires the storage of a counter for
each row. Unfortunately, this overhead cannot be eliminated for counter-mode encryption.
However, the storage dedicated to the per-word sub-counters, initially proposed by SE-
CRET [52] to reduce energy and improve endurance, could be retargeted to improve fault
tolerance. This storage would be insufficient to add additional ECC, but could add two
additional ECP pointers. This comparison is shown in Figures 64 and 65 by comparing word
CA with ECP-N to row CA with ECP-N+2. The results indicate that for lower fault rates,
row CA would provide an advantage in fault tolerance at the cost of increased energy and
reduced endurance. As the fault rate increases, word CA in PM mode is more fault tolerant
while maintaining energy and endurance benefits over row CA.
NIST has proposed to use AES XTS as a standard for disk encryption [103]. While there
are feasibility challenges to applying XTS in memory while guaranteeing protection, XTS
would eliminate the need for counter storage in memory. XTS is based on XOR-encrypt-
XOR (XEX) [104]. In disks, XEX/XTS encrypts twice, utilizing one key/encryption based
on the sector and a second for each block within the sector. By extending the second
encryption with an additional parameter supplied by the sub-counter, multiple candidates
can be generated per block to improve fault tolerance. Because the ciphertext candidates
for both XTS and counter-modes of AES have the same random properties, the results we
obtained from XTS encryption are the same as those reported in Figures 64 and 65.
10.4 Related Work
SECRET is the current state of the art in energy reduction and fault tolerance for
encrypted PCM memory. However, SECRET improves on prior proposals such as DEUCE,
or Dual Counter Encryption, which saves energy by distinguishing between dirty and clean
words and encrypting on the dirty words within the epoch. DEUCE does not consider
reliability and SECRET provides significant savings over DEUCE at the cost of additional
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sub-counter bits [52]. A specifically fault-tolerant proposal is to use the increasing counter
value to serve as an indicator of PCM memory cell age and using this information to adopt
increasingly capable ECC to combat memory faults [105]. Counter advance is complementary
to this approach allowing use of lower overhead ECC for a longer duration, or achieving a
particular UBER with a lower overall ECC storage. There has also been recent work to
collaboratively design wearleveling with counter-mode encryption. The counter storage size
is reduced by resetting the counter when the data is moved to a new location from the
wear-leveling resulting in improved overhead and latency [102]. Again counter advance is
complementary as the number of counter advancements to maintain reliability would require
minimal impact to the total counter advancement, which can retain the storage savings of
this wear-leveling approach.
10.5 Conclusion
Counter advance leverages the nature of block cipher encryption to improve reliability
of systems that use in memory encryption for memory with endurance faults that manifest
as stuck-at values. Counter advance in the presence of SA-Ws generates additional write
candidates to maximize SA-Rs just by advancing the counter. Counter advance is compatible
with row or word-level writes and provides multiplicative improvements in UBER compared
to error correction alone. Counter advance can achieve the same protection as strong error
correction (e.g., ECC or ECP5) with far fewer pointers (e.g., ECP1) at moderate error
rates. It can also maintain an UBER of 10−10 with the same error correction as the leading
related work [52] for extremely high fault rates of 10−2. This can lead to lifetimes being
extended by 2-10× or more depending on severity of process variation. We plan to explore
the performance impact, lifetime improvement, and examine other modes of encryption in
detail in our future work.
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Figure 62: Block level counter advance architecture.
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Figure 63: Cell fault rate for different coefficients of variation.
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Figure 64: UBER for various error rates. Counter advance explores one epoch (w=8), except
where noted. Word CA+ECP is reported for CM with an error bar indicating PM.
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11.0 FaME
11.1 FaME Error correction
In Chapter 7.2, we discussed how FLOWER can enable and enhance previously devel-
oped fault-tolerance techniques. Most importantly, however, FLOWER enables new fault-
tolerance techniques which otherwise would not be possible. In this section, we propose a
new technique for correcting stuck-at faults in PCM: Fault Map Enabled Error Correction.
11.2 FaME Design
In FaME, f bits are added to each memory row to provide protection against f faults.
Instead of requiring f pointers, FaME utilizes the FLOWER fault vector, utilizing spare bits
for each reported fault location, in order. A comparison of the auxiliary bit overheads to
protect three faults for ECP, YODA, and FaME are shown in Figure 66. Traditional ECP
requires 31 ECP bits per 512-bit row to protect three faults: 3× 9 pointer bits, three spare
bits, and one flag bit signifying all pointers are used. ECP does not require knowledge of
SA-R or SA-W. YODA requires only 11-bits to correct three faults: one ECP pointer, or
nine pointer bits, one flag bit, and one inversion bit (see Section 7.2.2). YODA also requires
knowledge of SA-‘1’ and SA-‘0’ fault locations. FaME requires only three auxiliary bits
to protect against three faults1. FaME requires knowledge of fault locations, but does not
distinguish between SA-‘1’ or SA-‘0.’
Because FaME only requires f bits per row to correct f faults per row, there are several
substantial advantages over previous fault tolerance implementations, such as ECP. The
primary advantage is that FaME combined with FLOWER can achieve a substantial area
savings over ECP. For example, if a 3.13% area overhead FLOWER fault map is used, six
1FaME works properly if FLOWER reports false positives, but each false positive will consume a spare
bit and limit the fault tolerance capability of FaME.
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1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
SA-W SA-R
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 510 511
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
a) Traditional ECP (31 bits) b) Yoda (11 bits)*
0 1 1
c) FaME (3 bits)*
1 All pointers in use bit
Pointers to faults Data
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Pointers to faults Data
…
SA-W
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
All pointers in use bit1
Flip All Data Bit1
Figure 66: Auxiliary bit example for a 512-bit PCM row for a) traditional ECP, b) Yoda,
and c) FaME. SA-W and SA-R refer to stuck-at-wrong and stuck-at right cells. FaME and
Yoda overheads do not include the fault map.
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fault protection per row requires an additional area overhead of 6512 or 1.2% for a total
overhead of 4.3%. In contrast ECP requires 61-bits per row for a 61512 or a nearly 12%
overhead. Even if the nominal lost fault tolerance from false positives is accounted for, FaME
still provides substantial benefits in area with iso-tolerance, fault tolerance with iso-area, or
both improved fault tolerance and area.
Faults in the auxiliary bits are protected in same way data faults are represented, by
extending the fault vectors with auxiliary bits in the fault map. Thus, FaME can discover
if an auxiliary bit has a stuck-at fault. In this case, the auxiliary bit identified as faulty
will be skipped, such that FaME with f auxiliary bits protects against f faults reported by
FLOWER across both the data and auxiliary bits.
11.3 Accumulated Faults
FaME’s dependence on fault vectors for its encoding and decoding operations allows it
to use extremely small auxiliary bit overheads. This dependence causes complications in
systems where faults accrue over time. Before updating a row’s partial fault vectors, as
discussed in Section 7.1.2.3, data rows whose fault vectors will be affected by adding the
new fault must have their auxiliary bits updated, even if the new fault is not a true fault
(e.g., a false positive).
MinCI with multiple arrays allows some simplifications, not possible with Murmur hashes,
to allow discovery of all the rows which might require updates. For example, consider an 8-
bit address (n=8), with a d=2 (2D) fault map that requires a 25% overhead (k=5). Assume
address A=[a0,a1, ...a7] has a hash function Hj(A)→ [hj0,hj1,...hj4]. Due to the properties
of MinCI, Hj(A) essentially strips n − k bits—in this case arbitrarily bits at positions 1,
4, and 6—to form a vector [a0,a2,a3,a5,a7]. Assuming a vector U that contains all possible
permutations of n − k bits, vector BAj can be created from Hj(A) and U, such that BAj=
[a0,u0,a2, a3,u1,a5,u2,a7]. Rows other than u0 = a1, u1 = a4, and u2 = a6 are the “conflicting
rows” from the hash. Determining these conflicting rows for all d hashes produces the pool
of memory rows that may require updates to their FaME bits. The size of the pool is d2n−k.
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Update Queue
10001010  (266)
Address A 1
Address BA,1,2 1
Address BA,1,6 0
Address BA,2,3 0
Candidate0
Candidate1
Candidate2
Candidate3
00010
Bit Position
Queue Pointer
…
Updated
A=[a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7]
H1=[1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1]
H1(A)=[a0, a2, a3, a5, a7]
BA,1,2=[a0, 0, a2, a3, 1, a5, 0, a7]
BA,1,6=[a0, 1, a2, a3, 1, a5, 0, a7]
H2=[0,1,0,1,1,1,1,0]
H2(A)=[a1, a3, a4, a5, a6]
BA,2,3=[0, a1, 1, a3, a4, a5, a6, 1]
Figure 67: FaME update cache.
However, the number of writes can be substantially reduced after checking the current partial
fault vectors for a potential candidate. Address BAj only requires updates if, for the new
fault position p and for all j, bit p of the partial fault vector addressed at Hj(BAj) is ‘1’ or
Hj(BAj)=Hj(A).
11.3.1 Memory Update Queue
To avoid memory stalls, any rows which satisfy the aforementioned conditions are added
to an update queue shown in Figure 67, while memory accesses continue. The queue stores
the bit position to update in the fault map and a list of update candidates. Each update
candidate entry stores the address and a flag bit to indicate whether the address is updated
(re-written with the corrected auxiliary bits) in memory. If an address in the update queue
is accessed and the auxiliary bits have been updated in memory, the fault vector from the
fault map is updated with the stored bit position. Otherwise, the access proceeds using the
unmodified fault vector. Once all the candidates in the update queue have been written,
the fault vector for row A is updated with the procedure in Section 7.1.2.3 and the queue
is flushed. In the rare case a second fault is discovered, for example in row C, prior to
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Figure 68: (1) Data/FLOWER access, (2) PETAL comparison, and (3) Error correction on
petal detection.
completing the first fault update, the write to row C stalls until the update to row A is
complete.
11.3.2 PETALs: In-Memory FLOWER Correction
Revisiting error detection and correction for FLOWER in the context of protecting the
fault map against transient faults (such as errors during in-memory AND operations), the
FaME update queue can also be used to support a fault tolerance structure for the in-
memory version of FLOWER. We add a FLOWER PETAL (Parity Enabling Tolerance
for Accelerating Logic-in-memory) bit to each memory row (not just memory rows storing
FLOWER) requiring a 1512 or 0.2% overhead, as shown in Figure 68. The PETAL bit stores
the parity of the number of faults for the corresponding FLOWER fault vector to that row.
If there is a fault accessing a partial fault vector, it may appear as a false positive (‘0’ read as
‘1’ where all other hashes are ‘1’) or a false negative (‘1’ read as ‘0’ and all other hashes are
‘1’). The PETAL bit will detect one fewer or one additional reported fault, which triggers
individual access of the partial fault vectors. These vectors can be corrected using their ECC
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Table 19: UBER for in-memory combination protected with PETALs versus memory con-
troller combination protected with ECC-1 for a 4D FLOWER fault map.
10−10 10−8 10−6 10−4
PETAL 2·10−19 4·10−16 4·10−12 4·10−8
ECC-1 6·10−19 6·10−15 6·10−11 6·10−7
at the memory controller. Note that the in-memory AND result of the ECC bits (shown as
‘X’s in red) is unusable [89] and discarded. Note, multiple rows will require updates to the
PETAL bit when a new fault is added to FLOWER. This update follows the same process
used to identify the rows requiring FaME bit updates as described above.
The UBER of using PETALs to protect in-memory partial fault vector combination is
shown in Table 19 and compared with using SECDED ECC at the memory controller across
different initial fault rates. Our goal was for PETALs to match ECC-1 when combining
fault vectors at the memory controller combination. PETALs provide slightly higher er-
ror protection making the in-memory access approximately as safe as ECC at the memory
controller.
11.4 FaME Lifetime Improvement for PCM
To determine the impact of YODA+FLOWER on the lifetime of PCM memory we
conducted experiments on memory traces to a 1MB memory segment (16K 64-byte rows).
Our custom simulator determines the expected lifetimes of each cell in the memory based
on a probabilistically determined failure map. The failure map is computed from the mean
lifetime (108 writes) and coefficient of variance (CoV) according to a normal probability
distribution with spatial correlation of faults [21, 82]. The memory traces averaged over nine
SPEC benchmarks (SUITE), synthetic traces simulating thrashing between two memory
rows (THRASH), and perfectly uniform wear-leveling (LEVEL) were run in the simulator
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for 20 different failure maps2 at CoV=0.2,0.3. During each experiment, once the number of
writes to a cell exceeds its lifetime, dictated in that particular failure map, it is considered
stuck-at its last recorded value. Once two rows in the 1MB memory segment cannot be
corrected, we consider the memory failed at its end of life.
Figure 69 shows the lifetime results for iso-area (12.5%) fault tolerance area overhead
for different correction schemes with and without FLOWER.As expected, because of the
high CoV, the system fails much earlier than the mean cell failure rate of 108 writes. For
the SPEC benchmarks, on average, “No Correction” fails before the 106th write to the 1MB
memory segment for a 0.3 CoV. ECC1 and ECP6 improve this correction substantially, to
close to 108 writes to the memory segment before failure.
Assuming a CoV of 0.2 and dedicating 1.56% area overhead for the fault map(s), YODA-
5 extends the lifetime compared to ECP6 by 4×. With the same encoding overhead, FaME
can provide 51 bit spares and extends the lifetime by 17× and 14× over ECP6 for CoV of
0.2 and 0.3, respectively. Comparing to larger fault maps (6.25%) at the expense of fewer
auxiliary bits, we see an interesting behavior. For SUITE, YODA achieves a longer lifetime
with more pointers and smaller fault maps (1.56%), while FaME achieves a longer lifetime
with larger maps (6.25%) and fewer auxiliary bits. This is because FaME benefits from the
drastically reduced false positives, which more than make up for the 20 fewer spare bits. For
LEVEL at 0.2 CoV, FaME31 with the larger FLOWER fault map improves lifetime versus
no correction by 2,895× and 28× compared to ECP6. This improvement can be treated as
an upper bound of the lifetime improvement for the system. For THRASH, the benefit is,
unsurprisingly, tempered—YODA and FaME improve over ECP6 by only up to 1.8× and
3.4×, respectively at CoV=0.3. However, as many systems aim to implement improved wear
leveling strategies, this THRASH (worst-case) improvement can typically be avoided, and a
behavior between SUITE and possibly close to LEVEL is the more likely scenario. It is also
important to note that the trends bear out that more overhead dedicated to the fault map
has a better impact on maintaining fault rates with higher CoV values. For both YODA and
220 maps were deemed to have sufficient coverage as the difference in results after including more than
10 maps was insignificant.
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Figure 69: Lifetime to 1MB memory for 12.5% area budget (iso-area). FLOWER overheads
shown in “[].”
FaME, the difference between CoV of 0.2 and 0.3 is tempered when more space is dedicated
to the map.
11.5 Conclusion
We present FaME, a new fault tolerance scheme for PCM endurance fault mitigation.
The PETAL bits scheme provides novel protection for in-memory operations to enhance their
reliability in this context. FLOWER combined with FaME provides a 17× improvement in
fault tolerance compared to ECP6 at the same area overhead for SPEC workloads. Compared
to Archshield at 10−4, a fault rate supported by physical studies of crosstalk in 5-year-old
DRAM [17], FLOWER+FaME can provide equal memory protection while reducing the area
overhead by 20% and when scaling to higher (e.g., 10−2) fault rates, this overhead advantage
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exceeds 7×. Further, we extend PCM lifetime using FLOWER+FaME fault tolerance, which
will reach 10−4 to 10−2 faults after continued use.
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12.0 Overall Conclusions
In this dissertation, I provided a variety of potential solutions to issues arising from the
scaling of memory technology. First, I demonstrated new techniques I developed for holistic
sustainability analysis, necessary at shrinking dimensions due to the non-negligible impact
of manufacturing. This including an architecture-level flow (GreenChip) and a lower-level
circuit/CAD tool (GreenASIC). I also developed a technique to utilize these tools while also
considering reliability, with LARS.
Secondly, in order to enable low-overhead extremely effective correction schemes, I cre-
ated several bit-level fault maps. SFaultMap is a low-overhead solution for static faults or
weaknesses in a system. FLOWER greatly improved on this with a structure which can
easily add faults over time, while also having better performance and built-in fault map
reliability through its PETAL bits. Separately, HOTH was developed specifically for harsh
environments, for tracking both permanently failed cells and cells weak to radiation.
Finally, I developed extremely low-overhead encoding techniques for fault avoidance,
several of which were directly enabled by the development of the bit-level fault maps. I
developed PFE, a technique for avoiding bitline crosstalk faults which provides substantial
reliability improvements when the fault locations are known. I also developed FaME, which
can correct n faults with n bits and is directly enabled by bit-level maps. Lastly, counter
advance requires no area overhead, and leverages the inherent randomness of encryption to
enhance the reliability of encrypted Phase Change Memories.
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